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Abstract 
 
The end of Cold-War ushered in an era of global economic integration and 
political openness in terms of emerging democracies; the world celebrated the triumph of 
free market capitalism as the East European ex-communist countries and Third World 
countries of Asia and Africa placed market forces at the center of their policy. There 
seems to have been a breakthrough for the idea of the Manchester School, in terms of 
using economics as a means of international peace. On the other hand, however, the 
world is not at peace. The collapse of the “Soviet Empire” was followed by the 
emergence, or re-emergence, of many ethno-political conflicts, religious militancy, 
terrorism, and severe competition over scarce resources. Domestic terrorism, as a form of 
intrastate violence, has varied widely along with the post-Cold War period of global 
economic integration and political openness, taking almost a U-shape in its fluctuations. 
How are these two phenomena– economic integration and emergence of democracies – 
related to domestic terrorism? The thesis is intended to explore whether post-Cold War 
trends of global economic integration and emergence of democracies are responsible for 
the fluctuations in domestic terrorism. A rational choice theoretic model of violent 
intrastate conflict that is based on three crucial factors- (1) political openness, (2) global 
economic integration, and (3) heterogeneity cost- is used to explain the causal 
relationship. I argue that resort to terrorism is a rational choice when individuals’ cost of 
heterogeneity - deprivation from public goods due to geographical and ideological 
distance -increases; opportunity is provided by democratization and integration to the 
global economy. The testable hypotheses regarding the influence of global economic 
integration, emerging democracies and heterogeneity cost on domestic terrorism derived 
from the theory are empirically tested on a global dataset of 172 countries for the time 
period between 1990 and 2007. I also use a regional dataset on South Asia and a case 
study on India to supplement my findings and situate them in historical context. I 
conclude with the policy implications of my findings and offer suggestions on how this 
research can be extended in the future. 
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
 
 
Terrorism: Victimization of the Innocent  
March 12, 1993 -- India -- 1.25 p.m. Indian Standard Time: 13 bombs planted in 
cars, motor scooters, and briefcases exploded throughout Bombay. One bomb, prompting 
the closure of 29-story Bombay Stock Exchange, tore away a thick concrete wall between 
the building and densely packed vendors outside, flaying victims and blasting cars. 
Bombs went off in expensive hotels, a bank, a university, a hospital and other crowded 
places of India’s financial capital killing 317 persons and wounding another 1250 
(Mickolus and Simmons, 1997, p.338).  
Two years later, thousands of miles away from the crowded city of Bombay, it 
was 9.02 a.m. on April 19, 1995. An explosion from a truck bomb caused the partial 
collapse of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The 
explosives that Timothy McVeigh, a 27 year old man, arrested shortly after the incident 
for speed driving on Interstate 35 and possessing a loaded pistol, and his associates had 
planted in a rented Ryder truck brought down the 9-story building, killing 168 innocent 
people, including 19 children (Levin, 2007, p.4).   
 These two incidents and many such acts of violence across time and space 
perpetrated by disparate peoples on disparate victims might have no physical 
connections, but they are related by a common thread. That common thread is spreading 
terror among larger audiences through the victimization of innocent people who are not 
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directly responsible for the grievances, perceived or real, of the perpetrators of violence. 
Both of the above mentioned events of domestic terrorism in Bombay and Oklahoma 
City generated tremendous publicity, anger and, above all, fear. This kind of fear is 
exactly what those terrorist attacks hope to achieve. Leaders of terrorist organizations 
want the public not only to be frightened, but also angry on the government for its failure 
to protect innocent citizens. They want to manipulate public emotions for their political 
ends, and in many cases they are successful.  
Domestic Terrorism 
 Contemporary scholars have devoted considerable time and energy in 
differentiating transnational and domestic forms of terrorism. For a terrorist incident to be 
transnational, it must involve at least two countries. Enders and Sandler (1999, p.149) 
write, “Whenever a terrorist incident in one country involves victims, or targets, or 
institutions of another country, then the incident is characterized as transnational.” The 
attacks on March 11, 2004 in Madrid and on November 26, 2008 in Indian city of 
Mumbai (Bombay) are well-known examples of transnational terrorism.  Domestic 
terrorism, in contrast, is terrorism that nationals carry out against their own country, 
including their government or their fellow countrymen and women. It does not involve 
foreign victims, targets, or institutions. Sandler (2003, 781) notes, “Domestic terrorism is 
home grown and has consequences for only the host country, its institutions, people, 
property, and policies.”  
In other words, in cases of domestic terrorism the venue, target, and perpetrators 
are all from the same country. Thus, domestic terrorism has direct consequences for only 
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the venue country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies. If a domestic 
commercial flight with only nationals aboard is hijacked to another city in the same 
country for political purposes, then the hijacking is a domestic terrorist act. Most terrorist 
acts, staged in a struggle for independence, are domestic terrorism. A domestic terrorist 
incident is designed to extract political concessions by groups or persons from their 
native government; it has nothing to do with a foreign government. 
The image of terrorism that remains in the minds of many is the collapse of the 
twin towers of the World Trade Center in September of 2001. The enormity and the 
devastation of the incident that killed thousands shocked every American. Many peoples 
of the world who watched on television screens the horror of men and women running for 
their lives from the falling debris of two massive skyscrapers were similarly horrified by 
the ghastly incident. But careful review of data reveals that most transnational terrorist 
attacks kill far fewer people. The modal, or most frequent, type of terrorist attack 
produces no casualties at all (Enders et al., 2011). In that sense, 9/11 was an outlier as far 
as transnational terrorism is concerned. Frieden et al. (2010) assert that averaging 78 
deaths per year (2 deaths per year, excluding the attacks of 9/11); transnational terrorism 
kills as many Americans as do bites by animals other than dogs.  
Although in recent years, suicide terrorism has claimed the spotlight in terrorism 
studies because it is often considered a puzzling form of violence, Young and Findley 
(2011) opine that differentiating between domestic and transnational terrorism is both 
desirable and potentially consequential. From a theoretical perspective, the causal 
mechanisms underlying domestic and transnational terrorism might be quite different, but 
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it is possible that the motivations for domestic and transnational terrorism are in fact 
similar. Regardless, a study of domestic terrorism versus transnational terrorism would 
have a different research design. Structural factors leading to increases in domestic 
terrorism are endogenous to the state that experiences it. Transnational terrorism, 
however, should involve a research design that incorporates factors associated with the 
target country as well as the country of origin of the attackers (Young and Findley, 2011, 
p.8). 
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, both policy makers, especially in the USA, 
and terrorism research have largely focused on transnational terrorism (Cronin, 2002; 
Enders and Sandler, 2002; Chalk, 2007). This has primarily been in reaction to the 
worldwide reach and recognition of al Qaeda, the Global War on Terrorism, and the 
availability of data on transnational terrorist incidents. Without minimizing the 
importance of lives lost in 9/11, domestic terrorism as a distinct phenomenon has been 
largely ignored despite the plethora of terrorist organizations that are principally domestic 
in nature. Abadie (2006) notes that while international terrorist attacks may generate 
more media attention, domestic terrorism is a far more frequent occurrence and accounts 
for the lion’s share of all terrorist activity in countries. During the period 1998–2005, the 
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism dataset recorded 26,445 fatalities, but 
only 6447 resulted from international terrorism, of which more than 3000 were due to the 
9/11 attacks (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008, p. 447). Domestic terrorism represents by far 
the greatest part of all terrorist violence. Transnational terrorism, although given great 
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leverage in scholarly and policy circles, is actually a small subset of the much larger 
phenomenon of terrorism. 
For the period between 1970 and 2007, a total of 66,383 incidents have been 
identified as terrorist incidents in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) database. Out of 
this number, 12,862 are categorized as international/transnational incidents, and 46,413 
are termed as incidents of domestic terrorism; demonstrating domestic terrorist incidents 
as far larger phenomenon than the international variety. As far as casualties are 
concerned, out of the total deaths of 105,147 persons worldwide from terrorism in the 
same period of time (1970 -2007), domestic terrorism has resulted in 91,436 deaths while 
international terrorism has caused 13,711 persons to die (Enders et al., 2011); hence 
domestic terrorism is far more devastating than the international one (see Figure 1).1 
Statement of the Problem 
On November 9, 1989, the shaky East German communist government resigned, 
and the Berlin Wall came tumbling down. The consequent collapse of the communist 
bloc was a triumph of neo-liberalism. In his seminal book “The End of History”, Francis 
Fukuyama (1992) argued that a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of 
liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world over the 
past few years, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and 
most recently communism. More than that, however, liberal democracy and free market 
capitalism may constitute the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the  
                                                 
 
1 Out of 175,481 persons wounded in all the terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2007, 132,492 persons were 
wounded in domestic terrorist attacks, while 42,989 persons were wounded in attacks perpetrated by 
international terrorist groups 
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Figure 1. A Comparison between Domestic and Transnational Terrorism 
 
“final form of human government,” and as such constitutes the “end of history.” Thus, 
global economic integration and the spread of liberal democracy are thought to constitute 
the ultimate route to world prosperity. 
During the final two decades of the twentieth century, development theory and 
practice were dominated by a single, overarching paradigm that placed market forces at 
the center of policy. Financier George Soros (2002, pp. 4–10) aptly termed that prevailing 
paradigm ‘market fundamentalism’. Others refer to it as the ‘Washington Consensus’, 
building on a term coined by John Williamson (1990). Many, however, simply call it 
‘free-market economics’. In addition to governments, the paradigm dominated the circles 
of academia, the media, the international financial institutions (IFIs), the corporate world 
and others involved in elite policy debate, both North and South. As this paradigm 
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radiated out to sweep the globe, so too did global capital; indeed, the Washington 
Consensus policies provided the unregulated, liberalized and privatized space needed for 
capital to become truly global (Board, 2004, p.130). 
World foreign direct investment flows (FDI), which amounted to less than $13 
billion in 1970, quadrupled every 10 years, reaching $54 billion in 1980 and $209 billion 
in 1990. During the last half of the 1990s, however, FDI practically exploded, reaching a 
peak of $1.4 trillion in 2000. The upward surge continued, reaching $ 4.1 trillion in 2007 
(World Investment Report, 2010, p.187). Worldwide trade also increased dramatically 
over the same time period. Trade as a percent of GDP grew from 27 percent in 1970 to 38 
percent by 1980 to 49.6 percent by the year 2000 and culminating at 59.6 percent in 
2008. 
During the same time period in question, there has been an increase in 
democratization across the globe. The percent of countries that are non-democracies as 
calculated by Freedom House starts at 46 percent in 1972. It falls to 35 percent by 1980 
and steadily declines to 25 percent by the year 2000. In 2008, the percent of non-
democratic countries declined to 22 percent (Freedom House, 2012). These trends are 
often used to demonstrate the extent to which the world is democratized and 
economically integrated or globalized (Blomberg and Hess, 2008). 
From the early 1990s, countries all over the world began to open up their 
economies, and international trade and capital flow across borders increased 
exponentially. Countries from the former Communist bloc soon joined free trade 
organizations. The Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the Third World 
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allowed democratization to proceed in many states previously ruled by Marxist 
dictatorships, and led to significant progress in resolving several Third World conflicts 
that had become entrenched during the Cold War. The reduction in East-West tension 
also led to a decrease in inter-state conflict, some of which occurred in part due to the 
superpower ideological rivalry during the Cold War. 
Economists argue that global economic integration is likely to alleviate the 
problem of poverty by stimulating economic growth; hence the rich and poor of the world 
would be better off than they were before. Recent studies claim that trade and financial 
market integration leads to enormous socio-economic benefits in health, social spending, 
education, particularly in the world’s poorest countries (Owen and Wu, 2007; Levin and 
Rothman, 2006; Frankel and Romer, 1999). Therefore, we might expect more social 
harmony and internal peace. Moreover, conventional wisdom suggests that democracy is 
likely to reduce internal political conflict because of the presence of peaceful conflict 
resolution mechanisms in such regimes. This perception of democracy as a panacea to 
internal violence is shared by scholars and policy analysts (Schmid, 1992; Windsor, 
2003). Therefore, post-Cold War democratization should be expected to reduce internal 
violence like domestic terrorism worldwide. 
  On the one hand, there seems to have been a breakthrough for the idea of the 
Manchester School, in terms of using trade as a means of international peace.  In recent 
years several scholars have found empirical support for the thesis that pairs of states with 
a high share of mutual trade are less war-prone (O’Neal and Russett, 1997; O’Neal and 
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Russett, 1999; Moaz and Russett, 1993), although the causal direction between trade and 
conflict is not beyond dispute and scholars disagree over the theoretical explanation too.  
On the other hand, however, it would be unwise to argue that the world is now at 
peace. The collapse of the “Soviet Empire” was followed by the emergence, or re-
emergence, of many serious conflicts in several areas that had been relatively quiescent 
during the Cold War. Some of these new conflicts have been taking place within the 
former Soviet Union, such as the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabakh, and the fighting in Chechnya. But some conflicts also erupted or intensified in 
several countries outside of Russia, and many Third World conflicts in which the 
superpowers were not deeply involved during the Cold War have persisted after it, like 
the secessionist movements in India, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. Ethno-political conflicts 
aside, there have been other threats to international order that are, indeed, beyond the full 
control of major powers, even the United States. The most notable ones include religious 
militancy, terrorism, North-South conflict, and severe competition over scarce resources 
(Yilmaz, 2008). 
Domestic terrorism, as a form of intrastate violence, has varied widely along with 
the post-Cold War period of global economic integration and emergence of democracies. 
Domestic terrorist incidents have varied after the end of Cold-War, taking almost a U-
shape in their fluctuations. Terrorist incidents suddenly spiked in 1992 with the number 
reaching to 3220, the highest since 1970. But the incidents dramatically declined to a 
very low number in 1993, only to rise to the pre Cold-War high the next year. In 1998, 
terrorist incidents declined considerably and stayed at a low level of annual average of 
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655.57 for seven years. But, incidents of terrorism started rising again in 2005 and 
continued their upward move, reaching the pre Cold-War level of occurrence in 2007. 
The trends roughly resemble a U-shape after 1997, declining considerably and then rising 
again since 2005 (Enders et al., 2011)2. 
The same matching trends can be observed as far as deaths from such incidents 
are concerned. But, terrorism has been much more devastating in post Cold-War period, 
causing far greater number of deaths per incident than the previous periods. 
In summary, terrorist incidents have widely varied after the end of Cold-War, 
taking almost a U-shape in their fluctuations. Fatalities from these incidents have varied 
in tune with these incidents, but yearly average of deaths per incident has risen. At the 
same time, as argued earlier, global economic integration and democratization that set in 
after the Cold-War have shown upward trends. Intuitively, domestic terrorism should 
have reduced due to economic openness, the spread of democracy and the end of Cold 
War rivalry. But this has not happened and this dissertation seeks to explain why not.  
Outline of the Dissertation 
How are economic integration and regime change related to domestic terrorism? 
Do they explain fluctuations in domestic terrorism? The dissertation explores whether 
post-Cold War trends of global economic integration and the spread of democracy 
account for the variations in domestic terrorism. I argue that individual/individuals-
deprived from public goods-have resorted to terrorism in post-Cold War period of 
                                                 
 
2 It is important to note the role of the US led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 for a notable 
rise in the count of domestic terrorist incidents. But, even if we exclude the incidents in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the trend still has a U shape. 
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political openness. Trade and investment have provided them economic opportunity. 
When minority discrimination is entrenched in a polity, economic prosperity in general 
may not alleviate grievances. Instead, aggrieved individual/individuals are likely to 
challenge the discriminatory state in an environment of economic and political openness. 
In Chapter Two, I review previous research on terrorism, paying particular 
attention to the existing literature on domestic terrorism and works on other forms of 
terrorism that have implications for domestic terrorism. Crucial to this discussion are the 
theoretical and empirical discrepancies that appear in the extant research and how my 
research addresses those discrepancies, thus contributing to the extant literature on 
terrorism. 
In Chapter Three, I develop a theoretic model of violent intra-state conflict that is 
based on three crucial factors: (1) heterogeneity cost, (2) emergence of democracies, and 
(3) global economic integration. I argue that resorting to terrorism is a rational choice 
when individuals’ cost of heterogeneity - deprivation from public goods due to 
geographical and ideological distance from the government -increases; opportunity is 
provided by political openness and integration to the global economy. From this model, I 
derive testable hypotheses regarding the influence of heterogeneity cost, immature 
democracies and global economic integration on the incidence of domestic terrorism.  
In Chapter Four, I discuss the trends of domestic terrorism with descriptive 
statistic and review the data on domestic terrorism. Next, I discuss the data used to 
empirically test the theoretical propositions presented in Chapter Three and empirically 
test the hypotheses on cross-country dataset on domestic terrorism in 172 countries for 
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the period between 1990 and 2007. I operationalize concepts discussed in the third 
chapter. Then, I present basic descriptive statistics that highlight important characteristics 
of the variables and their sources, and I also introduce the statistical models to be used in 
the empirical analysis. Finally in Chapter Four I present my empirical finding of cross 
country analysis and discuss the results in a substantive way explaining the findings of 
the models. 
In Chapter Five, I empirically test the hypotheses on region-level analysis on 
South Asia and discuss the results explaining the findings of the models. I confine my 
empirical analysis to five countries – India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka – 
of South Asia, not because the preponderance of active terrorist groups there in 
comparison to other regions of the world, but due to the convergence of almost all the 
explanatory factors as per the thesis’ theoretical expectations, namely, heterogeneity and 
minority discrimination, immature democracies, and growing trade and investment. The 
results of my empirical analysis on South Asia on a regional subset of the same dataset 
largely corroborate the findings of cross-country analysis. The factors responsible for any 
empirical discrepancies are then explained. 
Chapter Six presents a study on India: this chapter explains the reason for 
selecting India as a case study and situates the theory in historical perspective. I analyze 
the causes and nature of two sources of terrorism in India prevalent since 1990s. The first 
set comprises of a network of rage-driven Indian Muslim youth and Indian Jihadist outfits 
who, with the support of the Pakistani terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and 
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), seek vengeance for the ‘sufferings’ inflicted upon their 
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community, active throughout India since late 1990s. The second set is formed by radical 
Leftists known as Maoist insurgents who have grown as India’s biggest internal security 
threat in last one decade. The similarities and differences of the two disparate sets of 
terrorist groups are discussed. The case study supplements the generalized findings of the 
large-N study and regional analysis. 
I conclude in Chapter Seven with a summary of what has been learned and offer 
suggestions on how this research can be extended in the future. I devote a section of the 
chapter on the policy implications of the findings of this research. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
The end of the Cold-War ushered in an unprecedented era of global economic 
integration and political openness. The world celebrated the triumph of free market 
capitalism as the East European ex-communist countries and Third World countries of 
Asia and Africa placed market forces at the center of their policies. Many elites 
concluded that economic integration and trade led to international peace. Still, the end of 
Cold War was followed by the emergence, or re-emergence, of many ethno-political 
conflicts, religious militancy, North-South conflict, and severe competition over scarce 
resources. Terrorism, both transnational and domestic, continued to frustrate political 
elites in many countries. How are economic integration and the spread of democracy 
related to domestic terrorism? This dissertation explores whether the post-Cold War 
trends of economic integration and the emergence of democracy are responsible for 
fluctuations in domestic terrorism. In this Chapter, I define domestic terrorism. Then, I 
review extant literature on domestic terrorism. Finally, I note the theoretical and 
empirical discrepancies that appear in the extant research and how my research addresses 
those discrepancies. 
Defining Terrorism 
Terrorism is a difficult term to define as scholars and policy makers disagree over 
motivations, tactics, targets, and consequences. Writing about the concept thirty years 
ago, Jenkins (1980, p.1) states that terrorism has no exact or accepted definition. And in 
the years since, it appears as though scholars, governments, and organizations have still 
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not been able to reach a consensus. As Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (2008, p.1) put 
it, “The search for an adequate definition of terrorism is still on.” 
Hoffman (2006) describes the scholarly search for a unanimously accepted 
definition of terrorism in the following words. 
In the first edition of his magisterial survey, “Political terrorism: A Research 
Guide,” Alex Schmid devotes more than a hundred pages to examining more than 
a hundred different definition of terrorism in a effort to discover a broadly 
acceptable, reasonably comprehensive explication of the word. Four years and a 
second edition later, Schimd was no closer to the goal of his quest, conceding in 
the first sentence of the revised volume that the “search for an adequate definition 
is still on.” Walter Laqueur despaired of defining terrorism in both editions of his 
monumental work on the subject, maintaining that it is neither possible to do so 
nor worthwhile to make the attempt. “Ten years of debates on typologies and 
definitions,” he responded to a survey on definitions conducted by Schmid, “have 
not enhanced our knowledge of the subject to a significant degree.” Laqueur's 
contention is supported by the twenty-two different word categories occurring in 
the 109 different definitions that Schmid identified in survey. At the end of this 
exhaustive exercise, Schmid asks whether the above list contains all the elements 
necessary for a good definition. The answer, “he suggests” is probably ‘no’. 
(Hoffman, 2006, pp.33-34) 
 
Hoffman (2006, pp.40-41) then proceeds to usefully distinguish terrorism from other 
types of violence and identify the characteristics that make terrorism the distinct 
phenomenon of political violence that it is. The author sums up all the characteristics of 
terrorism and proposes to define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of 
fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. Levin 
(2006, p.1) asserts that terrorism refers to tactics and strategies used by 
individual/individuals to further their objectives.  
Throughout history, desperate individuals have resorted to terrorism as a strategy 
for achieving their political objectives. Terrorism has been used not only by the weak and 
marginalized to overthrow unpopular political regimes and provoke social change but 
 
16 
also by the strong, and the powerful, for the purpose of maintaining their advantaged 
position in society. 
Although scholars have tried to differentiate terrorism from guerrilla warfare and 
insurgency with valid arguments (Hoffman, 2006), rebels have often used terrorism as a 
strategy, including assassinations, hostage taking, hit and run attack, bombing at public 
places and so on. In fact, nearly a third of the thirty seven groups on the US State 
Department’s “Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations” list could just be categorized 
as guerrillas (USSD, 2004, p.113).  
Although the tactic of terrorism is difficult to define, it does have several key 
features that distinguish it from other types of violence. First, it is planned and calculated 
(Enders and Sandler, 2002, p.145). Terrorism is not spontaneously executed, but rather 
“premeditated and purposeful” (Crenshaw, 1983, p.2). Terrorists devote much time, 
consideration, and care to the preparation process in order to increase the impact of their 
attacks. Second, terrorism is intrinsically violent (Hoffman, 2006, p.40). Richardson 
(2007, p.4) argues, “If an act does not involve violence or the threat of violence, it is not 
terrorism.” Often, the use of violence is a trait that distinguishes the terrorist group from 
the political party that supports it. Thirdly, Krueger (2007) argues that terrorism is 
perpetrated by sub-state organization and individuals. Although, it does not necessarily 
mean that state-sponsored terrorism does not exist, it is the involvement of non-state 
actors that distinguishes terrorism from conventional war. This proposed feature of 
terrorism appears to be contradicted by the fact states often use terror as a tactic. But a 
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study of state terrorism3 would require a different research design than a study of non-
state terrorism. Fourthly, a defining characteristic is the deliberate targeting of civilians 
(Richardson, 2007, p.6) or non-combatants (Victoroff, 2005, p.4). While admittedly the 
targeting of civilians remains controversial as a defining feature of terrorism and many 
scholars consciously do not include this facet in their definition of terrorism, the 
deliberate targeting of civilians (or non-combatants) separates terrorism from other forms 
of political violence. Williams (2008, p.14) notes, “For terrorist organizations . . . the use 
of indiscriminate violence against civilian targets is not only central to their strategy but 
is also their defining characteristic.” Unlike war, the object of terrorism is to bypass the 
other side’s military (which would otherwise result in certain defeat) and inflict pain on 
the target population so as to induce political change (Frieden et al., 2009).  
Terrorism also is a political act (Hoffman, 2006, p.40; Richardson, 2007, p.5; 
Krueger, 2007, p.14). Terrorism seeks to manipulate political4 standpoints rather than 
conquer an opponent (Crenshaw, 1983, p.2). In the words of Reinares (2005, p.120), 
“Terrorism becomes political when it intends to affect the distribution of power and 
social cohesion within a given state jurisdiction or in a wider, international scenario.” 
Further, terrorists design their attacks to have prolonged psychological effects beyond the 
immediate victims (Bjorgo 2005, p.2). Terrorism is effective when it generates an 
atmosphere of fear. For Reinares (2005, p.120), “an act of violence is to be considered as 
terrorist when its psychological effects within a certain population or social aggregate, in 
                                                 
 
3 State is considered to be the only institution that has the legitimacy to use violence. Moreover, a state’s 
action of terror can well be perceived as repression or human rights violations. 
4 Often social objectives might also lead to terrorist actions (Enders et al., 2011). 
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terms of widespread emotional reactions such as fear and anxiety, are likely to condition 
attitudes and behavior in a determined direction.” Finally, terrorists communicate a 
message to an audience (Victoroff, 2005, p.4). In many cases, the target of the attack does 
not have much value to the perpetrators. Instead, terrorists intend their attacks to convey 
statements to governments, citizens, or rival groups. Terrorists may carry out an attack in 
order to influence a primary audience, such as a government, so that it adopts (or stops) a 
certain course of action or effects a policy change, but, at the same time, the attack may 
send a signal to a secondary audience, such as a funder. The same attack may convey a 
message of its resolve to a sympathetic populace. 
More simply put:  
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or 
subnational groups against noncombatants in order to obtain a political or social 
objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the 
immediate victims. (Enders et al., 2011, p.3) 
 
To be sure, it can be difficult to differentiate domestic terrorism from other forms of 
violence, such as civil war, insurgency, and organized crime, but some defining traits 
stand out. Domestic terrorism can resemble civil war when it takes the form of a 
protracted campaign. Even when this is the case, however, domestic terrorism is a tactic 
employed as part of a larger violent movement. Terrorism can take place within the 
context of civil war or war more generally, but the two types of violence are not identical, 
although considerable overlap exists. As pointed out in Chapter One domestic terrorism 
is terrorism that nationals carry out against their own country, including their government 
or their fellow countrymen and women. It does not involve foreign victims, targets, or 
institutions.  
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Extant Literature 
Qualitative case studies have dominated the literature on terrorism for decades. 
Historical analysis of country specific studies on terrorism may fail to generate 
cumulative knowledge on the subject of terrorism because they are, in most cases, 
selected to represent a specific viewpoint, and hence may not lead to broad 
generalization. But case studies contribute to a great extent in understanding the 
intricacies of this particular phenomenon of intrastate violence and shed light on some 
very important aspects.  
Assassins, a branch of the Ismaili sub-sect of Shi’a Islam in twelfth century Iran 
and Syria, were one of the first groups to make planned and systematic use of murder as a 
political weapon in challenging the traditional Sunni rulers of the Muslim world. Lewis 
(1968), in his historical accounts of the Assassins, evaluates two contending theories 
about the logic of Assassins’ violence: a struggle between the Persians who the Assassins 
represented and the Sunni Arabs (racial theory), and an urban egalitarian-rural feudalistic 
power struggle (Assassins being basically rural people). Lewis’ study did not explain 
why the Assassins had chosen violence instead other peaceful methods. Messianic view 
and post-mortem luxurious life as promised by certain religion for martyrdom may be the 
cause, but there are plenty of examples of peaceful political protests among the Muslims.  
The thugs, who operated in India from as early as the thirteenth century until they 
were suppressed by the British in the nineteenth century, were another terror group 
(Woerkens, 2002). The ‘Thugs’ or ‘deceivers’, an Indian network of secret fraternities 
engaged in murdering and robbing travelers, were devotees of the Hindu Goddess Kali. 
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As religious cults or sects, these murderous groups of mercenaries were often used by 
Indian rulers to fight against their rivals, thus making them shareholders in power 
structures of numerous Indian Kingdoms. Woerkens identifies the political-economy of 
these criminal groups; the change in the land distribution pattern by the Islamic rulers, 
followed largely by the British colonial administration, and the destruction of native 
kingdoms by the British left a large section of people, many of them were the soldiers 
under the native kings, without employment. These disgruntled people formed mercenary 
gangs and obstructed the free market exchange that the British introduced in colonial 
India; selected interpretation of Hindu sacred texts gave an extent of social legitimacy 
and social protection. Moreover, Thugs’ emergence coincides with the Islamic invasion 
in 13th century. Therefore, these xenophobic gangs were resisting intrusion to Hindu 
culture and naturally had a sympathetic populace as their support base.  
  Crenshaw (1981) attempts to generalize certain conditions by comparing different 
cases of terrorism and distinguishes a common pattern of causation from the historically 
unique. Crenshaw posits that a significant difference exists between preconditions as 
enabling or permissive factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run, and 
precipitants, specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism. 
Modernization is a significant permissive cause of terrorism because increased 
complexity on all levels of society and economy creates opportunities and vulnerabilities. 
Urbanization, another permissive factor, increases the number and accessibility of targets 
and methods and creates recruiting ground among the politicized inhabitants. Social 
facilitation, an important permissive factor, refers to social habits and historical traditions 
 
21 
that sanction the use of violence against the government, making it morally and 
politically justifiable. A government’s inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism is 
the most salient political factor in the category. The first precipitant of terrorism is the 
existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, 
such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority. The lack of opportunity 
for political participation might create motivations for terrorism. Context is especially 
significant as a direct cause of terrorism when it affects elites, not the mass population. A 
government’s use of unexpected and unusual repressive force in response to protest might 
fuel fire to the unrest, thus prompting terrorist retaliation. 
Crenshaw’s (1981) broad generalizations of the causal mechanism in the study of 
terrorism would be relevant if some of the country based case studies are reviewed. 
Pomper (1995), evaluating Russian terrorism in the 19th century, draws some conclusions 
from the half-century long experience of terrorism in Russia. Firstly, terrorism was not 
the first option of the revolutionaries; it all started with a benign students’ movement 
demanding reform. Frustration with failure in extracting any political concession, state 
repression, and rejection by a large section of people, especially by the peasants, 
gradually pushed them down the path of extreme violence. Secondly, the Russian 
revolutionary movement represents a ‘maturing’ process in tactics as well as ideas, going 
through several cycles. The revolutionaries adopted such strategies and tactics that could 
attract more recruits to their ranks. Thirdly, Tsarist repression gradually intensified and 
provided justification for the revolutionaries to use more violence. Finally, the failure of 
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the masses to respond to their propaganda and agitation propelled the revolutionaries to 
choose the extreme methods of terrorism.  
A case study on Shining Path (Palmer, 1995), the Maoist revolutionary terrorist 
organization in Peru, explains the circumstances of its founding and its distinctive thirty-
year trajectory of rebellion against the state. For its part, Shining Path’s terrorist acts are 
both selective and numerous, with a clear pattern of increasing frequency and growing 
geographical dispersion over time. What started as a Marxist study group in Huamanga 
University under a firebrand professor in the 1960s in Native American Indian inhabited 
Ayacucho region gradually grew into a dreaded nationwide terrorist movement in 1980s 
and 1990s. Shining Path’s transition to a terrorist organization with the aim of violently 
overthrowing the existing regime with a Marxist system coincided, paradoxically but 
significantly, with the democratization of Peruvian political system after a twelve-year 
period of reformist, not repressive, military rule. A charismatic leader in Guzman, who 
would exploit the legitimate grievances of the minority Ayacucho people, and his 
organizational structure, made Shining Path a formidable force. Guzman’s capture in 
1992 dramatically reduced Shining Path terrorism in Peru, but it did not disappear. 
Western Europe witnessed two major terrorist movements pertaining to identity 
and territorial claims – Irish movement in Northern Ireland and Euzkadi ta Askatasuna 
(Basque Homeland and Security, or ETA) in Basque country Spain – that have resulted in 
violence associated with center-periphery conflicts. Shabad and Ramo (1995) traces the 
causes, consequences and tactics of ETA terrorism trying to answer the question why 
ETA’s violence continued even after the demise of Franco’s authoritarian regime and in 
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an environment of democratization post-1975.  First, the culture of violence that had been 
legitimized in Basque country did not die with Franco. The post-civil war generation of 
Basque grew up in a climate of physical and symbolic violence and repression that was 
transmitted to the following generation. Secondly, as democratic process set in, ETA 
engaged in competitive outbidding with other nationalist groups thus increasing their 
violent campaign. The result of post-Franco ETA violence had another major effect in 
that the Basque nationalists were able to extract greater concession from the Spanish 
state. Significantly, the moderate nationalists and ETA appeared to have a symbiotic 
relationship, thus blowing hot and cold on the Spanish state to extract a better deal.  
Like the Spanish case, a culture of violence has been institutionalized over the last 
three hundred years in Northern Ireland (Townshend, 1995). The contentious history of 
the six-county area of Northern Ireland has produced a protracted blurring of the 
conventional boundary between politics and violence, or peace and war; political 
violence has been a recurrent element of Irish public life. Provisional Sinn Finn’s open 
attempt to exploit this categorical ambiguity ‘with a ballot paper in one hand and gun in 
the other’ is only the most recent version of a strategy that has repeatedly emerged in the 
past. On the anti-republican side, the continuity of the roots of the Ulster Defense 
Association and other loyalist organizations is more tenuous. Townshend (1995) argues 
that political violence persists in Northern Ireland because it is effective; its efficacy is 
the primary condition for its adoption, legitimation and continuation. The illegitimacy of 
the contested state plainly contributes to the legitimacy of violent opposition. Although 
people of Northern Ireland in general may disapprove naked force as a legitimate form of 
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authority, a significant section recognizes the political validity of organizations like IRA 
that claims to be at war against the established state.  
The culture of violence as experienced in Basque region and Northern Ireland has 
been argued to have substantial explanatory power in other cases of terrorism. Nowhere 
is the history and culture of violence more applied than Iran. Green (1995) in his case 
study of post-1926 terrorism of Iran analyzes the different sorts of terrorist experiences 
during both the Pahlavi and Khomeini period trying to answer the question why people as 
well as state chose mainly violent means of political expression, and other peaceful 
means were followed to a far lesser extent. The roots of terrorism in modern Iran can be 
traced back to Reja’s Shah’s politics of westernization that was largely followed by his 
son. As a fierce nationalist, Reja Shah initiated an assault on Islamic clergy. There was 
severe opposition to the Shah’s reforms, but the brutality employed to enforce Reja 
Shah’s will engendered equal brutality from the suppressed people and promoted 
widespread animosity toward the emerging Iranian state. Throughout the 1960s and 
1970s Iranian politics became more violent in nature than before. Even peaceful 
demonstrations and marches evoked violent and brutal responses from the government. 
Thus violence was routinized as an integral part of Iranian politics. Interestingly, violence 
was routinely used even after 1979 revolution which was largely peaceful. Iran’s 
involvement in hostage taking in Beirut, public support for the Palestinian intifada in 
1989, death-sentence to Salman Rushdie, and a host of terrorist activities elsewhere are 
all deep-rooted, according to Green, in a political history which has institutionalized 
violence. Terror has been an intrinsic component of Iranian political expression.   
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Although historical studies may not be designed to do, such studies fail to answer 
general questions: why do some groups and not others resort to criminal violence to 
challenge the establishment? What are the major drivers of terrorism? In other words, 
historical case studies do not identify any causal mechanisms that are applicable across 
cases and, thus, fail to contribute to the scientific study of terrorism.  
Since the events of September 11, 2001 many conflict scholars have shifted their 
attention to understanding the causes and consequences of political terrorism. The 
amount of research on terrorism being published in political science journals has doubled 
several times over what it was pre-9/11 (Young and Findley, 2011). The proliferation of 
quantitative studies post-9/11 has hardly succeeded in achieving cumulative of 
knowledge because of two problems – universally accepted definition and profusion of 
typologies of terrorism. Although scholars have agreed on certain features of terrorism 
like involvement of non-state actors, social or political goal, presence of a larger audience 
other than the immediate target, spreading terror and so on; some issues are still 
unresolved about what constitutes a terrorist attack. Some argue that the target of the 
violence has to be a civilian or a noncombatant, while others relax this restriction (Ross, 
2006). There is a similar problem. If scholars agree on a definition of terrorism that 
specifies that civilians are the only ones that qualify as terrorist victims, military targets 
during peace time might also reasonably qualify in the category of terrorism. The suicide 
bombing of the United States Navy destroyer, the USS Cole, in Yemen in 2000 is a good 
example. The attack was perpetrated against the military, yet the USS Cole was not 
involved in any specific combat operation, conflict, or war. The ship was refueling in the 
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port of Aden (Lippold, 2012). Definitional disagreements cause different datasets to vary 
in coding terrorist incidents, and this anomaly in terrorism datasets impedes accumulation 
of scientific knowledge on the subject of terrorism based on quantitative research. 
Terrorism can be categorized in several varieties. It is useful to think about 
“terrorisms” rather than “terrorism” (Miller, 2007). Scholars identify many different 
typologies and bases for classifying terrorism; hence there is no agreement among 
scholars on typologies which impedes the development of systematic knowledge on the 
subject. Johnson (1978, p.276) noted that “there are almost as many typologies of 
terrorism as there as analysts.” Schmid and Jongman (1988) identified at least 50 
typologies and proposed at least 10 common bases for classification, contending that 
most typologies of terrorism are “of little utility since [they] cannot explain or predict 
terrorist behavior in any way” (p.43). Although in recent years, suicide terrorism has 
claimed the spotlight in terrorism studies, scholars tend to differentiate between domestic 
and transnational terrorism because the causal mechanisms underlying two types of 
terrorism might be quite different. Factors leading to increases in domestic terrorism are 
endogenous to the state experiencing it. Transnational terrorism, however, involves 
factors associated with the target country as well as the country of origin of the attackers.  
Given the problems of definition and typology, one basic flaw in terrorism 
research is that scholars do not typically distinguish between domestic and transnational 
terrorism, or they tend to only examine transnational terrorism (Young & Findley, 2011, 
p.7). This exclusive focus on transnational terrorism on the part of quantitative scholars is 
primarily due to the availability of event data.  
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The first worldwide dataset that includes domestic and transnational terrorist 
incidents for an extended time period is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 
maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START). Currently, START’s GTD data cover 1970–2007; however, 
domestic terrorist incidents are not distinguished per se from transnational ones. The first 
attempt to systematically differentiate domestic and international terrorism was made by 
Enders et al. in 2011. This has facilitated quantitative research since the creation of this 
publicly available database. 
This dissertation explores whether post-Cold War economic integration and 
political openness are related to domestic terrorism with the theoretical framework that 
terrorism is driven by group grievances of being deprived from public good provisions 
due to their ideological and geographical distance from the political power center. 
Political and economic openness provide them opportunities to mobilize and challenge 
the state. As I am mainly interested in exploring political and economic drivers of 
domestic terrorism, I review quantitative researches on terrorism that focus on such 
factors. 
Political Factors 
Regime Type: One political factor that has received particular attention in explaining 
terrorism is the regime type of states that are targets of terrorism in general. What is the 
relationship between democracy and terrorism? The Bush Doctrine, former president 
George W. Bush’s policy of democracy promotion abroad (and preventive war), placed 
regime’s effect on terrorism at the forefront of American foreign policy. It claimed: 
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“freedom and democracy are critical to defeating terror… Free nations that respect 
human rights will help overcome hatred, resentment, and the ideologies of murder” 
(Windsor, 2003). Though President Bush assumes a negative relationship, in fact no 
consensus exists on how democracy affects political violence. The literature presents two 
opposing views. Some researchers argue that democracies are less likely to experience 
domestic terrorist incidents (Schmid, 1992; Rummel, 1995), while others contend that 
democracies provide a fertile ground for domestic terrorism and hence are more likely to 
be targeted (Eubank and Weinberg, 1994; Pape, 2003). 
Schmid (1992) argues that domestic terrorism is less likely to take root in a 
democracy because of the system’s strengths. Firstly, the opportunity to bring a new 
government through elections reduces the need of using violence to effect social change. 
Secondly, grievances can be ventilated through demonstration and debate in free media. 
Lastly, independent and impartial court system settles disputes and protects minorities. 
These conflict reducing mechanisms are great strengths of democracy if they work 
properly. Schmid contends cautiously that the struggle between terrorism and democracy 
is one for legitimacy, and maintaining the latter is strategically more important for 
democratic governments than winning shortterm victories through tactical ‘quick 
fixes’; hence any manipulation of the democratic process might create grievances. When 
he argues about democracy as an appropriate regime to prevent domestic terrorism, 
Schmid emphasizes the perfect democracies numbering 28 during the 1980s. 
Windsor (2003) argues that democratic institutions and procedures, by enabling 
the peaceful reconciliation of grievances and providing channels for participation in 
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policymaking, can help to address those underlying conditions that have fueled the rise of 
Islamist extremism. The source of much of the current wave of terrorist activity - the 
Middle East - is not overwhelmingly undemocratic by coincidence; most regimes in the 
region in fact lack the legitimacy and capacity to respond to the social and economic 
challenges that face them. Throughout the Middle East, secular opposition parties lack 
dynamism and a broad base of political support. Civil society is weak as a result of the 
severe legal restrictions and coercive methods that the region’s regimes use to stifle 
political expression. Independent media are largely nonexistent; most newspapers and 
articles are censored, and those that exist are seen as serving the interests of the regime or 
particular political parties. In such societies, severe repression drives all politics 
underground, placing the moderate opposition at a disadvantage and encouraging 
political extremism. Windsor’s article is a justification of post-9/11 US drive to spread 
democracy in the Middle East; hence the generalization about the ameliorative effect of 
democracy is not based on any systematic survey of domestic terrorism worldwide.  
Eubank and Weinberg (1994), on the other hand, argue that political and civil 
liberties are positively correlated with terrorism because of the permissiveness of 
democratic systems. The freedoms of movement and association enjoyed within 
democracies provide opportunities for terrorist groups to take root in societies and 
perform actions against either their own governments or foreign governments (Eubank 
and Weinberg, 1994). This view is supported by Robert Pape (2003) in his analysis of 
suicide terrorism which includes both domestic and transnational terrorism. Pape presents 
the universe of suicide terrorist attacks world-wide from 1980 to 2001 to argue that 
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suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic, one specifically designed to coerce modern 
liberal democracies to make significant territorial concessions. From Lebanon to Israel to 
Sri Lanka to Kashmir to Chechnya, every suicide terrorist campaign from 1980 to 2001 
has been targeted against a state that had a democratic form of government. Pape’s list of 
countries suffering suicide attacks from domestic terrorist groups shows that only Israel 
can be considered an institutionalized democracy; all other countries might be well 
considered immature or unconsolidated democracies (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). 
Therefore, it depends how one defines democracy, and it is clear that Sri Lanka does not 
guarantee all its citizens civil rights and liberties as United States or Great Britain do. 
Most quantitative studies of the terrorism-democracy relationship have focused on 
transnational terrorism incidents (Eubank and Weinberg, 2001; Li, 2005; Piazza, 2008), 
while there is paucity of such studies on the subject focusing on domestic terrorism. One 
such study is done by Abadie (2006) who explores the intensity of country-level terrorist 
risk to study linkages between terrorism and economic and political conditions in 186 
countries and against these countries’ interests abroad for 2003-2004. The results show 
that lack of political rights increases the risk of terrorism. But Political Right Index 
(Freedom House) squared has a statistically significant negative coefficient; terrorism 
reduces with higher level of democracy.5 It would be interesting to use data for a longer 
period of time and a different direct measure of regime type to see if the relationship 
holds.  
                                                 
 
5 The author runs the same model with the counts of domestic terrorism from RAND database as the 
dependent variable and gets the same results. The study is on a horizontal data for the year 2003-2004. 
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A regional level study on Latin America shows a similar pattern.  Feldmann and 
Perala (2004) explore why terrorism continued in Latin America even after the end of 
Cold War rivalry which was widely believed to be the driving force of domestic terrorism 
in that region. An analysis of Latin American countries for the period 1980-95 shows that 
terrorism is likely to occur in weakly institutionalized regimes, characterized by some 
measure of political and civil liberties but concomitantly by a deficient rule of law and 
wide-spread human rights violations. This finding supports the theoretical expectation 
that terror is more likely to be adopted as an opposition strategy in political settings 
where resource mobilization is possible but where peaceful protest generally renders no 
fruitful results. This type of violence has been less prevalent under right-wing 
dictatorships, institutional dictatorships, and left-wing popular dictatorships. Conversely, 
domestic terrorism has been more prevalent in Latin American countries characterized by 
some degree of political and civil liberties.  The results also indicate that terrorism tends 
to surface cyclically and to be more prevalent in countries that have long-established 
organizations with a history of engaging in terrorist activities. Just as significant, no 
conclusive evidence is found to link domestic terrorism to either economic performance 
or structural economic inequality.  
A study on the home country of the transnational terrorists6 between 1968 and 
1998 finds that anocracies and democracies are more likely to harbor terrorist 
organizations targeting other countries; autocracies are less likely to produce terrorist 
organizations than other forms of government (Lai, 2007). Lai (2007) argues that 
                                                 
 
6 Findings from home country characteristics of transnational terrorism research may pertain to domestic 
terrorism albeit in a more limited way. 
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autocracies are able to inhibit the formation and mobilization of terrorist organizations 
through the use of highly coercive state institutions like the party, military, or secret 
police. On the other hand, Burgoon (2006) finds that democracy reduces transitional 
terrorist incidents originating from a country.  
Given that most transnational terrorist groups attack Western democracies, Savun 
and Phillips (2009) investigate what it is about democracies that make them particularly 
vulnerable to terrorism from abroad. The authors argue if democracies are prone to 
transnational terrorism by design, then democracies should be vulnerable to domestic 
terrorism as well and devote the first section of their article in exploring the relationship 
between democracy and domestic terrorism between 1998 and 2004. The dependent 
variable is the number of domestic terrorism incidents in a country, and the main 
theoretical variables of interest are democracy, political participation and press freedom. 
The results show that democracy has no statistical relationship with terrorism. Similarly, 
neither participation nor press freedom is a statistically significant predictor of domestic 
terrorism. In sum, the findings suggest that having a democratic regime does not 
necessarily increase or decrease domestic terrorism. 
Defining democratic rule of law as the coexistence of effective and impartial 
judicial systems and citizens’ recognition of the law as legitimate, Choi (2010) presents a 
causal explanation in which a high-quality rule of law is considered to dampen ordinary 
citizens’ opportunity and willingness to engage in political violence, protecting 
democracies from becoming victims of terrorism. Ordinary citizens have incentives to 
use political violence against other citizens, political figures, institutions, or the 
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government under three conditions: (1) when they hold grievances, (2) when they find no 
peaceful means of resolving these grievances, exacerbating feelings of hopelessness, and 
desperation, and (3) when they view terrorist action as a legitimate and viable last resort 
to vent their anger and frustration. The lynchpin of this line of reasoning is that as long as 
ordinary citizens have access to a peaceful mechanism for conflict resolution, they are 
less likely to contemplate terrorist violence as a practical option to settle disputes. 
Therefore, since liberal democracies promote a high-quality rule of law system, which 
serves as an effective conflict resolution mechanism, they are likely to experience fewer 
activities of domestic terrorism. Likewise, individuals resort to transnational terrorism 
because their undemocratic systems give foreign occupants impunity; when local people 
have grievances against Western foreigners, they have little chance of resolving them 
through the legal authority due to an omnipotent presence of foreign power or an unequal 
international treaty in which foreigners’ crimes are immune from the domestic 
jurisdiction. 
The findings (Choi, 2010) show that, controlling for a number of economic 
variables, as the quality of the rule of law improves, the likelihood of domestic and 
international terrorist events decreases. In other words, with the presence of democratic 
rule of law systems, ordinary citizens are more likely to settle grievances peacefully. The 
main problem with this study is that the author uses a combined domestic and 
international terrorist events data to test the hypothesis basically due to lack of 
differentiated data. In case of transnational terrorism, the number of incidents in the 
target country is the dependent variable; hence the author is correlating, in many cases, 
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the rule of law practices in the target country with terrorism which originated in another 
country, but the theory posits that the rule of law as practiced in the home country of the 
terrorist would cause his action. 
Most studies on the political drivers of terrorism explore the relationship between 
terrorist incidents and regime types. But, Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) explore why some 
terrorist organizations are more lethal than others. They use the RAND data on terrorism 
(domestic and transnational combined) in exploring the characteristics of the host country 
where the terrorist organizations are based. The lethality of a terrorist organization is 
measured by number of deaths the organization is responsible for per year. The authors 
find that regime type of the host country has no relation with the lethality of violence 
perpetrated by an organization. Democracy plays no role, positive or negative, in 
determining how lethal a terrorist organization is.  
State Fragility: Another political factor that is often associated with intrastate violence is 
state weakness. Fearon and Laitin (2003), for example, argue that states that are 
financially, bureaucratically or politically weak make an attractive target for rebellion. 
The key reasons lie with the inability of the state to control remote areas and have 
effective counterinsurgency strategies. It has become a standard argument that a source of 
state weakness originates in the incoherent political organization of states (Bodea, 2012). 
Instability creates volatility, disorganization and short horizons which can be perceived as 
opportunities for rebel leaders (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Englebert and Ron, 2004).  
A study by Lai (2007) examines the factors that lead a country to become a 
“swamp”—a state that produces international terrorism. The theoretical argument is 
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based on the belief that political violence is likely when state conditions either allow 
terrorists to easily evade government forces or recruit from the population. The author 
applies this approach to identify state attributes that explain the number of terrorist 
incidents originating from groups within that state and tests a hypothesis about the cost of 
operating within a state by examining the number of international terrorist events 
originating from a state. State weakness can be causally related to the emergence of 
domestic terrorism and insurgency in a country; hence this study can also contribute in 
understanding the dynamic of domestic terrorist organizations and insurgency. Lai finds 
that a state engaged in civil war and international war is more likely to host transnational 
terrorists. Governments involved in a civil war are not likely to have the resources 
available to effectively control their territory, allowing groups to organize without fear of 
government reprisals. War requires diversion of resources from internal security to 
external one, thus lowering the cost of terrorist organizations to mobilize inside the state. 
Economic discrimination of the minority and presence of terrorism in the neighboring 
states increase the chance of terrorist groups mobilizing in a country. Lastly, the number 
of telephones per 1000 people in a state is negatively related to the presence of 
transnational terrorist groups in that state. Lai argues that existence of a large 
telecommunication network indicates government’s capacity or the ability to effectively 
develop a state’s infrastructure. States’ greater capacity to monitor and patrol their own 
borders increases the costs for terrorists to operate. Thus, the author finds strong support 
for the state strength approach, suggesting that one way to address the threat of 
international terrorism is to strengthen a government’s ability to control its own territory. 
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Economic Factors 
The limited studies on the political drivers of domestic terrorism are highly 
inconclusive of the relationship between terrorism and regime type. Similarly, studies on 
the economic determinants of terrorism inconclusively pull in different directions. The 
widespread view that poverty creates terrorism has dominated much of this debate that 
was generated after 9/11 attacks (Kahn and Weiner, 2002). This is not surprising because 
the notion that poverty generates terrorism is consistent with the results of most of the 
literature on the economics of conflicts. Alesina et al. (1996) suggest that poor economic 
conditions increase the probability of political coups; Collier and Hoeffer (2004) show 
that economic variables are more powerful predictors of civil wars than political 
variables. Because terrorism is a manifestation of political conflict, these results seem to 
indicate that poverty and adverse economic conditions may play an important role in 
explaining terrorism (Abadie, 2006, p.50). 
Common sense might suggest that individuals who have “nothing to lose” (or 
comparatively less to lose) would be more likely to engage in self-destructive activities. 
In other words, people with fewer opportunities in the legal or secular world are expected 
to be more likely to commit crimes, commit suicide, or join religious sects.  Since 
terrorism is often explained through a similar rationale, the intuitive expectation is for 
terrorist organizations to be populated with those individuals who have the lowest market 
opportunities (Berrebi, 2007). 
This conventional wisdom has been adopted by public officials from President 
George W. Bush to many other government representatives and political figures, and it 
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appears to form the basis for some of their policies. President George W. Bush, in a 
speech on the closing day of a five-day U.N. conference on poverty in Monterey, Mexico 
on March 22, 2002 declared:  
“We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror. . . . We will 
challenge the poverty and hopelessness and lack of education and failed 
governments that too often allow conditions that terrorists can seize and try to 
turn to their advantage.” (Cited in Berrebi, 2007)  
 
Former United States Vice President Al Gore told the Council on Foreign Relations in 
New York on February 12, 2002  
“For there is another Axis of Evil in the world: poverty and ignorance; disease 
and environmental disorder; corruption and political oppression. We may well put 
down terror in its present manifestations. But if we do not attend to the larger 
fundamentals as well, then the ground is fertile and has been seeded for the next 
generation of those born to hate us. . . .” (Gore, 2002) 
 
Recent empirical studies, however, have challenged the view that poverty creates 
terrorism. Russell and Miller (1983) assembled demographic information on more than 
350 individuals engaged in terrorist activities in Latin America, Europe, Asia and the 
Middle East based on newspaper reports. Their sample consisted of individuals from 18 
revolutionary groups known to engage in urban terrorism, including the Red Army in 
Japan, Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, Red Brigades in Italy and People's 
Liberation Army in Turkey. They found that more than two-thirds of arrested terrorists 
came from the middle or upper class families in their respective nations or areas. They 
also report that the vast majority of those individuals involved in terrorist activities as 
cadres or leaders are well educated. Approximately two-thirds of those identified 
terrorists are persons with some university training, university graduates or postgraduate 
students.  
 
38 
A study by Krueger and Maleckova (2003) explores whether higher income and 
greater education would reduce participation in terrorism by evaluating public opinion 
data from the West Bank and Gaza Strip on Palestinians’ attitudes toward violence and 
terrorism; a statistical analysis of the determinants of participation in Hezbollah in 
Lebanon; biographical evidence on Palestinian suicide bombers and the backgrounds of 
27 Israeli Jews who were involved in terrorist activities in the early 1980s; and finally, a 
cross-country data set. The evidence suggests little direct connection between poverty or 
education and participation in terrorism. Indeed, the available evidence indicates that, 
compared with the relevant population, members of Hezbollah's militant wing or 
Palestinian suicide bombers are at least as likely to come from economically advantaged 
families and have a relatively high level of education as to come from the ranks of the 
economically disadvantaged and uneducated. On the other hand, members of the Israeli 
Jewish Underground who terrorized Palestinian civilians in the late 1970s and early 
1980s were overwhelmingly well-educated and were engaged in highly regarded 
occupations. In the cross-country study, the authors use a country-level data set on the 
origins of perpetrators of terrorist events drawn from the U.S. State Department's annual 
list of significant international terrorist incidents. Using GDP per capita of the country of 
origin of the terrorists as the main explanatory variable, the authors find no statistical 
relationship between poverty and terrorism when they control for civil liberty, illiteracy 
and the religion of the terrorists. Interestingly, civil liberty as a control variable has a 
statistically significant relationship with terrorism; low level of civil liberty (Freedom 
House Index) correlates with increases in terrorist activities in a country. But neither 
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education nor poverty could predict the likelihood of a person’s involvement in terrorism. 
Similarly, Abadie (2006) assessed the risk of terrorism in 186 countries for 2003-2004 
where the main economic explanatory variable, poverty, is measured by the country’s 
GDP per capita. The results show that GDP per capita has no statistical relation with 
terrorist risk; poverty is not related to terrorism. 
Other quantitative studies support the above finding that poverty neither increases 
nor decreases terrorism (Krueger and Laitin, 2008; Boylan, 2010). Krueger and Laitin 
(2008) exploring the country characteristics in post-Cold War transnational terrorist 
attacks suggest that, at the country level, the sources of international terrorism have more 
to do with repression than with poverty. The findings show that neither country GDP nor 
illiteracy is a predictor of terrorist origins. Similarly, Boylan (2010), exploring if 
economic development and religion can help explain levels of domestic terrorism while 
controlling for other factors, including political rights, population, education, and past 
domestic terrorist incidents, finds that economic development as a country’s GDP per 
capita has no statistical relationship with domestic terrorism; poor countries are no more 
likely to suffer domestic terrorist attacks as wealthy ones.  
On the hand, some studies relate terrorism with economic prosperity (Berrebi, 
2007; Lai, 2007). A micro level analysis by Berrebi (2007), assessing whether individual 
terrorists could be linked to destitution and lack of education by examining correlates of 
Palestinian terrorists, 335 members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and 
comparable Palestinian micro population data in the late 1980s, shows that both higher 
education and standard of living are positively associated with participation in Hamas or 
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PIJ and with becoming a suicide bomber. While Berrebi’s counter-intuitive findings are 
important, further research is needed to explore whether wealthier and more educated 
persons than the average population participate in terrorist activities at a global level or 
only in Palestinian territories. Likewise, Lai’s (2007) study of the economic conditions of 
the home country of the transnational terrorists shows that per capita GDP of a country 
has statistically significant positive relationship with the number of transnational terrorist 
attacks originating from it. But terrorism is likely to decline in high income countries. 
Therefore, wealth and terrorism have a curvilinear relationship. 
The scholarly disagreement over the role of economic drivers of terrorism is 
compounded by studies (Burgoon, 2006; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2010) arguing that 
social welfare policies—including social security, unemployment, and health and 
education spending— discourage terrorism by reducing poverty, inequality, and 
socioeconomic insecurity. In an economic sense, higher social spending translates into 
higher opportunity costs of terrorism as poverty and inequality diminish, and additional 
economic alternatives open up. Secondly, welfare regimes that promote low levels of 
market dependence and high levels of social equality are generally more able to sway 
certain socioeconomic conditions like inequality and deprivation in ways that reduce 
terrorism. Burgoon (2006) argues that such welfare policies of the state might diminish 
incentives to commit or tolerate terrorism, and weaken extremist political and religious 
organizations by providing economic and cognitive security to people where public 
safety nets are lacking. The author’s findings show that welfare spending relative to GDP 
reduces the number of terrorist incidents occurring in a country and total number of 
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transitional terrorist incidents originating from a country.  A similar study by Krieger and 
Meierrieks (2010) scrutinizes the effect of welfare policies (indicated by social spending 
and welfare regime variables) on homegrown terrorism in Western Europe. The results 
show that domestic terrorism deceases as the total welfare spending increases. Welfare 
spending on health, labor and unemployment separately has ameliorating effect on 
domestic terrorism. But, welfare spending on old age, family and housing has no 
relationship with terrorism. The authors also finds that trade openness {(export and 
import)/GDP} has a statistically significant negative relationship with domestic terrorism, 
and concludes that economic integration may reduce grievances associated with poor 
economic conditions, consequently reducing terrorism building on such grievances. One 
problem with these studies (e.g. Burgoon, 2006; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2010) is that the 
authors seem to have pre-concluded that poverty, unemployment and inequality are all 
determinants of domestic terrorism without any empirical support to that effect. In fact, 
empirical studies show no relation between poverty and terrorism. 
Recognizing that the empirical literature of the past several years has produced an 
inconclusive picture, Piazza (2011) revisits the relationship between poverty and 
terrorism and suggests a new factor to explain patterns of domestic terrorism: minority 
economic discrimination. Central to this study is the argument that because terrorism is 
not a mass phenomenon but rather is undertaken by politically marginal actors with often 
narrow constituencies, the economic status of sub-national groups is a crucial potential 
predictor of attacks. Collective or social status disadvantages – when accompanied by 
repression on the part of the state – help to produce cohesive minority group identities 
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within countries that differentiate group members from larger society. Political violence 
results when these grievances are wedded to opportunities. The author puts the 
assumption that minority economic discrimination is an important explanatory factor for 
domestic terrorism alongside aggregate measures of economic development to empirical 
evaluation on a country-year database of 172 countries from 1970 to 2006 using the 
Enders et al., 2011 data on domestic terrorist incidents. The results show that presence of 
minority economic discrimination in countries is a significant, positive predictor of the 
likelihood that a country will experience domestic terrorist incidents. General level of 
economic development, measured by gross national income per capita and the Human 
Development Index, bears a significant positive relationship with domestic terrorism. 
This suggests that countries marked by high levels of economic development have a 
higher probability of experiencing domestic terrorist attacks than do poorer, less 
developed countries. Inequality in a country also bears a significant positive relationship 
with domestic terrorism.  
Conclusion 
A review of terrorism literature shows that there is little scholarly consensus on 
the roles that socio-economic or political factors play in determining patterns of 
terrorism. Piazza (2011) asserts this is a glaring deficit on more than one front. First, it 
has contributed to a discovery lag vis-a-vis other social science literatures on violence, 
such as the work on civil war and the fields of criminology and sociology. Second, 
inconclusiveness regarding political or economic predictors of terrorism (see Table 2.1) 
has left terrorism studies unable to articulate a clear counter-terrorism policy 
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recommendation. This deficit is more glaring in the scholarly research on domestic 
terrorism. Large-N studies on the effects of economic globalization on domestic terrorism 
are non-existent to the best of my knowledge. As far as transnational terrorism is 
concerned there are limited studies on the subject (Li and Schaub, 2004; Blomberg and 
Hess, 2008). Therefore, my research would contribute to the study of domestic terrorism 
and help in explaining some political-economic determinants and post-Cold War 
dynamics of terrorism in general. Moreover, I explain domestic terrorism as a result of 
varying ‘heterogeneity cost’ – deprivation of public goods due to individuals/groups’ 
heterogeneity of preferences – among others. I operationalize ‘heterogeneity cost’ by 
creating a unique index that captures both diversity and political-economic discrimination 
against these diverse individuals/groups. Piazza (2011) has used discrimination against 
minorities as a variable to explain terrorist incidents, but his variable did not take into 
account the extent of diversity/heterogeneity in a country. My index on ‘heterogeneity 
cost’ would contribute substantially in future scholarly studies of terrorism in particular 
or other types of intrastate violence in general. Lastly, my research would have policy 
implications and relevant to the practical world of counter-terrorism. I devote a section of 
my concluding chapter on how my finding could be relevant for counter-terrorism policy 
formulation. 
In Chapter Three, I develop a theoretic model of violent intra-state conflict that is 
based on three crucial factors: (1) heterogeneity cost, (2) emergence of democracies, and 
(3) global economic integration. I argue that resorting to terrorism is a rational choice 
when individuals’ cost of heterogeneity - deprivation from public goods due to 
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geographical and ideological distance from the government -increases; opportunity is 
provided by political openness and integration to the global economy. From this model, I 
derive testable hypotheses regarding the influence of heterogeneity cost, immature 
democracies and global economic integration on the incidence of domestic terrorism.  
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Chapter 3  
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
How are two post-Cold War phenomena – economic integration and emergence 
of democracies – related to domestic terrorism?  In this chapter I intend to explain the 
theoretical framework that addresses the above research question and form hypotheses to 
be empirically tested in later chapters. Firstly, I examine the assumptions of rationality 
for the acts of terrorism emphasizing the need of a theory that takes into account 
willingness and opportunity that are consistent with those assumptions. Secondly, I 
explore two theories – liberal and dependency – that are traditionally used to explain the 
relationship between conflict and global economic integration, and the inadequacies of 
these two traditional theories in addressing all the issues that have emerged as results of 
post-Cold War trends of global economic integration and democratization. Thirdly, I 
discuss the theoretical framework presented by Alesina and Spolaore (2003) that relates 
to these issues more precisely than liberal and dependency theories. Lastly, I form a set of 
hypotheses based on Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) theoretical expectations in explaining 
domestic terrorism.  
It is important to note that this study is about domestic terrorism in general; it 
comprises all types of non-state terrorism – revolutionary, jihadist, rightist extremism, 
separatism and so on. Throughout history, desperate individuals have resorted to 
terrorism as a strategy for achieving their political objectives (Levin, 2006). Although 
scholars have tried to differentiate terrorism from guerrilla warfare and insurgency with 
valid arguments (Hoffman, 2006), such groups have often used terrorism as a strategy. In 
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fact, nearly a third of the thirty seven groups on the US State Department’s “Designated 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations” list could be categorized as guerrillas (USSD, 2004, 
p.113). Therefore, we need a broad theoretical framework that accounts for a wide variety 
of typologies of domestic terrorism. 
Rational Choice Theoretical Model 
Any theoretical framework exploring terrorism needs to take two factors into 
account. The first factor is the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable 
subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the 
majority (Crenshaw, 1981). The second is opportunity for social or political movement to 
develop in order to redress these grievances (Tilly, 1978, pp.133-138). I argue that 
terrorism is a rational choice when individuals’ grievances, mainly deprivation from public 
goods due to their geographical and ideological distance from political leaders, increase; 
political openness and integration into the global economy provide them opportunity for 
mobilization. 
Causal analysis of how economic integration and emerging democracies affect 
domestic terrorism presupposes that terrorists behave rationally. The notion that terrorists 
are rational actors merely implies that terrorists are goal oriented, can rank order their 
preferences, and act to maximize their preferences within budgetary constraints 
(Crenshaw1981; Sandler et. al., 1991; Li and Schaub, 2004). Rationality refers to 
purposive behavior or strategies by which individuals or groups pursue their interests; the 
term rational is not a statement about the substance of an individual or group’s 
preference. The groups resorting to terrorist violence often possess interests that may not 
widely be shared, especially by the target audience. In fact, there is evidence that given 
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their interests, terrorist networks choose targets, respond to risk, and adjust to 
counterterrorist efforts in quite purposeful ways (Sandler, 2003). Enders and Sandler 
(1993) show how the worldwide implementation of metal detectors in airports led to a 
decrease in the number of worldwide skyjackings but resulted in an increase in the use of 
other similar modes of attack, most notably kidnappings and hostage-taking missions. 
One common explanation of increasing number of suicide attacks in recent years is that 
as sites are well-protected, terrorists have upgraded from their conventional methods of 
using “dumb bombs” controlled by a timer to “smart bombs” in the form of well-trained 
suicide bombers who can adapt to countermeasures and react to events on the scene 
(Berman and Laitin, 2005).  
A person’s choice to become a terrorist – especially to become a suicide bomber – 
may entail costs larger than the gains to that individual and, thus, appears not to be an 
effective strategy for obtaining one’s goal. Frieden et al. (2010) argue that we do not have 
a good explanation why a suicide bomber would sacrifice his life, but at the same time, 
we also lack a complete explanation for why an individual may voluntarily choose to join 
a country’s military and go into battle to risk death for her country. Berman and Laitin 
(2005) argue that much of the terror generated by suicide attacks comes from the idea of 
an army of theologically-motivated suicidal drones. Yet they could be rational, given 
either: a) a belief in the hereafter combined with a belief that the suicidal act will be 
rewarded in the hereafter, or b) altruism toward family or compatriots combined with a 
belief that the suicidal act will benefit family, community or some larger cause 
(Wintrobe, 2003 cited in Berman and Laitin, 2005, p.10). Whatever rationality or 
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motivation a terrorist might have at the personal level, a terrorist organization 
purposefully and carefully strategizes how it deploys its forces, including suicide 
bombers.  
Often the selection of targets and times is a part of a terrorist’s strategy. If terrorist 
attacks are systematic and predictable, the population will adjust accordingly. Thus, the 
selection of places and times seems erratic; in this way terrorists can magnify their threats 
and instill great fear and uncertainty among the population. (Frieden et al., 2010, p.384).  
The rational actor assumption has empirical support. Pape (2003) presents the 
universe of suicide terrorist attacks worldwide from 1980 to 2001 to argue that suicide 
terrorism follows a strategic logic, one specifically designed to coerce modern liberal 
democracies to make significant territorial concessions. Three principal findings relating 
to rational actor assumption follow. Firstly, suicide terrorism is strategic. An individual 
suicide terrorist might be irrational, but the leaders who use it as a strategy follow certain 
logic. The vast majority of suicide terrorist attacks are not isolated or random acts by 
individual fanatics but, rather, occur in clusters as part of a larger campaign by an 
organized group to achieve a specific political goal. Groups using suicide terrorism 
consistently announce specific political goals and stop suicide attacks when those goals 
have been fully or partially achieved. Secondly, the strategic logic of suicide terrorism is 
specifically designed to coerce modern democracies to make significant concessions to 
national self-determination. All suicide terrorist campaigns inflict punishment on the 
opposing society, either directly by killing civilians or indirectly by killing military 
personnel in circumstances that cannot lead to meaningful battlefield victory. It generates 
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coercive leverage both from the immediate panic associated with each attack and from 
the risk of civilian punishment in the future. In general, suicide terrorist campaigns seek 
to achieve specific territorial goals, most often the withdrawal of the target state's military 
forces from what the terrorists see as national homeland. From Lebanon to Israel to Sri 
Lanka to Kashmir to Chechnya, every suicide terrorist campaign from 1980 to 2001 has 
been waged by terrorist groups whose main goal has been to establish or maintain self-
determination for their community's homeland by compelling an enemy to withdraw. 
Further, every suicide terrorist campaign since 1980 has been targeted against a state that 
had a democratic form of government (Pape, 2003).7 Thirdly, during the past 20 years, 
suicide terrorism has been steadily rising because terrorists have learned that it pays. 
Suicide terrorists sought to compel American and French military forces to abandon 
Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces to leave Lebanon in 1985, Israeli forces to quit the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995, the Sri Lankan government to create an 
independent Tamil state from 1990 on, and the Turkish government to grant autonomy to 
the Kurds in the late 1990s. Terrorist groups did not achieve their full objectives in all 
these cases. However, in all but the case of Turkey, the terrorist political cause made 
more gains after the resort to suicide operations than it had before. Leaders of terrorist 
groups have consistently credited suicide operations with contributing to these gains. 
These assessments are hardly unreasonable given the timing and circumstances of many 
of the concessions and given that other observers within the terrorists' national 
                                                 
 
7 It is debatable whether Sri Lanka, Lebanon, India and Russia can be categorized as democracies. They 
definitely do not guarantee civil liberties as western democracies like UK and USA do. 
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community, neutral analysts, and target government leaders themselves often agreed that 
suicide operations accelerated or caused the concession.  
In explaining variation in domestic terrorism with global economic integration 
and the emergence of democracy, the two contending schools of thought that traditionally 
connect conflict in general to economic and political openness need a brief review. 
Although liberal and dependency theories have been widely used to explain interstate 
conflict, a limited number of scholars have also extended these theoretical explanations to 
intrastate conflicts. These two theories would generate two diametrically opposite sets of 
hypotheses. Liberal theory would causally connect global economic integration and 
concurrent emergence of democracies to reduction in terrorist violence. On the other 
hand, dependency theory would predict an increase in terrorism due to socio-economic 
inequality resulting from global economic integration. In reality, we are witnessing 
increase in terrorism, emergence of immature democracies, economic development and 
rising socio-economic inequality all at the same time. I discuss liberal and dependency 
theories as well as their inadequacies to address these issues in detail below.   
Two Contending Theoretical Expectations 
The scholarly community is divided on the issue of whether globalization leads to 
an increase in internal violence in a state or greater societal harmony. Liberal scholars 
argue that globalization leads to greater economic development. Intuitively, if economic 
growth benefits people, they would have fewer incentives to engage in political violence. 
Prosperity generated by globalization would bring greater harmony to society as a whole. 
Eusufzai (1996) finds, for example, that open countries have a higher level of human 
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development as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI), a lower under-five 
mortality rate, and a higher proportion of the population with access to safe water. 
Firebaugh and Beck (1994) draw a similar conclusion: in poor countries, openness and 
economic growth have a significant, positive effect on expected lifespan, child mortality, 
and calorie consumption per capita.  
In wealthy countries, where an open economy provides higher level of welfare, 
similar improvement in people’s lives can be observed with liberalized trade and 
investment (Rodrik, 1997). However, Rodrik also notes the dilemma created by the lower 
ability of developed states to tax capital and highly-educated people, and the increased 
need for social insurance in the globalized economy. As capital and highly-educated 
people are attracted by countries with lower levels of taxation, countries need to lower 
their taxes in order to stop capital flight (Rodrik, 1997, pp. 55–64; Martin and Schuman, 
1998); hence in the long term, the state will lack money for redistribution which reduces 
the level of welfare. However, states devise institutional barriers that protect people 
against the unsettling forces released by the transition to free trade and redistribute the 
assets from trade by income transfers, protecting workers against risks (especially illness 
and unemployment) or supporting them in their old age (Vayrynen, 1997, p.76). 
Economic development generated by trade and investment might pave the way for 
democracy.  
Decades ago, Lipset (1959) proclaimed that a high level of prosperity increased 
the chances for societal harmony and a democratic system of government. Higher income 
and better education for the lower strata would, he argued, lead to a more compromise-
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oriented view of politics. Actors can channel their expressions within the democratic 
system, thereby reducing the likelihood of outright rebellion (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975; 
Rummel, 1995). 
In summary, a high degree of openness in the economy will strengthen the level 
of economic development. A prosperous country has a greater likelihood of having a 
democratic form of government. The final link in the chain is that both democracy and a 
high level of economic development have a positive effect on domestic peace (Gissinger 
and Gleditsch, 1999)8. On this basis, then, economic globalization would have a generally 
peace-building effect. Hegre et al. (2003) summarize the liberal model in Figure 2. In 
developing this model, the authors were inspired by the overall perspective of liberal 
conflict theorists such as Weede (1995), and Russett and Oneal (2001), drawing on 
Manchester liberalism and on what have been identified as a Kantian mode of thinking in 
international affairs. While these scholars have developed their argument mostly in 
relation to building a secure foundation for international peace, there is also a solid basis 
for a liberal argument about domestic peace (Hegre et al., 2003). 
On the other hand, according to dependency theory as illustrated in Figure 3 by 
Hegre et al. (2003), the penetration of foreign capital into peripheral economies leads to 
the exploitation of local human and natural resources and to a transfer of profit back to 
the imperial centers. This process results in impoverishment, inequality, and injustice 
(Galtung, 1971). The production of raw materials in poor countries serves to prevent 
competence-building, and the economy remains export-oriented. Ties are created  
                                                 
 
8 Gissinger and Gleditsch (1999) extend the basic tenets of the Manchester School to such areas as 
intrastate conflicts. 
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Figure 2. The Liberal Model 
 
 
Figure 3. The Dependency Model 
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between the local power elite and foreign interests, in turn increasing income inequality 
in the poor countries (Boswell and Dixon, 1990; Muller and Seligson, 1987). Today 
reference is frequently made to the increased income inequality in wealthy countries. 
Globalization might be the best explanation for the increased inequalities, especially in 
North America and in Great Britain (Wood, 1994). Imports of cheap textiles and 
electronic goods often out-compete domestic products, producing an increasing number 
of unemployed. A new group of ‘working poor’ is emerging because Multinational 
Corporations are moving their manufacturing units to LDCs for cheap labor and because 
the capital-intensive developed countries have a reduced demand of unskilled labor. 
Many scholars argue that inequality is the root cause of internal conflict.9  
As with the liberal model, this discussion can be summed up in a simple 
hypothesis. Global economic integration would lead to prosperity and the emergence of 
democracy. Prosperity and democracy together would lead to domestic peace. The main 
hypothesis of the dependency school is that a high degree of openness in the economy 
leads to a high degree of income inequality, which in turn increases the likelihood of 
armed conflict (Gissinger and Gleditsch, 1999). 
The dependency model as summarized above by Hegre et al. (2003) does not 
account for government type whereas the liberal model envisages democracy as a 
concurrent development of open economy. Liberal theory ignores the process by which 
                                                 
 
9 As Lichbach (1989) points out, many revolutions have been based on egalitarian ideas. The rhetoric in the 
American Revolution was that ‘all men are created equal’; in the French Revolution, the partisans shouted 
‘liberty, equality, fraternity’; the motto of the Russian Revolution was ‘peace, land, bread’; and a wartime 
slogan of the Chinese Communist Revolution was ‘those who have much give much, those who have little 
give little’ (Lichbach, 1989, p.433). 
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democracies emerge and consolidate: a transitional phrase. In reality we observe a 
process of democratization that has accompanied global economic integration since the 
1990s. But, only a handful of countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, Israel, 
Mongolia, Cape Verde, Trinidad and Tobago, and Chile have transformed into 
institutionalized democracies between 1990 and 2007; others in North America and 
Western Europe had already transformed into institutionalized democracies much earlier 
whereas most of the countries that began integrating into the global economy in early 
1990s are not fully consolidated democracies (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010).  
An effort to extend the liberal model of Manchester School to intrastate violence 
has to take into account the effect of these immature or unconsolidated democracies on 
internal peace.  At the same time, most countries of the world show an increase in per 
capita Gross National Product as well as in inequality as the global economy opened up 
(World Bank, 2011). If per capita GNP measures prosperity, most countries are becoming 
both prosperous and unequal simultaneously. On the other hand, domestic terrorism is on 
the rise since 2005 both in incidents and casualties (Enders et al., 2011). Therefore, 
neither the liberal model nor dependency theory can fully capture the post-Cold War 
trends in development, inequality, immature democracies and intrastate violence; hence 
there is a need for a new theoretical framework that combines both liberal and 
dependency theories and provides a better explanation for these post-Cold War trends. 
Alesina and Spolaore (2003) provide a theoretical framework that offers a better 
explanation for these post-Cold War trends by combining some of the basic assumptions 
of both the liberal and dependency theories.  
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In ‘The Size of Nations’, Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore (2003) investigate 
how big heterogeneous nations survive or disintegrate due to contradictory internal 
forces. Their central assumptions are that the advantage of large nations is economies of 
scale in the production of public goods and the disadvantage is the increasing 
heterogeneity of a population as its size increases. A big nation can spread the cost of 
producing public goods over more people, thus reducing the cost per capita, but in doing 
so it runs into the “one size fits all” problem. The amount and nature of the public good 
produced may be close to optimal for all of the members of a small, homogenous 
population, but the larger the nation is the larger and less homogeneous its population 
becomes. For individuals whose preferences are far from those the public good is 
designed to satisfy, it may not be worth its cost and they would tend to break away. The 
break-up of nations would be facilitated by global economic integration and spread of 
democracy. In the following pages I extend the basic tenets of their theoretical framework 
to explain domestic terrorism.10 I extend Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) theoretic 
framework to argue that resorting to terrorism is a rational choice when individuals’ 
grievances referred as ‘heterogeneity cost’ - deprivation from public goods due to 
geographical and ideological distance –increase, and opportunity for mobilization is 
provided by political openness and integration into the global economy. 
 
                                                 
 
10 Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) theoretical framework is more appropriate in explaining 
separatism/secessionism. But I am extending the same theory to explain broad category of intrastate 
violence (revolutionary, jihadist, rightist extremism, separatism and so on). Therefore, I deviate from their 
theory at places and modify it to accommodate other types of violence. In doing so I borrow from other 
sources (with citation), but largely stick to the core of their theoretical expectation. 
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Grievances 
 In Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) theoretical framework there is trade-off 
between the benefits from the size of heterogeneous state and the cost of this 
heterogeneity. There are benefits of a large state with a large population. First, the per 
capita costs of public goods are lower in large countries where more tax payers are 
available to pay for them. Public goods like defense, a judicial system, infrastructure for 
communication, public health, embassies, and national parks, to name a few, would be 
more cost effective with the increase of tax payers.  
Secondly, it is often argued that a large country (in terms of population, area and 
national income), all other things equal, can better protect itself from foreign aggression. 
Defense is a public good and per capita cost of defense decreases with country size. 
Bigger area gives the advantage of strategic depth and space of initial retreat in case of 
aggression. Although smaller states can enter into alliances, size might determine the 
extent of military power (Sandler and Hartley, 1995). 
Thirdly, the size of a country affects the size of its economy. To the extent that 
larger economies and larger markets increase productivity, larger countries should be 
richer. In other words, the economy of scale is more viable in larger countries. Although 
size does not matter if a country is fully integrated into the world economy, but national 
borders matter in trade in almost every country; hence larger size would benefit a 
country’s prosperity through intra-state trade. 
Fourthly, large countries can build redistributive schemes from richer to poorer 
individuals and regions better than small countries; thereby achieving redistributions of 
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after-tax income that would not be achievable were its regions acting independently. 
Fifth, a large state can provide regional ‘insurance’. If one region is in financial crisis or 
is hit by natural calamities, it could receive fiscal transfers from other parts of the 
country. Lastly, large states might have greater leverage in International Organizations in 
extracting favorable outcomes (Chowdhury, 2012). 
On the other hand, if a great many diverse individuals share the same public 
goods and policies, they face an increasing heterogeneity cost of preferences, since they 
have to agree with each other on common government policies. The trade-off between 
benefit of size and cost of heterogeneity is not uniform across all public goods and 
policies. For some public goods and policies, defense for example, the benefits of size are 
large and costs of heterogeneity are low; for others like a public school system, the 
opposite is true. One way to resolve the contradiction is to devise a federal structure. 
While a national government assumes the responsibility of several policy prerogatives 
without the monopoly of all public goods; sub-national levels of government are 
important providers of several public goods. In a unitary state, the delegation of authority 
to regions and local self-governments are devised to minimize the cost of heterogeneity 
(Scheberle, 2004, p.46). In effect, a national state could be said to emerge as an 
organization that optimizes the trade-off between size and heterogeneity in the provision 
of public goods and policies. 
The state’s capacity to provide most of the public goods is more efficient in a big 
country (in terms of size and population) because per capita costs for the tax payer 
decline as the number of tax payers increases. But bigger size means greater 
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heterogeneity of opinion. Different individuals might have different views about how the 
polity should spend tax revenues. Individuals may even disagree on the amount of the 
tax. Policy preferences or ideology may differentiate people.  
Public goods have not only an ideological dimension but also a geographical one; 
being close to a public good minimizes travel costs. Also several public goods 
(communication system, bureaucracy, etc.) are often concentrated in one location, the 
capital (national and sometimes states), so being close to the capital has its advantages. 
This may vary according to the extent of decentralization.  
The two dimensions of heterogeneity - geography (the distance of an individual 
from public goods) and ideology (how close public goods and policies are to the 
individual’s preferences) – might be highly correlated: individuals who are close together 
in space are also more alike in preferences. First, individuals with similar attitudes, 
ideology, preferences, income, religion and race tend to live close to each other. The 
second is that hundreds of years of proximity generate more uniformity of beliefs and 
preferences. A common language is also something that evolves from geographical 
proximity.  
Given the trade-off between economies of scale and in the production of goods, 
services and policies provided by it, and the heterogeneity of the population, Alesina and 
Spolaore (2003, p.29) posit that optimally the world would be organized in a number of 
countries, each providing its citizens all the necessary public goods and services. If a 
single central government provides all the public goods in a large country, the 
configuration of a border might optimize maximum total welfare, but the distribution of 
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welfare is uneven. Some individuals are very well off and others are not so well off. The 
disadvantaged individuals may either want to change the configuration of borders or 
bring by regime change a new government that would make transfer or side payments to 
the disadvantaged region.  
But why should welfare be uneven? One answer would depend on the 
geographical location of the disadvantaged individual vis-à-vis the center of the 
government. A middle location of the public good minimizes the average (and total) 
distance of citizens from public good and maximizes total welfare for the costs of the 
public good. Deviations from a middle position are likely to reflect significant differences 
in the political weight of different regions within a country. The capital will most likely 
be, not necessarily though, located at the center of the country because the government 
can control its jurisdiction efficiently. The location of the capital city may be determined 
by a number of other factors too: an area of fertile land capable of supporting a growing 
population; a good water supply such as a large river, though built above flood level; well 
away from the earthquake belts and volcanoes; defensible against enemies; chosen at or 
near river-mouths for these reasons, with facilities for trade, both inland and overseas; 
tradition and folklore and so on. 
In the absence of side payments or transfers to regions, the benefits of belonging 
to a large country are unequally distributed, with the larger share going to the individuals 
who live close to the government in ideology or in geographical location. These 
individuals pay as much as everyone else but do not bear the higher heterogeneity costs; 
in fact they are close in preference to the policies chosen, and close in distance to the 
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public good. By contrast, individuals far from the government bear a disproportionate 
share of the heterogeneity costs, and hence do not fully internalize the benefits of 
belonging to a larger country.   
 For example, in Figure 4 the public good is located at c11, but everyone situated 
between a and b pays the same tax. The individuals with average utility in terms of public 
goods are located between a and b. Everyone else located between points a and a 
and between b and b gets a less than average utility in terms of public goods. In a 
heterogeneous country, if these individuals have different ideology in terms of ethnicity, 
language, religion etc. than the individuals located between a and b, they might either 
secede from the country or attempt to bring a new government which is closer to their 
ideology – a government that would transfer resources to these disadvantaged regions or 
would provide public goods to them. The Basque region of Spain (See Map in Figure 5)  
 
Figure 4. Location of Public Good 
 
is a good example where ethnically distinct peoples are located far away from the capital; 
geographical distance combines with ideological distance. The Tamil region in Sri Lanka, 
                                                 
 
11 The public goods like airports, universities, hospitals, police headquarters etc. are generally located in the 
capital in most countries. As argued earlier, the capital will most likely be, not necessarily though, located 
at the center of the country because the government can control its jurisdiction efficiently. 
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Figure 5. Basque Area in Spain 
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and Ayacucho region of Peru are two other examples in this category. 
In a federal structure, the public goods are provided by two set of governments: 
national and regional creating a complex net of overlapping jurisdiction. The problem of 
uneven distribution of public goods can be resolved in such a system if individuals living 
far away in location and preferences are compensated with transfers of resources. 
Optimally such a system should work in a perfectly decentralized arrangement. But there 
is a problem of feasibility in the redistributive transfer schemes. The implementation of 
these transfer schemes may be economically costly because they require high taxes on the 
part of the population, creating tax distortions i.e. disincentives to work, save and invest.  
In Figure 6, a country is divided into seven regions, a being the location of the 
national government. Given all the citizens pay equal tax, individuals located between A 
and B would enjoy welfare or public goods above average as they are close to the 
government geographically. Individuals located farther left to A and farther right to B 
would receive less than average utility in terms of public goods because of their 
geographical distance from the capital. Now, if the government wants to transfer 
resources to region 1, for example, it should extract resources from individuals located 
between A and B to compensate the disadvantaged in region 1. The redistributive scheme 
implying fiscal transfer would impose extra costs on the individuals located between A 
and B (region 4). In the presence of heterogeneity, the better off region may not agree to 
compensate individuals of a different ethnicity, religion or ideology. If the individuals 
located between A and B (region 4) are ethnically, religiously or ideologically different 
from the individuals in region 1, the former would not be willing to bear the extra cost in  
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Figure 6. The Federal Structure 
 
compensating the latter. The issue of inter-regional transfers may be complicated by 
political and electoral incentives or disincentives of the federal government too.  
There is the possibility that, even in a federal structure, pockets of discontent may 
emerge. This is germane in a state (federal unit) where one or more heterogeneous groups 
may be disadvantaged due to its/their distance from the median voter in ideology and 
geography. Such heterogeneous group/groups might fall victims of deprivation; hence 
they might either opt to secede or attempt to bring a new government identical to their 
ideology. A good example would be the violent movement of the Gorkha people of 
Darjeeling Hills in the Indian state of West Bengal where an ethnically heterogeneous 
people live in a federal unit far away from the state capital (see Map in Figure 7); 
geographical distance combines with ideological distance in a federal unit.  
Although states in post-independent India were reorganized on the basis of ethno-
linguistic criteria, the policy failed to eradicate the problem of “entrapped minorities” as 
many states within the Indian federation continued to include peripheral minority ethnic 
groups that were linguistically and culturally different from and politically and 
economically subordinate to the majority ethno-linguistic communities that wielded  
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Figure 7. Gorkhaland Problem in India 
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power in the states (Hardgrave and Kochanek, 1990). The reorganization of Indian states 
in 1954 failed to give state status to the Gorkhas, a hill tribe, living in the north of the 
state of West Bengal. In the years following the states reorganization, these isolated and 
peripheral minority ethnic groups came to resent their endemic poverty and 
underdeveloped status and became convinced that they were being deprived (deliberately 
or otherwise) by the majority Bengali community that controlled the state government. 
The only way out of this poverty and underdevelopment, these groups felt, was by 
creating their own state and entering into a direct relationship with the Indian federal 
government for assistance and guidance; for instance, Gorkha leaders in Darjeeling cited 
the example of Sikkim (a state in the Indian federation), which had one-third of 
Darjeeling’s population but received almost ten times more federal resources than 
Darjeeling (Ganguly, 2005). A violent separatist movement that started in 1986 has 
resulted in thousands of casualties as well as the destruction of property. The issue of 
deprivation has been repeatedly raised by the leaders of the insurgent organization of the 
Gorkhas, the Gorkhaland National Liberation Front, spearheading the violent secessionist 
movement. 
Leaders of the Gorkhaland agitation argued that the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist)-led Bengali administration of West Bengal has deliberately kept Darjeeling 
isolated and neglected (Sen, 1986). In a letter to the editor of The Statesman newspaper, 
Kharga Bahadur Lama, President of the “Intellectual Cell” of the GNLF, observed that 
crores (1 crore is equivalent to 10 million) of rupees (Indian currency) meant for hill 
development went towards the development of Siliguri, only small sums were spent on 
 
67 
Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Kurseong (The Statesman12, 13 June, 1986). It is important to 
note that the Darjeeling district consists of four subdivisions; three subdivisions - 
Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Kurseong – are inhabited by Gorkha tribes, and one 
subdivision – Siliguri – is mainly inhabited by Bengali people. 
But, in many cases the heterogeneous groups (in cluster) may live close to the 
source of public goods, but yet be deprived of those goods because of their ideological 
distance from the group in power in terms of religion, language, ethnicity etc. The 2002 
massacre of the Muslims in major cities of Gujarat in India is a good example in that the 
Muslim neighborhoods were located in the city of Ahmadabad – a few hundred meters 
away from the city police headquarters – but hundreds of Muslim civilians were killed by 
Hindu extremists without any police intervention. The BJP-the Hindu nationalist party-
government deprived the minority people of the basic public good of physical security. 
Such killings of minority people in Indian cities are major precursors to homegrown 
Jihadist terrorism in India (Clarke, 2011, p.93).  
In summary, the deprivation from public goods may create grievances; hence the 
victims of deprivation might opt to secede, want policy change or attempt to bring in a 
new government identical to their ideology. They are likely to resort to terrorist violence 
to fulfill their demands. Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) theoretical model would strictly 
apply to those examples where heterogeneous groups in the border region would opt for 
secession (e.g. Sri Lanka, Peru, Basque, Gorkhaland in India). To include ‘Jihadist’ 
terrorism in India as mentioned above or such other violent movements that demand 
                                                 
 
12 The Statesman is a leading English language newspaper published from major Indian cities including 
Kolkata. 
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policy concessions and challenge the state is an extension of the core logic of their 
theoretical model. The deviation, as mentioned earlier, is designed to accommodate 
variety of other violent political movements that might result from grievances due to the 
deprivation from public goods.  
Political Opportunity 
Alesina and Spolaore (2003, p.69) argue that people challenge the state more 
when the political system opens up. A non-representative government tends to rule big 
and heterogeneous territory because such rent-maximizing government cares about its 
own welfare, and that of its close associates. It can ignore individual/group’s grievances 
because such government’s survival does not depend on public support. Dictators would 
prefer large empires to small countries because they can extract larger total rents from 
larger a population. But, even a dictator who does not need the support of the majority of 
the population to stay in power will nonetheless need to provide some minimum level of 
well-being to at least a fraction of his people in order to ensure his political survival. This 
is referred to as constraints here.  
In the absence of constrains, the Leviathan’s (Hobbes, 1651) rents will be 
maximized if he controls the entire world, and expropriates all the income of every 
individual through taxation. But this is not feasible. No dictator has ever managed to 
conquer and run the entire world precisely because empires that are too big become 
unmanageable, and various internal and external challenges lead to their collapse 
(Kennedy, 1988). But dictators tend to rule large empires.  
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As empires enlarge and encompass more distant populations (both geographically 
and ideologically), avoiding insurrections becomes a tricky problem of the Leviathan. 
The dictator who wants to maintain large revenue will need to make costly concessions to 
those regions, such as reduce taxes or expand more of his intake in revenue on military 
police. 
In an absolute dictatorship the number of people a ruler has to please to remain in 
power would be very small. In reality, dictators rule with very narrow elite of privileged 
groups – for example, the aristocracy in ancient regimes, the core group of Communist 
Party in China, or the friends and family (the Tikriti clan) of Saddam Hussein. 
According to Alesina and Spolaore (2003), the borders of a state depend on the 
size of the population that a ruler satisfies to remain in power. The larger the fraction of 
population that has to be pleased, the larger is the number of countries in a world of 
dictators. Intuitively, the dictator has few constraints and does not care much about 
individual (heterogeneous) preferences. By ignoring heterogeneity costs, rulers can take 
full advantage of economies of scale. An increase in the share of the population that the 
dictator has to satisfy to prevent insurrections makes the heterogeneity costs more 
important compared to economies of scale: larger constraints imply that the preferences 
of a large number of individuals have to be taken into account by a rent-maximizing state. 
Hence the dictator will obtain less gain in ruling large populations, and may allow far 
away regions to break up. The democratization result is important since, historically, the 
formation of existing countries has been determined largely in a non-democratic world. 
As the world becomes more democratic, we should observe attempted secessions, or, at 
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least, increasing pressure for decentralization and local autonomy. If the newly 
transitioned democratic state which is large and heterogeneous tries to maintain its large 
size, it will face insurrections and rebellions. Therefore, higher levels of terrorist 
activities would be experienced in a state that has newly emerged as a democracy.  
This hypothesis has empirical support. Lai (2007) studied the political and 
economic conditions of the home country of the transnational terrorists between 1968 and 
1998 using the ITERATE dataset of 193 countries and found that autocracies are less 
likely to produce terrorists than other regime types. Lai argues that autocracies are able to 
inhibit the formation and mobilization of terrorist organizations through the use of highly 
coercive state institutions like the party, military, or secret police. 
But, an institutionalized democracy has several conflict-reducing mechanisms like 
an independent and impartial judiciary to settle disputes and protect minorities, 
entrenched system of rule of law, free and fair elections to effect policy changes and free 
media to vent grievances through debates that make resorting to violence a less attractive 
option (Schmid, 1992). Choi (2010) also argues that a high-quality rule of law is considered 
to dampen ordinary citizens’ opportunity and willingness to engage in political violence. 
Institutionalized liberal democracies promoting a high-quality rule of law system as an 
effective conflict resolution mechanism are likely to experience less domestic and 
transnational terrorism. Choi’s cross-sectional, time-series data analysis with a sample of 131 
countries between 1984 and 2004 period shows the likelihood of domestic and international 
terrorist events declining in a country with high quality of the rule of law. Therefore, as a 
country is transformed in a fully institutionalized democracy, it may not experience high 
levels of terrorist activities.  
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Economic Opportunity 
The findings on economic determinants of terrorism are highly inconclusive about 
the relationship between poverty and terrorism. There is no empirical evidence that 
poverty causes terrorism. According to some scholars like Hamilton, Moss, Clutterbuck 
and Laqueur, terrorism is typically the work of the idle elites and arises during periods of 
affluence rather than desperate poverty (cited in Schmid and Jongman, 1988, p.66). 
Crenshaw (1981, p.384) argues that terrorism is essentially the result of elite disaffection; 
it represents the strategy of a minority, who may act on behalf of a wider popular 
constituency who have not been consulted about, and do not necessarily approve of, the 
terrorists' aims or methods. Therefore, poverty among the common people might not 
necessarily relate to terrorism. Had terrorism been a function of desperate poverty, we 
would expect terrorism largely in countries like Eritrea, Central African Republic, 
Burundi, Malawi and such countries in poverty-ridden Sub-Saharan Africa. But we 
observe more terrorism in the United States, France, Spain and Japan than in the poor 
African countries mentioned above. Abadie (2006) uses a country-level terrorist risk ratio 
that encompasses both transnational and domestic terrorism as his dependent variable and 
concludes that terrorist risks are not higher for poorer countries once other country-level 
characteristics are considered. Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) consider factors that explain 
the lethality of terrorist organizations, regardless whether they are transnational or 
domestic in nature, and find that the economic performance of the country that hosts the 
organization does not relate to the lethality of groups. Feldmann and Perala (2004) do not 
 
72 
find an association between economic performance or structural economic conditions and 
the prevalence of terrorism in Latin America. 
On the other hand, a large-n empirical study by Piazza (2011) shows that 
economic prosperity in a country is likely to increase domestic terrorism. Intuitively, 
these findings make sense when considering terrorist activity around the world. The 
persistence of groups in West Europe, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA), and the FLNC, seem to suggest that poor 
countries are not more prone to terrorism than rich countries. In fact, the Basque region in 
Spain, ETA’s regional base, is one of the most economically prosperous areas in the 
country (Boylan, 2010, p.31).  
Berrebi (2007) who presented a statistical analysis of the determinants of 
participation in terrorist activities by members of the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
between the late 1980s and May 2002 found that both higher education and standard of 
living are positively associated with participation in Hamas or PIJ and with becoming a 
suicide bomber. Economic prosperity would probably enable the terrorist organizations to 
pay for weapons and recruits, and trade and investment might provide them the economic 
resources to engage in violence.  
In Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) theoretical framework, the trade-off between a 
state’s size and heterogeneity is influenced by the trade regime. A large market size 
matters for economic success. Because of specialization and other mechanisms, 
interaction among a large number of individuals may increase productivity. The extent of 
the market also plays a key role of models of industrialization; a certain size of market 
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(defined by the size of demand) is necessary for entrepreneurs and investors to step in 
and overcome fixed costs, and spur development. A bigger country can mobilize 
investment capital better. A country’s market size coincides with its political size only if 
the country’s economy is perfectly integrated domestically but completely closed to the 
rest of the world. It follows that only in an autarkic world a country that is small has a 
small market and thus a low demand for output, low production and low probability of 
capital mobilization.  
In an economically integrated world, on the other hand, the market size of a 
country is larger, and possibly even much larger, than its political size. In the extreme 
case where borders are totally irrelevant for economic interactions, the market size of 
each country is the world. In a world of free trade, political borders are economically 
irrelevant. In summary, at one extreme (autarky), market size and political size coincides, 
while at the other extreme (perfect free trade) political size does not affect market size, 
which is given by the whole world. In general, a country’s market will be given by its 
domestic market and part of world market, depending on the degree of economic 
openness. The political size of a country should become less relevant as economic 
integration increases; hence, the viable size of a country decreases with international 
openness. Since the economic costs of being small fall as economic integration increases, 
one should observe that ethnic minorities and border regions of larger countries may 
prefer to split away as international openness and economic integration increases. In a 
globalized economy, people do not necessarily depend on the state for managing trade 
and investment; flow of foreign capital and movement of goods make the state less 
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important for economic prosperity. This argument of Alesina and Spolaore (2003) can 
well explain why secessionist and nationalist aspirations might increase with economic 
openness, but I intend to causally connect economic openness with all types of domestic 
terrorism.  
Economic globalization creates winners and losers. The uneven and disruptive 
effects of globalization, particularly for developing countries, have been singled out by 
such critics as Stiglitz (2002). Bussmann and Schneider (2007) also argue that steps 
toward globalization (measured by changes in the level of economic openness) may 
increase the risk of armed conflict in the short run. Thus, by lowering the opportunity 
cost of violence for the losers of globalization, a move toward economic openness can 
increase domestic conflict (Magee and Massoud, 2011). In a heterogeneous country with 
group discrimination, if the losers of economic globalization happen to belong to the 
already aggrieved section, terrorist organizations representing such aggrieved sections 
might grow stronger with more people joining their ranks. Therefore, a heterogeneous 
country where groups are discriminated might experience an increase in terrorist 
activities with economic openness. 
   The earlier argument that we should observe attempted secessions, or, at least, 
increasing pressure for decentralization and local autonomy and more terrorist violence 
as the world becomes more democratic can be combined with the effect of economic 
openness and global integration. It follows that both democratization and opening of 
international markets should accompany political separatism, attempted break up of 
larger countries, and attempt to challenge the state, especially if the level of heterogeneity 
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and deprivation from the public goods are high. The resentment might translate into 
terrorist violence.  
In summary, three things are addressed in the theoretical framework - grievances, 
political and economic opportunities - that can together lead to terrorism. I have extended 
Charles Tilly’s ‘Polity Model’ (Tilly, 1978, p.53) to include political and economic 
opportunity in translating the above theoretical framework into a ‘public goods’ model 
(see Figure 8).  No socio-political movement is feasible without grievances. Individuals 
or groups excluded from the public goods are likely to challenge the state. Terrorism 
takes place in non-democratic countries too (e.g. Rwanda, Uganda, Gabon, Congo 
Kinsasha). Similarly, terrorism is also experienced in relatively closed economies (e.g. 
Sikh terrorism of 1980s in India). I expect open polities and economies to increase 
terrorism, not to condition it. In the model, I expect the likelihood of ‘challenger 2’ and 
‘challenger 3’ to engage in terrorist activities to be greater than ‘challenger 1’ (see Figure 
8) because they have more favorable political and economic conditions for challenging 
the state than the latter. Three hypotheses follow from the theoretical framework 
discussed above. 
H1: The more individuals or groups face heterogeneity costs in a state, the more the state 
is likely to suffer from domestic terrorism. 
 
H2: An immature democracy with low level of institutionalization is more likely to 
experience domestic terrorism than other regime-types. 
 
H3: Global economic integration is likely to increase domestic terrorist activities in a 
state. 
 
In addition to the above hypotheses, I also test two conditional hypotheses. 
Although terrorism might not be conditioned by opportunities, political and economic 
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Figure 8. The Polity Model 
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opportunities might lead to increases in terrorism even more when interacted by 
grievances. 
H4: The more individuals or groups face heterogeneity costs in a state, the more the state 
is likely to suffer from domestic terrorism if the aggrieved individuals get greater 
political opportunity in an immature democracy with low level of institutionalization. 
 
H5: The more individuals or groups face heterogeneity costs in a state, the more the state 
is likely to suffer from domestic terrorism if the aggrieved individuals get greater 
economic opportunity as the country is integrated with global economy. 
 
In this Chapter I have examined two theories – liberal and dependency – that are 
traditionally used to explain the relationship between conflict and global economic 
integration. But these two traditional theories are inadequate in addressing many trends 
observed in post-Cold War world. Alesina and Spolaore (2003) offer a theoretical 
framework that can better explain the post-Cold War trends of global economic 
integration and its resultant developments. Based on Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) 
theoretical framework, a rational choice theoretic model of violent intra-state conflict that 
is based on three crucial factors- (1) heterogeneity cost, (2) political openness, and (3) 
global economic integration - is used to explain the causal relationship between domestic 
terrorism and the post-Cold War trends of global economic integration and emergence of 
democracies. I have argued that the resort to terrorism is a rational choice when 
individuals’ cost of heterogeneity - deprivation from public goods due to geographical 
and ideological distance - increases; opportunity is provided by democratization and 
integration to the global economy.  
In the next chapter, I discuss operational measures of the important variables, 
present preliminary descriptive statistics, and evaluate the influence of these variables 
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using zero inflated negative binomial regression models on a dataset of 172 countries for 
the period between 1990 and 2007.  
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Chapter 4  
Empirical Beginnings: Cross Country Analysis 
 
In order to explore whether the post-Cold War trends of global economic 
integration and spread of democracy are responsible for fluctuations in domestic 
terrorism I introduce a rational choice theoretic model of violent intrastate conflict that is 
based on three crucial factors- (1) heterogeneity cost, (2) political openness, and (3) 
global economic integration . Terrorism is a rational choice when individuals’ deprivation 
from public goods due to preferential distance from the ruling elite increases; 
democratization and integration to the global economy provide opportunities to mobilize. 
Five hypotheses were developed based on the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 
Three. I propose to test these hypotheses on a cross-country analysis in this chapter. 
Large-N cross-country analyses are limited on the issue of domestic terrorism. My study 
contributes to the terrorism literature with an emphasis on broad-based generalization on 
the issue.  
In this chapter, I discuss the data used to empirically test the theoretical 
propositions presented in Chapter Three on a cross-country dataset on domestic terrorism 
in 172 countries for the period between 1990 and 2007. I also operationalize concepts 
discussed in the third chapter. Then, I present basic descriptive statistics that highlight 
important characteristics of the variables and their sources, and review the data on 
domestic terrorism.  Next, I introduce the statistical models to be used in the empirical 
analysis. Finally, I discuss the empirical evidence uncovered and suggest future research 
possibilities. 
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Research Design 
In this section, I discuss the variables used in the statistical analyses. This 
includes providing measurable proxies for the three concepts discussed in Chapter Three: 
(1) heterogeneity cost, (2) regime type, and (3) global economic integration. I then 
present basic descriptive statistics for each of the operationalized variables. A description 
of all the variables used in the estimation that follows is presented below.  
Unit of Analysis 
To test my hypotheses described in Chapter Three, I use a set of zero-inflated 
negative binomial regression models on the incidence of domestic terrorism using a 
country-year database of 172 countries from 1990 to 2007. The unit of analysis is 
country-year. Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011) formed the most reliable dataset on 
domestic terrorism by deriving their count of domestic terrorist attacks occurring within 
countries by separating domestic from international terrorist events published in the 
widely used Global Terrorism Database (GTD). GTD is a publicly available, open source 
event-count database of aggregated domestic and international terrorist attacks from 1970 
to 2007 built and managed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, housed at the University of Maryland. While the database 
developers, to the best of their abilities, corroborate each piece of information with 
multiple independent open sources, they make no further claims as to the veracity of this 
information (START, 2010 b).   
            Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011, p.3), first of all, clearly define terrorism as 
the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups 
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against noncombatants in order to obtain a political or social objective through the 
intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims. They then proceed 
to remove those observations from the GTD that do not fall within their definition of 
terrorism. To identify incidents as transnational, they apply a five-step procedure (Enders 
et al., 2011, p.4). Firstly, if the venue country is different from the country of nationality 
for one or more victims, then the attack is clearly a transnational terrorist incident. 
Secondly, attacks against diplomatic targets are deemed to be transnational incidents. 
Thirdly, terrorist attacks against US entities that occurred outside the USA are classified 
as transnational terrorist events. Fourthly, a terrorist act that occurs outside of the United 
States and involves US fatalities or injuries is classified as transnational. Finally, any 
such incidents that involve the diversion of an airplane or resolution in another country, 
so that two or more countries are involved, are transnational terrorist events. 
Based on the above five-step procedure, Enders et al. (2011) identify 12,862 
transnational terrorist incidents. They check the validity of their domestic–international 
decomposition technique by comparing the GTD international events with the 
international terrorist events published in the ITERATE database (International 
Terrorism: Attributes of Events) by Mickolus et al. (2009). A total of 12,784 
transnational terrorist incidents was recorded in ITERATE dataset for the same time 
interval. Although GTD and ITERATE datasets have some uncommon incidents, the 
nearly identical numbers support the methodological choices by Enders et al. (2011). 
Next, after identifying uncertain incidents from the remaining terrorist events in GTD, the 
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remaining 46,413 incidents are identified as domestic terrorist events because there are 
no grounds for identifying them as transnational terrorist events.  
A review of the dataset shows that incidents of domestic terrorist attacks have 
fluctuated between 1970 and 2007 at the global level. The same can be said about the 
casualties from such incidents (see Figure 9). Incidents of domestic terrorism remained 
quite low between 1970 and 1974 with an average of 95.8 incidents per year that resulted 
in approximately 64 deaths per year. These numbers more than double in the years 1975-
76 with a yearly average of 308 incidents causing an annual death of 174.5 persons on 
average, and more than quadruple in the years 1977-78 with a yearly average of 812.5 
incidents causing an annual death of 506 persons on average. The number of incidents 
peaked at 1380 in 1979 with 950 deaths. Overall, the ratio of incidents to deaths remained 
low at 1.56:1 in the 1970s. 
Domestic terrorism intensified in the 1980s. For the years 1980-89, the yearly 
average of incidents was 1805.7 resulting in 2672.5 deaths. The incidents became more 
fatal than those in the 1970s; 1.48 deaths were reported per incident. In the four years 
between 1980 and 1983, an average of 1434 incidents of domestic terrorism was reported 
per year. The number of incidents spiked in 1984 with 2006 incidents and again in 1989 
with 2864 incidents; deaths were 3870 and 4125 respectively. 
Since the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, incidents and the resultant fatalities 
from domestic terrorism fluctuated more widely than the previous decades (see Figure 
10). Terrorist incidents suddenly spiked in 1992 with the number reaching 3220 with the 
reported death of 5128 persons, the highest since 1970. But the incidents dramatically  
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Figure 9. Domestic Terrorism 1970-2007    
 
 
 
Figure 10. Domestic Terrorism 1990-2007     
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declined to a very low number of 307 in 1993, only to rise to 1798 in 1994. The number 
of incidents remained at an average of 1684.25 for the four years between 1994 and 1997. 
In 1998, terrorist incidents declined considerably and stayed at a low annual level of 
655.57 for the next seven years.  
Incidents of terrorism started rising again in 2005 and continued their upward 
move, reaching the pre Cold-War level of occurrence in 2007 with 1843 attacks. The 
trends roughly resemble a U-shape after 1997, declining considerably and then rising 
again after 2005. It is important to note the role of the US-led wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq in 2001 and 2003 for a notable rise in the count of domestic terrorist incidents. But, 
even if we exclude the incidents in Afghanistan and Iraq, the trend will still have a U 
shape. Domestic terrorist incidents started rising in 2005 and came close to the 1997 level 
in 2007 even after the combined incidents in Afghanistan and Iraq are taken into account. 
Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are responsible for approximately 30 percent of the total 
incidents of domestic terrorism in the world between the years 2001 and 2007. Figure 11 
shows the trend from 1997 to 2007 taking into account the incidents in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. 
Similar trends are observed in fatalities from such incidents are concerned (see 
Figure 10). But, terrorism has been much more devastating in the post Cold-War period, 
causing far greater deaths than the previous periods. In 1997, 1776 incidents caused 7024 
deaths, and similarly 1843 incidents killed 7711 persons in 2007. It is important to note 
here too the role of the US-led war in Afghanistan and Iraq starting in the years 2001 and 
2003. Terrorist activities in Afghanistan from 2001 and in Iraq from 
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Figure 11. Domestic Terrorism 1997-2007 
 
2003 are largely responsible for the dramatic increase in the number of casualties from 
2005 onwards. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are responsible for approximately 41 
percent of the total casualties of domestic terrorism in the world between the years 2001 
and 2007. Figure 12 shows the trend from 2001 to 2007 taking into account the casualties 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
According to GTD (Enders et al., 2011) reports, pre Cold-War period (1970-
1989) deaths per incident were 1.32; 1.32 persons were killed in each incident on 
average. For the post Cold-War period (1990-2007), the deaths are 2.71 per incident; 2.71 
persons were reportedly killed in each incident on average. This average annual death per 
incident account includes all the incidents and resultant casualties in post 2001 
Afghanistan and post 2003 Iraq. If those in Afghanistan and Iraq are excluded, the deaths 
are 2.44 per incident in the post-Cold War period (1990-2007), implying that domestic 
terrorism has become more menacing after 1990. Although terrorist incidents have  
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Figure 12. Domestic Terrorism 2001-2007 (Casualties) 
 
fluctuated at the global level, the GTD data show that domestic terrorism has become 
more severe in terms of fatalities over the years. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for the empirical models is a country-year count of 
domestic terrorist incidents derived from the above mentioned dataset developed by 
Enders et al. (2011). The number of incidents per year measures the existence of 
terrorism and well as how widespread terrorism is in a particular country. The country-
year count has been used widely by scholars in quantitative studies of terrorism (Li and 
Schaub, 2004; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2010; Piazza, 2011). Figure 13 and Table 1 
illustrate the distribution of domestic terrorism by country from 1990 to 2007.  
Independent Variables 
I have three independent variables that are designed to test the hypotheses stated 
in Chapter Three. I describe below the operationalization of three variables –  
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Figure 13. Histogram of Terrorist Incidents 1990-2007 
 
heterogeneity cost; immature or unconsolidated democracy; and global economic 
integration – that will be used as main explanatory variables in the empirical models. 
The first independent variable, heterogeneity cost, means the presence of heterogeneity in 
a country and the extent to which the heterogeneous groups are deprived from public 
goods. Ethnic, racial or religious identity may be primordial, but such identities 
themselves do not produce resentment; they might coexist with peace. Moreover, ethnic, 
religious or racial heterogeneity generally remain constant over years at a country level, 
although in some rare cases mass migration or ethnic cleansing might change the 
demographic composition of a country. Heterogeneity being constant cannot explain 
domestic terrorism that varies over time at a country level. But heterogeneous groups can 
be treated differently at different points of time by the ruling political elite; hence 
discrimination varies. Ethnic, religious or racial identity can serve as a ‘focal point’ 
(Schelling, 1963) facilitating convergence of individual expectations and be useful as a  
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Table 1. Distribution of Terrorist Incidents 1990-2007  
 
 
No. of Incidents per              Frequency             Percentage          Cum. Percentage                
country-year           
 
 
0 1,853 60.65 60.56 
    
1 335 10.95 71.5 
    
2 145 4.74 76.24 
    
                           3 84 2.75 78.99 
    
4 64 2.09 81.08 
    
5 60 1.96 83.04 
    
6-10 148 4.84 87.88 
    
11-14 68 2.23 90.11 
    
15-40 163 5.32 95.43 
    
41-200 140 3.99 99.42 
    
201-673 18 0.58 100.00 
 
 
Total                              3060                         100.00 
 
 
Mean: 7.831699 
 
Standard Deviation: 32.65379 
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mobilization strategy; hence, political leaders can strategically manipulate such identity 
for the sake of power (Hardin, 1995; Rogowski, 1985; Brass, 1973). In a hostile political 
environment, minority group/groups may be discriminated and the cost of heterogeneity 
increases for such groups. Therefore, operationalization of heterogeneity cost would have 
to be a composite score of heterogeneity and discrimination. 
I use data on the measure of ethnic heterogeneity in 176 contemporary countries 
from the Finnish Social Science Data Archive (Vanhanen, 2010). It is on a 0 to 80 scale 
where 0 stands for no heterogeneity and 80, extreme heterogeneity. The measurement of 
ethnic heterogeneity is based on the percentage of the largest ethnic group that has 
greatest stake in political power of the total population. This percentage indicates the 
level of ethnic homogeneity in a country, and its opposite indicates the level of ethnic 
heterogeneity (EH). The dataset on ethnic heterogeneity is designed to measure political 
discrimination as well. The CIA's World Factbook has been used as the principal source 
of data on ethnic groups, but many other sources have also been used (Vanhanen, 2010).  
To operationalize minority economic discrimination and policies to remediate 
discrimination in countries, I use the ‘ECDIS Index’ published by the Minorities at Risk 
Project (2009). The ‘ECDIS/ Economic Discrimination' variable measures the degree to 
which members of groups designated as ‘minorities at risk’ (MARs) – ethno-political 
communities in countries that ‘collectively suffer or benefit from systematic 
discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in society’ (Minorities at Risk Project, 
2009, p.1), face economic discrimination as a result of formal or informal governmental 
neglect, lack of opportunities or social exclusion, and whether or not they are afforded 
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affirmative remediation. ECDIS is coded in the Minorities at Risk database as a five-
point categorical measure – ‘0’ for countries with no discrimination against minorities 
and ‘4’ for countries with highest level of discrimination against minority group/groups 
(Minorities at Risk Project, 2009, p.11). The Minorities at Risk project reports data for all 
possible minority groups in a country for 176 countries. The dataset provides a score of 
discrimination for each minority group. I use the score for the group which suffers the 
worst form of discrimination in a particular country; therefore the highest economic 
discrimination score is used in my models to represent the highest level of discrimination. 
This method has been used in other empirical studies of domestic terrorism (Piazza, 
2011). 
I combine these two measures – level of heterogeneity (0 to 80) and level of 
economic discrimination (0 to 4 – 0 for no economic discrimination and 4 for extreme 
economic discrimination) and convert it into a 0 to 4 index in the following way to 
operationalize heterogeneity cost.  
 
 
Therefore, heterogeneity cost measures the combined effect of the presence of 
heterogeneity in a country and the extent of group/groups’ deprivation from the political 
and economic benefits of public goods. This measure has not been used before and is an 
original contribution to the research on domestic terrorism.13    
                                                 
 
13 I ran models using ‘heterogeneity index’ (Vanhanen, 2010) and ‘minority discrimination index’ (MAR, 
2009) separately. ‘Heterogeneity index’ has no relationship with domestic terrorism. But ‘minority 
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The second independent variable is immature or unconsolidated democracy. I use 
the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010) to operationalize regime type. The 
Polity IV conceptual scheme examines concomitant qualities of democratic and 
autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive 
forms of governance. This perspective envisions a spectrum of governing authority that 
spans from fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, authority 
regimes to fully institutionalized democracies. The “Polity Score” captures this regime 
authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 
(consolidated democracy) and consists of six component measures that record key 
qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political 
competition. It also records changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing 
authority. I generate a dummy variable ‘Immature Democracies’14 coded 1 for all the 
countries that score +6 through +9 on the combined 21 points democracy-autocracy scale. 
These less institutionalized democratic countries have some, but not all the democratic 
institutional features that consolidated democracies have. All the rest of the countries on 
the Polity IV scale are coded as 0.15 This characterization of immature or unconsolidated 
democracies is consistent with dichotomous measures employed by other scholars in 
international relations (Mitchell and Prins, 1999). I create three other categories of regime 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
discrimination index’ is positively related with domestic terrorism at a level of statistical significance that 
supports Piazza’s (2011) findings. The models are provided in the Appendix. 
14 Immature democracy and unconsolidated democracy are interchangeably used in my dissertation. 
15 For robustness check I ran several models with different regime types all opertionalized using the Polity 
IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). ‘Full Democracy’ operationized as a dummy variable (1) for all 
countries with a Polity score of +10 has no relationship with domestic terrorism. ‘Anocracy’ (-5 through +5 
in Polity scale) is negatively related with domestic terrorism at a statistically significant level. But 
‘autocracy’ (less than -5 in Polity scale) has no relationship with domestic terrorism. All those models and 
a table showing relationship between regime types and domestic terrorism are provided in the Appendix.   
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types – all dummy variables. Full democracy consists of all the countries with a 
combined score of +10 in Polity IV 21-points autocracy-democracy scale. All countries 
scoring -5 through +5 in the Polity IV scale are coded as anocracy. Autocracy stands for 
all the countries that score -10 through -6 in the combined autocracy-democracy scale. 
Finally, the third independent variable is global economic integration or economic 
globalization. Two direct indicators of economic globalization are trade openness and 
foreign direct investment. In the globalization literature, both economists and political 
scientists have widely used these indicators as standard measures of economic 
globalization and national integration into the global economy (Gissinger and Gleditsch, 
1999; Li and Schaub, 2004). They capture, respectively, two distinct and significant 
dimensions of economic globalization - exchange of goods and services, and monetary 
capital.  More specifically, FDI denotes the annual sum of the value of inflow and 
outflow of the foreign direct investments of a country as a percentage of the country’s 
GDP. TRADE is the annual sum of the value of imports and exports of the goods and 
services of a country as a percentage of the country’s GDP. Both trade and FDI are used 
as percentage of GDP to assess the extent of economic integration in relation to the size 
of a country’s economy. Data for these two variables are taken from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2011). Both Trade and FDI are lagged by one to 
control for endogeneity. 
Control Variables 
I include in all models a host of controls that frequently appear in empirical 
studies of terrorism (Li, 2005; Wade and Reiter, 2007; Piazza, 2011). The size of a 
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country is often used in empirical studies of terrorism with the expectation that bigger 
countries might experience greater numbers of attacks than smaller ones. Moreover, the 
theoretical expectation is that greater country size is a major indicator of greater 
heterogeneity cost. I therefore measure size by geographic area of all countries in the 
sample to use them in my models. The size of a country is mostly constant over the years, 
but it varies across the 172 countries in the models. In the sample, there are countries 
such as Maldives (298 sq. km.), Malta (316 sq. km.), and Grenada (344 sq. km.) which 
are small in size. On the other hand, huge countries like Russia (17,098,242 sq. km.), 
Canada (9,984,670 sq. km.) and United States (9,826,675 sq. km.) also figure in the 
dataset (CIA Factbook, 2013). A country’s population can also be used to measure size, 
but geographical area and population of countries are highly correlated. Therefore, I use 
only geographical area in my empirical models. Geographical area has been used as a 
control variable in terrorism research (Li, 2005; Abedie, 2006; Pizza, 2011). The data on 
this control variable come from the United Nations Statistics Division (2011). 
The relationship between economic development and terrorism remains a 
contentious issue in terrorism research. As I have elaborated in the literature review 
section, findings on terrorism are inconclusive of the relation between terrorism and 
poverty. While most studies conclude that people from economically developed countries 
are as likely to engage in terrorism as the people from less developed countries, some 
empirical studies find that terrorism originating in a country is positively associated with 
the country’s wealth or economic development (Burgoon, 2006; Berrebi, 2007; Lai, 
2007; Piazza, 2011). If economic and political opportunities facilitate terrorism, I would 
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expect domestic terrorism to increase with the level of economic development. 
Otherwise, poverty might itself create grievances among people; hence terrorism might 
decrease with economic development. Therefore, I include Gross National Income per 
capita held at constant 2000 US dollars as a control variable in my empirical models. 
GNI per capita is lagged one period in the models. Data for this control variable are taken 
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2011).  
Crenshaw (1981) argues that a state’s inability to effectively tackle violence 
might exacerbate the problem of domestic terrorism. Lai (2007) argues that states are 
likely to be greater producers of terrorism when they impose low costs on groups for 
mobilizing and operating out of that state. When groups are deciding the resources to 
allocate to terrorist activities, the cost of operating is probably an important 
consideration. States with low-cost environments reduce the operating expenses of a 
terrorist organization, allowing them to funnel more resources into the actual production 
of terrorism. Thus, groups that are already in low-cost environments can devote more 
resources towards terrorist activities than groups in high cost environments. Research on 
factors leading terrorists to target states (Enders and Sandler, 2002; Berrebi and 
Lakdawalla, 2007) and those contributing to the onset of civil wars (Fearon and Laitin, 
2003) have shown that governments with greater ability to impose costs on groups face 
fewer incidents of political violence. Although dissatisfied groups may exist within every 
state, the ability for these groups to recruit, organize, and train is likely to be contingent 
on their ability to avoid detection by the government (Lai, 2007).  
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A fragile state may be an ideal breeding ground for domestic terrorist organization 
because of the ease with which the groups can operate. I use the state fragility index - a 0 
to 25 composite score of political effectiveness and legitimacy (Marshall and Cole, 2010) 
- as a control variable in the models. The index is available from 1995 to 2010; hence I 
follow imputation method used in other terrorism studies (Piazza, 2011) to address 
missing observations. I expect state fragility to be positively associated with domestic 
terrorism.  
Eyerman (1998) and Li (2005) find the age of the current political regime to be a 
negative predictor of terrorism. I therefore control for regime duration, which is 
calculated as the number of years the current regime has ruled, using data from the Polity 
IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). The intuitive logic is that frequent regime 
change might prevent the government from pursuing a long term counterterrorism policy 
and provide the terrorist groups opportunities to organize. Crenshaw (1981) has asserted 
that a history of violence is a major predictor of terrorism in a given country. The culture 
of violence has been emphasized by scholars in several case studies. Shabad and Ramo 
(1995), in their case study on Basque terrorism in Spain, have argued that the reason of 
the continuation of violence in that region is that the culture of violence had been 
legitimized in Basque country. A post-civil war generation of Basque grew up in a 
climate of physical and symbolic violence and repression that was transmitted to the 
following generation. Similarly, Green (1995) in his case study of post-1926 terrorism in 
Iran emphasized that people as well as the state in Iran chose mainly a violent means of 
political expression, although other peaceful means were followed to a far lesser extent, 
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because of the culture of violence that was routinized in Iranian society. So I include a 
history variable as one of the controls in the model. It is simply a lag of the dependent 
variable, as the previous year’s violent activities by the terrorist organizations can be a 
good predictor of this year’s attacks. 
Terrorism is frequently urban warfare. Urbanization is part of the modern trend 
toward aggregation and complexity, which increases the number and accessibility of 
targets (Crenshaw, 1981, p.382). Hobsbawn (1973, pp.226-227) has pointed out that 
cities became the arena for terrorism after the urban renewal projects of the late 
nineteenth century France. Pomper (1995) in his case study on Russian revolutionary 
terrorism pointed out the role of urban intelligentsia and how their failure to engage the 
rural masses propelled the revolutionary to choose the extreme methods of terrorism. The 
revolutionaries came from urban educated elites and almost always enjoyed support of a 
section of urban intelligentsia with limited appeal to the masses (p.76). Therefore, I 
expect urbanization will increase terrorism and include urban population as a percentage 
of a country’s total population as a control variable.  
Unemployment might increase domestic terrorism because it would be easier for 
the terrorist organization to recruit cadres if people are jobless. Moreover, unemployment 
might create grievances among the section of jobless people. If the distribution of public 
goods is uneven, we would expect more unemployed people among the deprived sections 
than others. In that case, terrorist organizations might exploit the grievances of the 
unemployed. Therefore, I include total unemployment as a percentage of a countries total 
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labor force as another control variable.16 The data on urban population and 
unemployment come from World Bank (2011). A summary of the data on independent 
variables and control variables are presented in Table 2. 
It is important to note here that Afghanistan and Iraq are dropped from the models 
because of missing data on many independent and control variables for those two 
countries. Therefore, I do not include ‘at war’ as a control variable. 
Analysis and Results 
As mentioned earlier, I use a set of zero-inflated negative binomial regression 
models on the incidence of domestic terrorism on a database of 172 countries from 1990 
to 2007. Owing to missing data for some cases, the sample size varies between 2,763 and 
2,787 observations, depending on the model. Because the dependent variable is an event 
count, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates can be inefficient, inconsistent, and biased 
(Long, 1997).  My decision to use zero-inflated negative binomial estimators – rather 
than ordinary least squares, Poisson or standard negative binomial models – is 
recommended by several unique features of the dependent variable. First, it is an interval 
measurement that cannot include negative values. Second, it is highly unevenly 
distributed across cases and years, resulting in wide difference between mean and 
standard deviation (see Table 1). The Poisson regression model is often applied to model 
event counts, in which the mean of the Poisson distribution is conditional on the 
independent variables. But the Poisson regression model assumes that the conditional 
mean of the dependent variable equals the conditional variance. This assumption, which  
                                                 
 
16 I ran models with regional dummies, but the results remained the same. A model with regional dummies 
is provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of variables 
 
Variable                        Number of Obs.      Mean           Std. Dev.         Min.          Max 
 
 
Heterogeneity Cost 2969 0.59 0.64 0 3.05 
      
Immature  Democracy 3077 0.28 0.44 0 1 
      
Trade 2966 82.44 47.48 0 438.09 
      
Foreign Direct Inv. 2944 6.91 45.26 -88.89 1129.83 
      
History 2808 7.45 29.48 0 523 
      
Log Area 3072 11.85 2.14 5.7 16.64 
      
Log GNI 3037 7.53 1.68 0.98 14.54 
      
Regime Duration 3041 22.79 29.07 0 198 
      
Unemployment 2963 11.31 11.27 0 70 
      
Fragility 3006 9.79 6.85 0 24 
      
Urban Population 2970 52.61 23.3 5.4 100 
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may be violated in my models, would cause underestimated standard errors and spurious 
statistical significance (Li and Schaub, 2004). Finally, it contains a large number of zero 
values in country-cases. More than sixty percent of the observations in the sample are 
zero. These elements – over-dispersion and the preponderance of zero values for the 
dependent variable (see Table 1) – suggest the use of zero-inflated negative binomial 
techniques. This decision is supported by Vuong tests, included in the results, and 
goodness of fit tests that recommend zero-inflated negative binomial estimations rather 
than negative binomial or Poisson estimations. Statistical models for the time-series, 
cross-sectional data as used in my models often suffer heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation in the error term. To deal with these potential problems, I estimate robust 
standard errors clustered by country. These estimated standard errors are robust to both 
heteroskedasticity and to a general type of serial correlation within any cross-sectional 
unit (Rogers 1993; Williams 2000). The inclusion of the lagged incidents as ‘History’ 
variable also helps to absorb temporal dependence in the data. 
In all models, I have included the vuong option which provides a test of the zero-
inflated model versus the standard negative binomial model along with the zip option 
which provides a likelihood ratio test of alpha=0 (basically zinb versus zip). In all my 
models the likelihood ratio tests that alpha = 0 is significantly different from zero. This 
suggests that data are overdispersed and that a zero-inflated negative binomial model is 
more appropriate than a zero-inflated Poisson model. The Vuong test suggests that the 
zero-inflated negative binomial model is a significant improvement over a standard 
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negative binomial model. The Wald test of the model fit is statistically significant at 99% 
level as well. 
The zero-inflated negative binomial model results presented in Table 3 include 
four of the same covariates in the inflated, certain-zero equations as are in the count 
equations. Drakos and Gofas (2006), in their piece on underreporting bias in quantitative 
studies of terrorism, argue against full specification of the inflated equation in zero-
inflated negative modeling and recommend instead including only covariates associated 
with ‘certain-zero’ countries: regime type. They assume that certain-zero countries 
appear to be so in the data because they lack free media that would report on terrorist 
events. I include four covariates of the count equations in the inflated, certain zero 
equations – state fragility, unemployment, regime duration and full democracy. These 
variables can be related to the underdeveloped as well as authoritarian countries. Full 
democracy, a dummy variable where all countries with perfect 10 on the combined 
autocracy-democracy score in Polity IV scale are counted as 1 and the ‘others’ as 0, 
should theoretically have a negative co-efficient in the inflated, certain zero equations. As 
expected ‘full democracy’ has a statistically significant negative co-efficient in the 
inflated, certain zero equations. 
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Results  
Table 3 presents results for the benchmark model IV and its variants (models I, II 
and II) for the robustness check. Below, I first focus on the results of the benchmark 
model as far hypotheses 1 to 3 are concerned and then discuss the interpretations of my 
analysis. Both the heterogeneity cost and immature democracy are statistically significant  
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Table 3. Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Models  
 
Independent Variable                     Model I          Model II          Model III           Model IV 
(Count Model)  
Heterogeneity Cost 
 
 
                     0.352* 
                    (0.155) 
 
0.354* 
(0.157) 
 
0.325* 
(0.149) 
 
0.303* 
(0.149) 
 
Immature Democracy 
 
 
                     ------ 
 
0.714** 
(0.253) 
 
          ------ 
 
0.689** 
(0.243) 
 
Autocracy 
 
 
                     ------ 
 
0.144 
(0.254) 
 
          ------ 
 
0.117 
(0.257) 
 
Full Democracy 
 
 
                     ------ 
 
0.781 
(0.503) 
 
          ------ 
 
0.411 
(0.495) 
 
Tradet-1 
 
 
                     ------ 
 
             ----- 
                                                   
-0.01** 
(0.002) 
-0.010** 
(0.002) 
 
Foreign Direct Inv.t-1 
 
 
                     ------ 
 
             ----- 
 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
 
History 
 
 
                   0.043** 
                    (0.007) 
 
0.040** 
(0.007) 
 
0.042** 
(0.008) 
 
0.040** 
(0.007) 
 
Log Area 
 
 
                   0.243** 
                    (0.051) 
 
0.231** 
(0.051) 
 
0.144** 
(0.056) 
 
0.125* 
(0.055) 
 
Log GNIt-1 
 
 
                   0.475** 
                    (0.133) 
 
0.445** 
(0.151) 
 
0.461** 
(0.138) 
 
0.485** 
(0.158) 
 
Regime Duration 
 
 
                     -0.002 
                    (0.003) 
 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
 
Unemployment 
 
 
                       0.001 
                    (0.007) 
 
0.004 
(0.007) 
 
0.009 
(0.008) 
 
0.013 
(0.008) 
 
Fragility 
 
 
                   0.093** 
                    (0.027) 
 
0.120** 
(0.030) 
 
0.081** 
(0.026) 
 
0.102** 
(0.028) 
 
Urban Population 
 
                     -0.007 
                    (0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
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Table 3. Continued 
Independent variable 
 
 
 
                  Model I 
 
 
Model II 
 
 
Model III 
 
 
Model IV 
Constant 
 
                 -6.537** 
                      (1.25) 
-6.904** 
(1.223) 
-4.466** 
(1.311) 
-4.889** 
(1.264) 
Inflated Logit (Certain Zero) 
 
Fragility 
 
 
-0.298* 
(0.134) 
 
-0.284* 
(0.130) 
 
-0.309* 
(0.134) 
 
-0.302* 
(0.131) 
 
Unemployment 
 
 
0.084** 
(0.026) 
 
0.096* 
(0.041) 
 
0.090** 
(0.028) 
 
0.093** 
(0.033) 
 
Regime Duration 
 
 
0.067** 
(0.015) 
 
0.072* 
(0.029) 
 
0.069** 
(0.017) 
 
0.068** 
(0.021) 
 
Full Democracy 
 
 
-37.339** 
(3.064) 
 
-36.33** 
(3.483) 
 
-34.857** 
(3.020) 
 
-34.748** 
(2.987) 
 
Constant 
 
-2.097 
(1.660) 
-2.856 
(3.226) 
-2.29 
(1.899) 
-2.427 
(2.993)  
 
 
Num. of Obs. 2787 2787 2763 2763 
Non-zero Obs. 1096 1096 1094 1094 
Zero Obs. 1691 1691 1669 1669 
Wald χ² 143.78** 147.1** 191.25** 226.17** 
LR Test (a=0)        2.5e+04**        2.3e+04**        2.4e+04**        2.2e+04** 
Vuong z Test 3.55**              2.61**               3.43**              2.66** 
     
      
Note: Dependent Variable is the country year counts of domestic terrorist incident.  
Robust standard errors are clustered by country in parentheses. Anocracy is used as the 
baseline regime category in all the models. 
(† p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01) 
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in the hypothesized directions. With a 1 unit increase in ‘heterogeneity cost’ score for a 
country, the rate of incidents of domestic terrorism in a year would increase by a factor of 
1.3548 on average in that country while controlling all other variables in the model. More 
substantially, a 1 unit increase in ‘heterogeneity cost’ increases the expected number of 
domestic terrorist incidents in a country by 35.4% on average, controlling for other 
variables in the model. Thus, the higher a country’s ‘heterogeneity cost’ score is, the 
more predicted incidents of domestic terrorism. It is significant at 95% level of 
confidence. The expected rate of domestic terrorist incidents in an Immature Democracy 
is 1.9928 times of that in an Anocracy when all other variables in the model are 
controlled for. Therefore, an Immature Democracy is about 1.9 times more vulnerable to 
domestic terrorist incidents than Anocracy17 when all other variables are controlled for. 
In other words, immature or unconsolidated democracy experiences 99.2% more 
domestic terrorist incidents on average than anocracy, when all other variables in the 
model are controlled for. This is significant at 99% level of confidence. Hypotheses 1 and 
2 that expected higher heterogeneity cost and immature democracies are likely to increase 
domestic terrorism are supported at a statistically significant level.  
One of the measures of economic globalization, Foreign Direct Investment, is not 
related to the rate of terrorist incidents; the coefficient for Foreign Direct Investment does 
                                                 
 
17 I tested several models using different regime types as baseline categories. When autocracy is used as a 
baseline category, the result is the same as in model IV (table 3). Immature democracy has a statistically 
significant positive coefficient. Neither full democracy nor anocracy reaches level of statistical 
significance. In a model with full democracy as a baseline category, no regime type has any statistical 
relationship with terrorism. When immature democracy is used as a baseline category, anocracy and 
autocracy have statistically significant negative coefficients, but full democracy is neither more nor less 
vulnerable to domestic terrorism than immature democracy. 
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not reach statistical significance. On the other hand, the other measure of economic 
globalization, Trade, is negatively associated with domestic terrorism at a statistically 
significant level. A one percent increase in international trade of a country in relation to 
its GDP results in change in the rate of domestic terrorist incidents in that country by a 
factor of 0.9893 on average, controlling for all other variables in the model. More 
specifically, a 1% increase in the average international trade of a country decreases the 
expected rate of domestic terrorist incidents in that country by 1.07% on average, 
controlling for all other variables. This is significant at a 99% level of confidence.  I 
hypothesized (H 3) that international trade as a percentage of GDP was likely to result in 
greater number of domestic terrorist incidents. This hypothesis was not supported.18  
A number of control variables including regional dummies are statistically 
significant in the expected directions. A history of terrorist violence in a country, 
operationalized as a lag of the dependent variable, is a positive predictor of terrorism. The 
rate of domestic terrorist incidents for a country is 1.04 if the country suffered terrorist 
incidents the previous year by one, controlling for all the other variables in the model. 
Had a country experienced 1more incident the previous year, the country is likely to 
suffer from 4% more incidents of domestic terrorism in time t, controlling for all other 
variables in the model. This is significant at 99% level of confidence. This is consistent 
with the expectation by scholars that both the presence and the absence of terrorist 
activities tend to be persistent. Terrorist groups, once operational, tend to engage in 
activities continuously. Similarly, terrorist groups may experience greater difficulties in 
                                                 
 
18 I discuss this finding in the ‘conclusion’ section of this chapter. 
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setting up operations in countries that rarely experience terrorist incidents (Li and 
Schaub, 2004). 
The size of a country is positively related to the rate of terrorist incident at a 99% 
level of statistical significance. The expectation that bigger countries might experience 
greater numbers of attacks than smaller ones is supported in the models. The theoretical 
expectation that greater country size as a major indicator of greater heterogeneity cost 
(Alesina and Spolaore, 2003) will increase domestic terrorism receives empirical support. 
Per capita Gross National Income is positively related to the rate of terrorist incidents at a 
statistically significant level. This finding supports earlier empirical studies that terrorism 
originating in a country is positively associated with the country’s wealth or economic 
development (Burgoon, 2006; Berrebi, 2007; Lai, 2007; Piazza, 2011). My theoretical 
expectation was that economic and political opportunities would facilitate terrorism; 
hence the finding that a country’s wealth or development in terms of per capita GNI is a 
positive predictor of domestic terrorism gives indirect support to Hypothesis 3.  
A one unit increase in the ‘State Fragility Index’ for a country increases the 
expected rate of incidents of domestic terrorism in a year by a factor of 1.1079 in that 
country while all other variables in the model are controlled for. It is significant at a 99% 
level of confidence. In other words, a 1 unit increase in the ‘State Fragility Index’ 
increases expected domestic terrorist incidents by 10.79%, controlling for all other 
variables in the model. This finding is compatible with earlier findings that weak states 
are ideal breeding grounds for internal conflicts like civil wars and insurgencies (Fearon 
and Laitin, 2003). The terrorist groups’ activity in freely recruiting, organizing, and 
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training is likely to be contingent on their ability to avoid detection by the government 
(Lai, 2007).  
An interpretation of the benchmark model in terms of change in rate of domestic 
terrorist incidents with discrete changes in independent variables that are statistically 
significant is presented in Table 4. The change in predicted rate of terrorist incidents due 
to one independent variable is calculated while keeping all the other count variables at 
their mean and all the categorical variables at their modal value of zero using ‘prchange’ 
command of Long and Freese (2005) in Stata. If ‘heterogeneity cost’ is increased from its 
minimum value to the maximum value, there is a likelihood of 2.07 or 2 (rounded) more 
cases of domestic terrorist incident a year. Similarly, change from other regime types to 
immature or unconsolidated democracy will result in 1.61 more incidents annually. If 
trade as percentage of GDP goes from its minimum to maximum value, there is a 
likelihood of 3.85 or 4 (rounded) fewer cases of terrorist incident per year. If the number 
of terrorist incident in the previous year changes from 0 to 1, there will be 0.05 more 
incidents this year. Similarly, if log GNI, state fragility score and log area are changed 
from their minimum to maximum values, there will be 47.7, 7.15 and 2.02 more cases of 
terrorist incidents annually.  
Table 5 shows the results of interaction models that are designed to test 
hypotheses 4 and 5 in Chapter Three. In model V both heterogeneity cost and immature 
democracy remain positive predictors of terrorism, but the interaction term between 
heterogeneity cost and immature democracy does not reach statistical significance. The 
rate of terrorist incidents neither increases nor decreases in an immature or  
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Table 4.: Predicted Change in Terrorism (Benchmark Model)   
 
 
Independent Variable                              Unit Change             Effect on the yearly rate of  
                                                                                                  terrorist incidents 
 
 
   Heterogeneity Cost     Min - Max        + 2.07 
     
  Immature 
  Democracy     0 - 1        + 1.61 
     
   Tradet-1     Min - Max        - 3.85 
     
   History     0 - 1        + 0.049 
     
   Log GNIt-1     Min - Max        + 47.7 
     
   State Fragility     Min - Max        + 7.15 
     
   Log Area     Min - Max        + 2.2 
     
 
Min – Max: Change from minimum value of the independent to its maximum value. 
0-1: Change from value 0 to value 1 of the independent variable. 
Note: The change in predicted rate of incidents due to one independent variable is  
calculated while keeping all the count variables at their mean and all the categorical  
variables at 0 (modal value).                
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Table 5. Interaction Models 
 
Independent Variable                 Model V              Model VI                       Model VII 
                                                    (Pol. Model)         (Trade Model)                (FDI Model) 
Count Model (Non Certain Zero) 
 
Heterogeneity Cost  0.399*(0.193)   0.033(0.235) 0.359*(0.152) 
    
Immature Democracy 0.594*(0.263)                      -----                       ---- 
    
Tradet-1                  -----  -0.013**(0.003)                       ---- 
    
Foreign Direct Inv.t-1                  -----                      ----- -0.022(0.16) 
    
Heterogeneity Cost* 
Immature Democracy -0.171(0.22)                      -----                       ---- 
    
Heterogeneity Cost*  
Tradet-1                 ----- 0.004(0.003)                       ---- 
    
Heterogeneity Cost*  
Foreign Direct Inv.t-1                 -----                     ----- -0.004(0.017) 
    
History 0.04**(0.007) 0.043**(0.008) 0.042**(0.007) 
    
Log Area 0.227**(0.05) 0.157**(0.057) 0.209**(0.055) 
    
Log GNIt-1 0.539**(0.133) 0.425**(0.138) 0.513**(0.131) 
    
Regime Duration -0.001(0.003) -0.003(0.003) -0.002(0.003) 
    
Unemployment 0.004(0.007) 0.009(0.009) 0.002(0.007) 
    
Fragility 0.1**(0.028) 0.075**(0.026) 0.097**(0.027) 
    
Urban Population -0.01(0.006) -0.005(0.007) -0.006(0.006) 
    
Constant -6.925**(1.2) -4.057**(1.375) -6.390**(1.234) 
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Table 5. Continued. 
                                       Model V               Model VI                  Model VII        
                                 (Pol. Model)           (Trade Model)              (FDI Model) 
 
Inflated Logit (Certain Zero) 
 
Fragility    -0.294*(0.127) -0.298*(0.132) -0.308*(0.135) 
    
Unemployment 0.079**(0.022) 0.092**(0.027) 0.079**(0.028) 
    
Regime Duration 0.061**(0.015) 0.069**(0.017) 0.067**(0.015) 
    
Full Democracy -36.03**(3.165) -36.591**(2.989) -34.362**(3.187) 
    
Constant -1.726(1.34) -2.461(1.984) -1.865(1.548) 
 
 
Num. of Obs. 2787 2785 2763 
    
Non Zero Obs. 1096 1095 1094 
    
Zero Obs. 1691 1690 1669 
    
Wald χ² 176.52** 211.64** 166.83** 
    
LR Test (a=0)                2  .3e+04**          2.4e+04**          2.4e+04** 
    
Vuong z                       3.68**                3.33**                 3.69** 
     
 
Note: Dep. Variable is the country year counts of domestic terrorist incident. Robust  
standard errors are clustered by country in parentheses.  
Significance Level: († p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01) 
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unconsolidated democracy with higher levels of heterogeneity cost. Hypothesis 4 is not 
supported. Similarly, trade remains a negative predictor of domestic terrorist incidents at 
a statistically significant level in model VI. But the interaction-term between 
heterogeneity cost and trade, in spite of the positive sign of the coefficient, does not reach 
statistical significance. Therefore, I do not find support for hypothesis 5; trade neither 
decreases nor increases rates of domestic terrorist incidents in the presence of 
heterogeneity cost. Lastly, model VII (see Table 4) shows that the interaction term 
between heterogeneity cost and Foreign Direct Investment is not statistically significant. 
Foreign Direct Investment was not related to terrorism (see Table 3) in my empirical 
finding. I also do not find support for the interactive hypothesis (H5) in relation to 
heterogeneity cost and FDI. Therefore, Foreign Direct Investment as a percentage of a 
country’s GDP neither increases nor decreases domestic terrorist incidents even in the 
presence of heterogeneity and discrimination. 
Conclusion 
Some of the findings of my cross country study here need further explanation. I 
find little support for hypotheses 4 and 5. Although heterogeneity cost and immature 
democracy as a regime type lead to increases in domestic terrorism, the presence of 
heterogeneity and discrimination in a immature democracy neither increases nor 
decreases incidents of domestic terrorism.  I argue that political and economic 
discrimination of minority group/groups in a heterogeneous country is one of the reasons 
for domestic terrorism. Domestic terrorism is a problem even in more or less 
homogeneous countries with no group discrimination. Haiti has no minority 
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discrimination as per MAR data, but the country has experienced 109 incidents of 
domestic terrorism between 1990 and 2007 (Enders et. al., 2011). Similarly, terrorist 
activities by dominant groups in many Western European countries and the United States 
cannot be explained by minority discrimination. In my models, I do not include other 
types of possible grievances such as racial enmity, perceived threat from new immigrants 
or fear of losing privileged positions in society or state, although I control for a number 
of variables like inequality, unemployment, and urbanization which could well constitute 
other types of grievances. There is likely to be higher levels of domestic terrorism in an 
immature democracy, but possible presence of other types of grievances along with 
minority discrimination might dilute the marginal effect of heterogeneity cost in an 
immature democracy in predicting higher levels of domestic terrorism. 
Another important finding that trade alleviates the problem of domestic terrorism 
needs explanation. For Neo-liberals, an open economy leads to a higher level of 
economic development. In turn, this leads to peace, both directly and through the 
promotion of democracy (Hegre et. al., 2003). This argument naturally follows from the 
supposition that a primary cause of terrorism is underdevelopment and poverty, an 
argument that recently became popular among policy makers and scholars (Biden 2001; 
Bush 2002; Rice 2001; Tyson 2001). Poor economic conditions create “terrorist breeding 
grounds,” where disaffected populations turn to terrorist activities as a solution to their 
problems (Li and Schaub, 2004). Free trade boosts economic growth and generates 
greater income for the people whose increased opportunity costs might dissuade them 
from resorting to terrorism. The World Bank (1996, Ch. 2) argues along the same lines, 
 
112 
pointing out that China and Vietnam have experienced considerable economic growth 
after replacing parts of their centrally planned economies with free trade and market 
liberalism. Rodrik (1997) argues that an open economy provides a higher level of welfare 
in rich countries. States redistribute the assets from trade to income transfers, protecting 
workers against risks (especially illness and unemployment) or supporting them in old 
age (Vayrynen, 1997, p.76). Therefore, redistribution by a state might alleviate people’s 
grievances arising out of the unsettling forces of free trade and make resorting to 
terrorism a less attractive option.  
But the assumption that terrorism is a function of poverty is not empirically 
supported in many studies. Scholars like Hamilton, Moss, Clutterbuck and Laqueur argue 
that terrorism is typically the work of the idle elites and arises during periods of affluence 
rather than desperate poverty (cited in Schmid and Jongman, 1988, p.66). We observe 
more terrorism in the United States, France, Spain and Japan than in poor African 
countries like Eritrea, Central African Republic, Burundi, Malawi and such countries in 
poverty-ridden Sub-Saharan Africa. Large-N and regional level empirical studies have 
not found any relationship between poverty and terrorism (Feldmann and Perala, 2004; 
Abadie, 2006; Berrebi, 2007; Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008).  In model IV (see Table 3) 
per capita Gross National Income is positively related with the rate of terrorist incidents 
at a statistically significant level. Therefore, the assumption that economic prosperity that 
results from international trade alleviates the problem of domestic terrorism is not 
supported by the empirical findings of this study.  
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One explanation for these results is that domestic terrorism may reduce 
international trade, thus lowering a country’s level of economic integration to the world. 
In such a case, we would observe a negative correlation between terrorism and openness 
because of the impact of terrorism on openness rather than because openness causes a 
decline in terrorism. In other words, countries can trade more extensively because they, 
for some reasons, are not victims of domestic terrorism. Several studies on civil war have 
received empirical support that civil wars reduce international trade flows (Bayer and 
Rupert, 2004; Martin et al., 2008; Magee and Massoud, 2011). The same phenomenon 
may also be occurring with domestic terrorism.  
Moreover, countries highly integrated into the global economy have two common 
features: high political effectiveness and state legitimacy. The five most open countries in 
terms of trade as percentage of GDP, Singapore, Luxemburg, Netherland, Belgium and 
Ireland (World Bank, 2011), are low in state fragility index - a 0 to 25 scale composite 
score of political effectiveness and legitimacy (Marshall and Cole, 2010). Only Singapore 
is an autocracy while the others are all fully institutionalized democracies. These 
countries are more or less free from the menace of domestic terrorism. Their strong 
political institutions and immunity from the problem of terrorism might contribute to 
greater openness. I think this observation provides an avenue for future research to 
explore the causal direction of trade and domestic terrorism.  
In Chapter Five, I test my five hypotheses on a regional dataset on South Asia for 
the same temporal domain between 1990 and 2007. In my empirical analysis, I narrow 
down my focus on South Asia because of the convergence of almost all the explanatory 
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factors as per Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) theoretical expectations. India, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka are highly heterogeneous in demographic composition; Nepal and Bangladesh 
follow the same pattern. All these countries have minorities who are discriminated and 
are characterized by center-periphery conflict. Therefore, my hypotheses are likely to be 
supported on a regional study of South Asia and Chapter Five would supplement my 
empirical findings on cross-country analysis in this chapter. 
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Chapter 5  
Deprivation and Homegrown Terrorism in South Asia 
 
How are post-Cold War economic integration and democratization related to 
domestic terrorism? In answering this question, I have argued that resorting to terrorism 
is a rational choice when individuals’ deprivation from public goods due to geographical 
and ideological distance from the ruling political elites increases; opportunity is provided 
by democratization and integration to the global economy. In the previous chapter, I have 
tested hypotheses drawn from this theoretical framework on a global dataset of domestic 
terrorism from 1990 to 2007. I found that discrimination indeed leads to homegrown 
terrorism and unconsolidated democracies experience more such terrorist incidents than 
other regime types. But global economic integration in the form of international trade 
reduces domestic terrorism in a country. In this chapter, I test the same hypotheses on a 
South Asian regional dataset for the same temporal domain. 
In this chapter, firstly, I discuss the reasons for choosing South Asia, emphasizing 
the issue of minority discrimination in each of the five countries of the region and 
situating the country’s problem of domestic terrorism in historical perspective. Secondly, 
I describe the research design for the empirical analysis on South Asia from 1990 to 2007 
in order to test the hypotheses formed in Chapter Three and present basic descriptive 
statistics. I also review trends of domestic terrorism in South Asia in this section.  Then, I 
present the results of negative binomial statistical models and provide interpretations of 
the results. Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of my findings. 
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I will confine my empirical analysis to five countries – India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, not because the prevalence of terrorism and terrorist 
groups in the countries, but due to the convergence of nearly all the explanatory factors in 
Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) theoretical model. India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are highly 
heterogeneous in demographic composition and in the politicization of heterogeneity; 
Nepal and Bangladesh also follow the same pattern, but to a lesser extent (Tambiah, 
1997). As a vast mosaic of ethnicities, languages, cultures, and religions, India’s internal 
instability resulting from diversity is further complicated by colonial legacies such as 
international borders that separate members of the same ethnic groups (Kronstadt and 
Voughn, 2005, p.37). Asymmetrical economic growth and a failure to ensure distributive 
justice led to regional disparities and social unrest that continue to fuel armed protest 
movements in India. Pakistan, another South Asian country to bear the brunt of 
homegrown terrorism, is also a divided society – the divisions running at two levels: 
sectarian and ethnic. From its very inception in 1947, a multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian 
state, Pakistan has been unable to consolidate a sense of united national identity (Mir, 
1999, p.69). The ethnic heterogeneity has a geographical dimension, which has resulted 
in violent separatist movements. Ethnically, every group has been discriminated at times 
by the most populous group, Punjabi, from share in employment to the distribution in 
resources (Talbot, 2002, p.51). Similarly, given Sunni numerical predominance, sectarian 
violence has spread across the country and is increasingly directed at disenfranchised 
targets such as Baluchistan’s Hazaras (a Shiite ethnic minority) and worshippers at Sufi 
shrines (Yusuf, 2012, p.1). In Sri Lanka too, ethnic heterogeneity has a geographical 
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dimension. The Sinhalese, the main ethnic group, are mostly concentrated in the south, 
west and central part of the country. The capital city Colombo is located in the Sinhalese 
majority central part of Sri Lanka. The Tamils form a majority in the north-east of the 
country and the Moors (Muslims) live in the east (Nubin, 2003, p.149). Thus, the Sri 
Lankan case can be construed as a center-periphery conflict where a heterogeneous 
people (the Tamils) are located far away from the capital. Being deprived from many 
public good provisions concentrated in the capital city of Colombo, the Tamils sought to 
redress their problem through a violent movement for a separate homeland.  
Scholars have interpreted the Maoist insurgency and terrorist violence in Nepal 
between 1996 and 2005 from ethnic as well as developmental angles. The hill high caste 
Hindus, Brahmin and Chhetri, and Newar (an urban ethnic group) – with their combined 
strength of 35 percent in total population of the country – have long been in a dominant 
position in the power structure of the country. Others, i.e. hill ethnic groups, Tarai caste 
and tribal groups, and Dalit are generally considered to be the excluded and marginalized 
groups. On the other hand, Bangladesh, a largely homogeneous country19, has been 
experiencing the menace of terrorism by disgruntled domestic groups since 1977. There 
are two major sources of terrorist violence in post-Liberation Bangladesh: ethno-
nationalist violence in the Chittagong Hill Track region in southeastern part (1977-1997), 
and Islamic terrorism (1999 onwards). The ethno-nationalist violence has largely 
subsided with the signing of a peace accord in 1997, but continues to persist (Mohsin, 
                                                 
 
19 Bangladesh is a predominantly Muslim country of 142 million people and the population data show that 
89.52% of the country’s population is Muslim, and the remaining 10.48 % consist of religious and ethnic 
minorities (Iva, 2011).  
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2003). But, the country has been witnessing rising Islamic radicalization, extremism and 
militancy in various manifestations since 1999.  
None of the five countries has transformed into a fully institutionalized 
democracy (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). Pakistan and Bangladesh have fluctuated 
between military dictatorship and elected government. Even Pakistan’s democratic rulers 
perpetuated the socioeconomic deprivation and cultural isolation of the minorities like 
Sindhi, Pushtun, Balochi and Mahajiri ethnic groups and denied them equal shares of 
power. Democratic institutions have failed to take root in Pakistan due to frequent 
interference from a powerful military which has undermined the rule of law in the 
country (Oldenburg, 2010). The most striking development in Bangladesh following the 
return of democracy in 1991 was the growth of religious parties which now attempt to 
replace the country’s incipient democracy with an Islamic theocracy through violent 
means (Ali, 2012). Religious parties like Jamaat-i-Islami have received government 
patronage as a part of coalition governments between 2001 and 2007 (Datta, 2007). Thus 
political expediency has prevented political elites from promoting the rule of law and 
impartial institution-building in Bangladesh. Nepal started its democratic transition in 
1990 that finally led to the abolition of monarchy in 2008 (Gellner and Hachhethu, 2008). 
The post-1990 politics in Nepal has been characterized by ambiguity of the Constitution, 
the King’s assertion of power against the spirit of constitutional monarchy, lack of 
effective leadership, political instability, and lack of institutionalization of party and 
parliament; and, finally, the exclusion of sizable section of people from the political 
process has impeded the task of democratic consolidation in Nepal (Baral, 2000; Hutt et 
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al., 1999; Brown, 1996). Nepal’s Maoist violence can best be explained in the context of 
exclusion of the minority ethnic groups in the process of democratization since 1990 
(Lawoti, 2007). Sri Lanka has only been a partially democratic country where the Tamil 
minority was deliberately kept out of a legitimate share of power through a calculated 
tactic of gerrymandering (Schmid, 1992). Lastly, as far as global economic integration is 
concerned, trade and foreign investment have steadily increased in South Asia in 
conformity with the global trends, although India has witnessed a greater hike in trade 
and investment in comparison to other countries in the region (World Bank, 2011).  
Presence of marginalized minority groups, unconsolidated democratic institutions 
and integration to global economy make South Asia an ideal area for empirical research 
in Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) theoretical framework. I expect both immature 
democracy and economic globalization to increase terrorism in the presence of 
heterogeneity cost in the region. In the following sections, I empirically test the theory’s 
implications in South Asia. 
Research Design 
To test the hypotheses, I use a set negative binomial regression models on the 
incidents of domestic terrorism using a country-year database of five countries from 1990 
to 2007. The unit of analysis is country-year. The count data on domestic terrorist 
incidents come from Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011) as discussed in Chapter 
Four.  
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Unit of Analysis 
Incidents of domestic terrorist attacks have fluctuated widely between 1970 and 
2007 in South Asia. The same can be said about the casualties from such incidents (see 
Figure 14). Domestic terrorism was not a problem in South Asia between 1970 and 1978 
with almost no incidents. The region first faced the problem in 1979, but incidents of 
domestic terrorism remained quite low between 1979 and 1983 compared to later years 
that show an annual average of about 22 incidents causing an average yearly death of 
approximately 42 persons. The number of incidents started rising steeply in 1984 and 
peaked at 601 in 1989 with 1404 deaths. For the next three years, terrorism sharply 
declined to 366 annual incidents on average, but domestic terrorism became more fatal 
than previous years. The year 1993 became the most peaceful year since the end of Cold 
War; only 27 incidents were reported with 224 deaths. 
Domestic terrorism again reached the pre-Cold War level of 563 incidents in 1995 
with 767 deaths, and then started declining with an average of 193 incidents causing 664 
deaths per year between 1996 and 2004. Incidents of terrorism started rising again in 
2005 and continue their upward move. The trends of domestic terrorist incidents roughly 
resemble a U-shape after 1995, declining considerably and then rising again starting in 
2005. The same trend can be seen in deaths from such incidents (see Figure 15). But, 
terrorism has been more fatal in the post Cold-War period, causing far greater deaths than 
the previous years. In the pre Cold-War period (1970-1989), 1.79 persons were killed in 
each incident on average (Enders et al., 2011). In the post Cold-War period (1990-2007),  
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 Figure 14.  Domestic Terrorism in South Asia 1970-2007 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Domestic Terrorism in South Asia 1990-2007 
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3.77 persons were reportedly killed in each incident on average. Thus, the severity of 
domestic terrorism in terms of death per incident has increased. 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable for my empirical models is a country-year count of 
domestic terrorist incidents derived from the above mentioned dataset developed by 
Enders et al. (2011). Figure 16 illustrates the distribution of domestic terrorism by 
country from 1990 and 2007. 
Independent Variables 
I have three independent variables that are designed to test the hypotheses: 
Heterogeneity Cost, Immature Democracy and Global Economic Integration. The 
operationalization of these three explanatory variables has been discussed in Chapter 
Four.  
Control Variables 
In addition, I include in all models a host of controls that frequently appear in 
empirical studies of terrorism (Li, 2005; Wade and Reiter, 2007; Piazza, 2011). 
Crenshaw (1981) has asserted that a history of violence is a major predictor of terrorism 
in a given country. The culture of violence has been emphasized by scholars in several 
case studies (Shabad and Ramo, 1995; Green, 1995). So I include a history variable as 
one of the controls in the model. It is simply a lag of the dependent variable, as the 
previous year’s violent activities by the terrorists can be a good predictor of this year’s 
attacks. Income inequality is used as a control variable. To operationalize income 
inequality, I use the same measure used by Abadie (2006), Li (2005), Li and Schaub 
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Figure 16. Histogram of Terrorism in South Asia 1990-2007 
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 (2004), and Piazza (2011): national Gini coefficients. Uneven distribution of public 
goods might result in inequality in the society; hence I expect Gini to be a positive 
predictor of domestic terrorism. The Gini index measures the extent to which the 
distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households 
within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 
represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality (World Bank, 
2011). 
In the case of the Gini, I impute values for years in which data are missing – Gini 
is published less frequently than once a year for some countries in the analysis – by just 
inserting the most recent value. This method of imputation is consistent with similar 
method employed by other scholars in international relations (Piazza, 2011). This 
variable is lagged by one year. 
Economic development is a contentious issue in terrorism research. Scholars’ 
findings on poverty as a driver of terrorism are inconclusive of any relationship. Some 
studies find that terrorism originating in a country is positively associated with the 
country’s wealth or economic development (Burgoon, 2006; Berrebi, 2007; Lai, 2007; 
Piazza, 2011). If economic and political opportunities facilitate terrorism, we would 
expect that domestic terrorism might increase with the level of economic development. 
Therefore, I include Gross Domestic Product per capita held at constant 2000 US dollars 
as a control variable in the empirical models. GDP per capita is lagged by one year. Data 
for this control variable are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2011). 
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Studies find the age of the current political regime to be a negative predictor of 
terrorism (Eyerman, 1998; Li, 2005). I therefore control for regime durability, which is 
calculated as the number of years the current regime has ruled, using data from the Polity 
IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). The intuitive logic is that frequent regime 
change might prevent the government in pursuing long term counterterrorism policy and 
provide the terrorist groups opportunity to organize. Unemployment might increase 
domestic terrorism because it would be easier for the terrorist organization to recruit 
cadres if people are jobless. Moreover, unemployment might create grievances among the 
section of jobless people. If the distribution of public goods is uneven, we would expect 
more unemployed people among the deprived than others. Terrorist organizations might 
exploit the grievances of the unemployed in the deprived section of people. Therefore, I 
include the total unemployment as a percentage of a countries total labor force as another 
control variable. The data on unemployment come from World Bank (2011).  
Crenshaw (1981) argues that a state’s inability to effectively tackle violence 
might exacerbate the problem; hence state fragility is likely to increase terrorism. A 
fragile state may be an ideal breeding ground for domestic terrorist organizations because 
of the ease with which the groups can operate (Lai, 2007). I use the state fragility index - 
a 0 to 25 scale composite score of political effectiveness and legitimacy (Marshall and 
Cole, 2010) - as a control variable in the models. The index is available from 1995 to 
2010; hence I use imputation to get the missing values. I expect state fragility to 
positively correlate with domestic terrorism. A summary of the independent and control 
variables is presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Summary Statistics of Independent Variables 
 
 
Variable              Number of Obs.      Mean           Std. Dev.                Min.              Max. 
 
 
Heterogeneity 
Cost 
90 
  
1.569 
  
0.889 
  
0.637 
  
2.625 
 
          
Immature  
Democracy 
90 
  
0.755 
  
0.496 
  
0 
  
1 
 
          
Trade 90  43.71  19.38  15.68  88.636 
          
Foreign Direct 
Inv. 90  0.826  0.843  -0.098  3.97 
          
History 85  49.14  62.1  0  383 
          
Inequality 90  37.89  5.38  30.6  50 
          
Economic 
Development 90  1475.57  825.07  491.13  4279.73 
          
Regime 
Durability 90  23.2  22.06  0  59 
          
Unemployment 90  5.93  3.22  1.845  14.7 
          
Fragility 90  15.48  2.08  12  20 
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Analysis and Results 
I use a set of negative binomial regression models on the incidence of domestic 
terrorism on a database of 5 countries from 1990 to 2007. Owing to missing data for 
some cases, the sample size is 85. Because the dependent variable is an event count 
variable, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates can be inefficient, inconsistent, and 
biased (Long, 1997).  The Poisson regression model is often applied to model event 
counts, in which the mean of the Poisson distribution is conditional on the independent 
variables. But the Poisson regression model assumes that the conditional mean of the 
dependent variable equals its conditional variance. This assumption which may be 
violated in my models (see Figure 6) would cause underestimated standard errors and 
spurious statistical significance (Li and Schaub, 2004). I tried Poisson regression and the 
main findings remained unchanged, but a likelihood ratio test showed that the negative 
binomial model is more suited to the data than a Poisson model. 
Negative Binomial Results 
Table 7 presents results for the benchmark model I and interaction models II, III 
and IV. Below, I first focus on the results of the benchmark model as far as hypotheses 1 
to 3 are concerned and then discuss the interaction models for hypotheses 4 and 5. Both 
the heterogeneity cost and immature democracy are statistically significant at the 
hypothesized directions. With a one unit increase in ‘heterogeneity cost’ score for a 
country, the rate of incidents of domestic terrorism in a year would increase by the factor 
of 1.461 on average in that country while controlling for all other variables in the model. 
In other words, a 1 point increase in the heterogeneity cost increases the annual rate of  
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Table 7. Negative Binomial Regression Models  
 
 
Independent Variable       Model I             Model II          Model III           Model IV   
 
 
 
Heterogeneity Cost 
  
0.379** 
(0.114)  
0.226 
(0.156)  
-0.551† 
(0.294)  
0.382** 
(0.04) 
         
Immature Democracy 
  
0.585** 
(0.148)  
0.014 
(0.073)  _____  _____ 
         
Trade 
  
-0.018† 
(0.009)  _____  
-0.062** 
(0.012)  _____ 
         
FDI 
  
0.401 
(0.318)  _____  _____  
-0.393 
(0.502) 
         
Heterogeneity Cost * 
Immature Democracy  _____  
0.478* 
(0.204)  _____  _____ 
         
Heterogeneity Cost * 
Trade  _____  _____  
0.031** 
(0.01)  _____ 
         
Heterogeneity Cost * 
FDI  _____  _____  _____  
0.301† 
(0.171) 
         
History 
  
0.003 
(0.002)  
0.004** 
(0.001)  
0.004** 
(0.001)  
0.004 
(0.002) 
         
Inequality 
  
-0.008 
(0.023)  
-0.056** 
(0.013)  
0.009 
(0.016)  
-0.002 
(0.035) 
         
Economic 
Development 
  
0.0001 
(0.0002)  
0.0004** 
(0.0001)  
0.0001 
(0.0001)  
-0.00002 
(0.0003) 
         
Regime Durability 
  
0.018* 
(0.008)  
0.002 
(0.005)  
0.017** 
(0.003)  
0.018* 
(0.008) 
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Table 7. Continued                                               
Unemployment 
  
Model I 
 
 
0.156** 
(0.041)  
 
Model II 
 
 
0.129* 
(0.062)  
 
Model III 
 
 
0.091† 
(0.047)  
 
Model IV 
 
 
0.038 
(0.056) 
         
State Fragility 
  
0.269** 
(0.054)  
0.25** 
(0.05)  
0.177** 
(0.044)  
0.239** 
(0.065) 
 
Constant 
  
-2.458 † 
(1.469)   
-0.884 
(0.752)  
0.64 
(0.873)  
-1.73 
(1.475) 
 
 
Number of Obs. 85  85  85  85 
         
Wald χ²  66.41**  62.48**  62.28**  60.98** 
         
LR Test (alpha=0) 1609.43**  1854.17**  1785.63**  1617.07**  
 
 
Note: Dependent Variable is the country year counts of domestic terrorist incident.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on country in parentheses. 
(† p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01) 
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terrorist incidents by 46.1% controlling for all other variables in the model. It is 
significant at a 99% level of confidence. The expected rate of domestic terrorist incidents 
in an Immature Democracy is 1.7953 times than that in other regime types when all other 
variables in the model are controlled for. Therefore, an Immature Democracy is about 
1.79 times as vulnerable to domestic terrorist incidents as a regime type other than 
Immature Democracy when all other variables are controlled for. Or, immature 
democracies are likely to experience 79% more domestic terrorist incidents than other 
regime types when all the other variables in the model are controlled for. This is 
significant at a 99% level of confidence as well. Hypotheses 1 and 2 that expected higher 
heterogeneity cost – level of deprivation from public goods due to heterogeneity- and 
immature or unconsolidated democracies are likely to increase domestic terrorism are 
supported in my study. The measures of economic globalization, Trade and Foreign 
Direct Investment, are not related to the rate of terrorist incidents; the coefficients for 
Trade and Foreign Direct Investment do not reach the level of statistical significance. 
Therefore, I do not find support for hypothesis 3 in my study.  
A number of control variables are statistically significant in the expected 
directions. A one unit increase in the ‘State Fragility Index’ for country increases the 
expected rate of incidents of domestic terrorism in a year by a factor of 1.3087 in that 
country while controlling for all other variables in the model. In other words, a 30.87% 
hike in domestic terrorist incident rate is predicted with a 1 unit increase in ‘State 
Fragility Index’ per year controlling for all other variables in the model.  It is significant 
at a 99% level of confidence. This finding is compatible with earlier findings that weak 
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states are ideal breeding grounds for internal conflicts like civil war and insurgencies 
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The terrorist groups’ activity in freely recruiting, organizing, 
and training is likely to be contingent on their ability to avoid detection by the 
government (Lai, 2007). Total unemployment as a percentage of a country’s total labor 
force is a positive predictor of domestic terrorism. A one percent increase in 
unemployment in a country results in the rate of domestic terrorist incidents increasing by 
a factor of 1.1692, controlling for all other variables in the model. In other words, a 1% 
increase in unemployment leads to a 16.9% increase in the rate of domestic terrorist 
incident when all other variables in the model are controlled for. This is significant at a 
99% level of confidence. Globalization might result in job loss among the losers of trade. 
If the jobless people are from discriminated groups, terrorist organizations might find 
new recruits. Finally, the control variable regime durability is statistically significant in 
opposite direction of what I expected. A one year increase in ‘regime durability’ for a 
country is likely to increase the expected rate of incidents of domestic terrorism in a year 
by a factor of 1.0185 in that country while controlling all other variables in the model. In 
other words, 1.85% increase is predicted in the rate of terrorist incident per year if regime 
durability as an explanatory variable goes up by one year, controlling all the other 
variables in the model. It is significant at 95% level of confidence. 
An interpretation of the benchmark model (Model I) in terms of change in rate of 
domestic terrorist incidents with discrete changes in independent variables that are 
statistically significant is presented in Table 8. The change in predicted rate of terrorist 
incidents due to one independent variable is calculated while keeping all the other count  
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Table 8. Change in the Predicted Rate of Domestic Terrorism   
 
 
Independent Variable                              Unit Change         Effect on the yearly rate 
                                                                                               of terrorist incidents 
 
 
Heterogeneity Cost                            Min - Max                        + 30.89 
     
Immature 
Democracy                                 0 - 1                        + 17.33 
     
State Fragility                            Min - Max                        + 118.4 
     
Unemployment                            Min - Max                        + 133 
     
Regime Durability                            Min - Max                        + 49.7 
 
 
Min – Max: Change from minimum value of the independent to its maximum value. 
0-1: Change from value 0 to value 1 of the independent variable. 
Note: The change in predicted rate of incidents due to one independent variable is 
calculated while keeping all the count variables at their mean and all the categorical 
variable at 1 (modal value).                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
133 
variables at their mean and all the categorical variables at their modal value of 1 using 
‘prchange’ command of Long and Freese (2005) in Stata. If the value of heterogeneity 
cost is changed from its minimum to maximum, 31 (rounded) more cases of domestic 
terrorist incidents are predicted. Similarly, change from other regime type to immature or 
unconsolidated democracy would result in 17 (rounded) more cases of terrorist incidents 
a year. Similarly, if the values for state fragility, unemployment and regime durability are 
changed from minimum to maximum, there would be 118 (rounded), 133, and 50 
(rounded) more cases of domestic terrorist incidents a year. 
Model II (see Table 7) shows that the interaction-term between heterogeneity cost 
and immature democracy is statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence. 
Immature Democracy as a regime type increases domestic terrorism in the presence of 
heterogeneity and discrimination. I get support for hypothesis 4 that the more individuals 
or groups face heterogeneity costs in a state, the more the state is likely to suffer from 
domestic terrorism if the aggrieved individuals get greater political opportunity in the 
form of living in an immature democracy. The coefficient of the interaction term is 
interpreted below. 
Rate of Incidents = b1 + b2 immature democracy + b3 het. cost + b4 immature 
democracy* het.    cost + Controls +e 
= b1 + b3 het. cost + immature democracy (b2 + b4* het. cost) + Controls + e 
When heterogeneity cost is zero, the expected rate of domestic terrorist incidents 
in an Immature Democracy is 1.033 times than in other regime types when all other 
variables in the model are controlled for. But if the heterogeneity is at its maximum of 
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0.637, the expected rate of domestic terrorist incidents in an Immature Democracy is 
2.084 times higher than in other regime types when all other variables in the model are 
controlled for. The marginal effect of immature democracy across heterogeneity cost in 
influencing the rate of domestic terrorist incidents is presented in Figure 17. 
Similarly, model III (see Table 7) shows that the interaction term between 
heterogeneity cost and trade is statistically significant at a 99% level of confidence. Trade 
increases domestic terrorism in the presence of heterogeneity and discrimination. I get 
support for hypothesis 5 that the more individuals or groups face heterogeneity costs in a 
state, the more the state is likely to suffer from domestic terrorism if the aggrieved 
individuals get greater economic opportunity in the form of increased participation of the 
state in international trade. The coefficient of the interaction term is interpreted below. 
Rate of Incidents = b1 + b2 trade + b3 het. cost + b4 trade* het. cost + Controls +e 
                = b1 + b3 het. cost + trade (b2 + b4* het. cost) + Controls + e 
When heterogeneity cost is zero, 1% increase in trade changes the rate of 
incidents by a factor of 0.8651 on average while controlling for all other variables in the 
model. But if the heterogeneity is at its maximum of 2.62, 1% increase in trade changes 
the rate of domestic terrorist incidents by a factor of 1.0425 on average when all other 
variables are controlled for. The marginal effect of trade across heterogeneity cost in 
influencing the rate of domestic terrorist incidents is presented in Figure 18. 
Lastly, model VI (see Table 7) shows that the interaction term between 
heterogeneity cost and Foreign Direct Investment is not statistically significant. Foreign 
Direct Investment was not related to terrorism (see Model I in Table 7) in my empirical  
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Figure 17. Marginal Effect of Immature Dem. across Het.Cost (95% C.I.) 
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Figure 18. Marginal Effect of Trade across Het.Cost with 95% C.I. 
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finding. I also do not get statistical support for the interactive hypothesis in relation to 
heterogeneity cost and FDI. Therefore, Foreign Direct Investment as a percentage of a 
country’s GDP neither increases nor decreases domestic terrorist incidents even in the 
presence of heterogeneity and discrimination. 
Conclusion 
 In my empirical analysis, I get support for hypotheses 1, 2, 4 and 5, but 
hypothesis 3 that economic globalization is likely to increase domestic terrorism did not 
get empirical support. Economic globalization in the presence of heterogeneity and 
minority discrimination increases domestic terrorism. In Chapter Four, I found that global 
economic integration in the form of international trade reduced domestic terrorism on a 
global dataset. Moreover, presence of heterogeneity cost in an immature democracy 
neither reduced nor increased terrorism. Similarly, global economic integration neither 
reduced nor increased terrorism in the presence of heterogeneity cost. These findings 
were contrary to theoretical expectation. I argued in Chapter Four that political and 
economic discrimination of minority group/groups in a heterogeneous country was one of 
the reasons for domestic terrorism. Domestic terrorism is a problem even in more or less 
homogeneous countries with no group discrimination. There might be other types of 
possible grievances such as racial enmity, perceived threat from new immigrants or fear 
of losing privileged position in society or state which I did not include in my models. 
There would probably be higher levels of domestic terrorism in an immature democracy 
and with increased global economic integration, but the presence of other types of 
grievances along with minority discrimination might dilute the effect of heterogeneity 
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cost in an immature democracy and on trade in predicting higher level of domestic 
terrorism. But my findings in this chapter are more supportive of the theoretical 
expectations because discrimination against minority groups is practiced in all five 
countries of South Asia. The homegrown terrorist movements in South Asia mostly 
resulted from exclusion for certain groups from public good provisions.   
In India, separatist movements in the northwestern Jammu and Kashmir state, 
western state of Punjab and in the remote and underdeveloped northeast regions have 
resulted in innumerable deaths and immense destruction to property. Moreover, 
indigenous Maoist rebels operating in eastern states and Islamic terrorism throughout the 
country are major internal security threats. The early 1980’s saw a vocal Sikh20 minority, 
backed up by the Akali Dal21, making demands for a separate homeland for the Sikhs, 
Khalistan, to the Government of India in the name of preserving Sikh identity. Sikh 
terrorists’ appeal drew on the theme of discrimination of the Sikh community by the 
predominantly Hindu Indian state (Wallace, 1995). This can be illustrated from a 
recorded speech of Bhindranwale, the leader of Sikh terrorists: ‘Sikhs are living like 
slaves in independent India. Today every Sikh considers himself a second rate 
citizen…How can Sikhs tolerate this?’22 Secessionist violence in the northeastern states 
of India, home to several indigenous tribes, largely resulted from inadequate federal 
support for economic development and the resultant lack of job opportunities. For 
instance, the plan for industrial investment in the region of five states between August 
                                                 
 
20 Sikhs represent 1.9% of India’s approximately 1.2 billion populations. They are a majority in the 
northwestern state of Punjab. 
21 Akali Dal is the political organization of the Sikhs. 
22 Cited in Wallace, 1995. 
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1991 and December 1994 involved a mere one thirtieth of the amount invested in a single 
state like Maharashtra (Hussain, 2007).  
In Pakistan, the problem of marginalization of the ethnic and religious groups23 is 
often causally linked to violence targeting civilians. The marginalization of Sindhis by 
the majority Punjabi community in post-1971 Pakistan manifested in violent separatist 
movement (Wright, 1991). The Mohajirs’24 sense of alienation and ethnic polarization led 
to the emergence of “Mohajir nationalism” and resulted in violent confrontation between 
the state and the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) – a violent ethno-nationalistic 
organization – in the 1990s destabilizing the city of Karachi (Ahmar, 1996). A highly 
centralized state of Pakistan and its unwillingness to allow regional and ethnic autonomy 
forced the nationalist forces in Baluchistan to launch a guerrilla war against the state 
(Khan, 2003). Similarly, an element of socioeconomic deprivation and cultural isolation 
of the minority Pushtun community of the NWFP (North Western Frontier Province) and 
FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Area) regions of Pakistan has manifested into a 
center-periphery conflict in these areas. Taliban insurgency in NWFP and FATA ‘has 
disguised the simmering dissatisfaction of Pushtuns with the poor delivery of public 
goods, the inequitable distribution of resources, and the general lack of provincial 
autonomy under the garb of religious fanaticism in Pakistan’ (Ghufran, 2009, p.1101).  
                                                 
 
23 The provincial/ethnic divides of Pakistan are as follows: Punjab (Punjabi, 56% of the population); Sindh 
(Sindhi, Gujarati, Memoni Kutchhi, 17% of the population); Northwest Frontier Province (Pushto, 16% of 
the population); Baluchistan (Baluchi, 3% of the population). Pakistan is divided along Sunni and Shia 
sectarian lines, with roughly 75%-85% of the population belonging to the Sunni sect and 15%-25% of the 
population belonging to the Shia sect. 
24 Mohajirs are refugees from India who settled in Karachi and other main cities of Sindh province. 
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For the past three decades, Sri Lanka25 and its people have suffered the menace of 
terrorism at the hands of one of the world’s deadliest terrorist organizations: the ruthless 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, better known as the LTTE or Tamil Tigers fighting for 
their separate homeland since late 2000s. The rise of terrorism in the north and east of Sri 
Lanka has been due to the lack of responsiveness of the political system to the deeply felt 
grievances of sections of the polity. Distribution of public goods has been extremely 
skewed starting from deprivation of citizenship to Tamil plantation workers in 1948 to 
deliberate neglect of Tamil majority areas in allotting development projects (Perera, 
2006). In Nepal, the link between ethnic discrimination and the 1990s Maoist insurgency 
has occupied a large part of conflict literature. Economic deprivation of the excluded 
groups had led to underdevelopment, poverty and unemployment in the peripheral 
regions (Bhhatachan, 2000, p.159). The Maoist movement “is basically a social and 
economic issue and is produced and sustained by failed development” (Pandey, 1999, 
p.12). 
Similarly, terrorist violence in Bangladesh emanates from exclusion for certain 
sections of people from the developmental process. A hindrance to the emergence of 
Bangladesh as a nation state in 1971 was the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) - an area of 
about 5,138 square miles bounded on the north and east by India and on the south by 
Myanmar. With less than 1% of the population of Bangladesh, this district contains an 
ethnic minority of traditional people with divergent religions, languages, and primordial 
                                                 
 
25 Sri Lanka has a population of about 20 million (2008 estimate), of which 74% are Sinhalese, 18.1% 
Tamils, 7.1% Moors, and 0.8% are Malays, Burghers (descendants of Dutch colonists) and others. The 
Sinhala speaking Sinhalese are mostly Buddhists whereas the Tamil speaking minority community mainly 
practices Hinduism. 
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sentiment that stand in the way of national integration (Islam, 1978, p.28). Since January 
1976, government officials and civilians in different parts of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
(CHT) have come under repeated attacks by Peace Corps – an insurgent organization of 
the tribal people. Conflicts in the Chittagong Hill Tracts resulted from internal 
colonization, or the settlement of previously unoccupied territories within the boundaries 
of the state (Ahsan and Chakma, 1989). The deprivation of the tribal people by 
colonizing Bengalis led the tribal people to perceive the Bengali-run government as 
having planned their total destruction and caused them to take up arms against it. 
Moreover, religious extremism is on the rise in Bangladesh and the groups identified with 
or espousing the cause of radical Islam have perpetrating violence since the mid 1990s. 
Religious militancy in Bangladesh can be construed as a result of skewed economic 
development where the rural poor are excluded from the process. The diminishing role of 
the state in overall welfare and developmental programs has accorded a space to religious 
groups and religious political parties, with steady supply of money from Middle Eastern 
Islamic NGOs, to endear themselves especially to the rural populace hitherto largely 
untouched by progress (Datta, 2007). Thus, most terrorist organizations in South Asia 
draw their support from ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities. Discriminatory state 
policies in each of the South Asian states are the main drivers of domestic terrorism. 
Therefore, the theoretical expectations from Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) model are 
best fulfilled in this region and my findings largely support these expectations.   
The findings have several policy implications. The people of these countries of 
South Asia cannot enjoy the benefits of trade because their governments discriminate 
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against minorities. It is interesting to note here that regime duration increases terrorist 
incidents; I expected a negative relationship. The political regimes in the region 
consistently follow discriminatory practices; the longer the regimes survive, the more 
institutionalized the discriminatory practices are. Therefore, the governments need to take 
effective steps to eliminate these institutionalized practices of discrimination, although I 
do not argue in favor of regime change in those countries. All the five countries in my 
study currently have democratic regimes. But, the democratic systems are not 
institutionalized; they do not guarantee the rule of law for all citizens. The governments 
need to take steps to strengthen their democratic institutions; democratic consolidation 
would probably bring greater internal peace to these countries. 
In this chapter, I find support for the hypotheses derived from the theoretical 
framework of willingness and opportunity in regional context. Crenshaw (1995, p.3) 
opines that terrorism depends on historical context – political, social and economic – and 
how groups and individuals participating in terrorism relate to the world in which they 
act. I intend to get further support of my findings in this chapter with a country specific 
study in order to situate theory of willingness in the form of minority discrimination and 
opportunities in the form of economic and political openness in historical context. In 
Chapter Six, I present a study on India. I analyze the causes and nature of two sources of 
terrorism in India prevalent since 1990s - a network of rage-driven Indian Muslim youth 
and Indian Jihadist outfits and the radical Leftists known as Maoist insurgents considered 
as India’s biggest internal security threat in the last decade. An analysis of terrorism in 
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India will set Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) theoretical framework in historical – social, 
political and economic – context. 
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Chapter 6 
Case Study on India 
 
Does global economic integration and democratization explain variations in post-
1990s incidents of domestic terrorism? I have argued that individuals or groups resort to 
terrorism when their deprivation from public goods increases. Deprivation results from 
ideological difference of heterogeneous groups from the ruling elite. Sometimes 
geographical distance of these groups from the capital where the public goods may be 
located adds to their deprivation. Democratization and integration to the global economy 
may provide the aggrieved groups opportunities of mobilization. In the previous chapter, 
I have tested hypotheses drawn from this theoretical framework on a South Asian 
regional dataset of domestic terrorism from 1990 to 2007. I found that discrimination 
indeed leads to homegrown terrorism and unconsolidated democracies experience more 
such terrorist incidents than other regime types. Global economic integration neither 
increases nor reduces domestic terrorism in South Asia. But international trade in the 
presence of minority discrimination increases the likelihood of domestic terrorism. 
Similarly, group discrimination in an immature democracy increases the risk of 
homegrown terrorism than in other regime types. The findings on South Asian dataset 
mostly support my theoretical expectation. 
In this Chapter, I will analyze the causes and nature of two sources of terrorism in 
India prevalent since 1990s with the above mentioned theoretical framework that 
terrorism is driven by group grievances of being deprived from public good provisions 
due to their ideological and geographical distance from the political power center. 
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Political and economic openness provide them opportunities to mobilize and challenge 
the state (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). Among the two sources of terrorism analyzed in 
this Chapter, the first set comprises a network of rage-driven Indian Muslim youth and 
Indian Jihadist outfits. The violent groups, with the support of the Pakistani terrorist 
groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), seek vengeance for 
the ‘sufferings’ inflicted upon their community, active throughout India since late 1990s. 
The second set is formed by radical Leftists known as Maoist insurgents who have grown 
to be India’s biggest internal security threat in last one decade. I will conclude with a 
discussion on the similarities and differences of the two disparate sets of terrorist groups. 
The case study is designed to analyze terrorism in historical context and supplement the 
generalized findings of the large-N study and regional level analysis in Chapters Four and 
Five.  
Violent Jihad: Homegrown Islamic Terrorism in Modern India 
In the summer of 1985, inflamed by the wave of Hindu-Muslim ethnic clashes 
that had ripped apart the industrial town of Bhiwandi near the Indian city of Bombay, 
activists of the Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadis26 had gathered in Bombay’s Mominpura slum to 
discuss the need for Muslim reprisal. An obscure West Bengal-based cleric named Abu 
Masood announced the birth of what would become the Indian wing of the Lashkar-e-
Taiba: the Tanzim Islahul Muslimeen (TIM), or the Organization for the Improvement of 
Muslims. Only a few residents of the slum were present to witness the birth of the 
                                                 
 
26 AEH is an organization of Salafi Muslims assiduously following the lead of Saudi clerics’ most 
orthodox and stringent school of interpretation of Islamic law.  
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Islamist jihad in India (Swami, 2008). In December 5-6, 199327, the TIM’s activities 
organized a series of 43 bombings in Mumbai and Hyderabad, and seven separate 
explosions on inter-city trains (Noonan and Stewart, 2011). The fatal explosions in 
Bombay28 (renamed Mumbai in 1995) in March 1993 had already demonstrated the 
existence of Islamist terror groups made up, in the main, of Indian nationals that have 
emerged outside Jammu and Kashmir. The Mumbai police cracked the case within two 
days of the March 1993 serial bombings and established the involvement of an infamous 
criminal syndicate of Muslim gangsters in the serial blasts. The criminal syndicate was 
reported to have resorted to terrorist violence as a ‘revenge’ for the atrocities committed 
on Muslims between December 1992 to January 1993 riots29 in Bombay, after the 
demolition of Babri mosque30 in Ayodhya by frenzied Hindu mobs (Gandhirajan, 2004). 
The terrorist attacks in March and December of 1993 signaled the beginning of an 
ominous saga of Islamic terrorism which was different in its spatial dispersion and nature 
of participation from the menace of jihadist terrorism that India had been suffering in the 
disputed territory of Kashmir. So far Jihadist terrorism in India was mostly confined to 
                                                 
 
27 December 6, 1993 was the first anniversary Babri mosque demolition by some Hindu fanatics. 
28 On March 12, a series of bombs blasts rocked the Indian city of Bombay (renamed as Mumbai) resulting 
in death of 317 persons and closure of 29-story Bombay Stock Exchange (Mickolus and Simmons, 1997, 
p.338).   
29 The city of Mumbai witnessed a series of Hindu-Muslim riots between December 1992 and January 
1993 in response to Babri mosque demolition by Hindu fanatics. Around a thousand people, mostly 
Muslims, were killed in the ethnic clashes (Kumar, 2012 ). 
30 The city of Ayodhya in northern India, regarded by the Hindus to be the birthplace of the God-king 
Rama, is one of India's most sacred religious sites. In 1528, after the Mughal invasion, a mosque was built 
by a Mughal general in the name of Emperor Babur after reportedly destroying a pre-existing temple of 
Rama at the site. The Hindu nationalists demolished the Babri mosque in 1992 in reclaiming their holy site 
(Jindal, 1995). 
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the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and perpetrated either by Kashmiri separatists or 
Pakistani infiltrators in support of the ‘Kashmir cause’ (Bahl, 2007). 
The Islamic jihadist movement in India can be traced back to the late eighteenth 
century31, but a discussion of jihad in modern India inevitably brings in Pakistan and the 
role of the country’s intelligence agency Inter Services Intelligence to the fore and finally 
leads to its connection to global jihad. Internationalization of the Kashmir problem and 
perceived injustice to India’s 150 million Muslim minorities has brought a predominantly 
Hindu India into the radar of pan-Islamist groups who see the establishment of a global 
caliphate through violence as the only solution to the Muslim community’s problems. 
India has been a target for al Qaeda and the global jihadist movement for over a decade 
and has often been listed by bin Laden and his accomplice Ayman-al-Zawahiri as a part 
of the ‘Crusader-Zionist-Hindu’ conspiracy against the Islamic world (Riedel, 2008). 
Even though ideological sources and material resources of the Indian jihad are global, the 
specific conditions in which it grew are local. India has failed to engage with, and 
address, those conditions, namely discrimination against the Muslim minority, their 
deprivation from public good provisions and socio-economic alienation of the community 
of 150 million Indian populations. 
                                                 
 
31 The roots of Islamic jihad can be traced to the decline of the Mughal Empire and to the emergence of 
British colonialism in the 18th century. Central to these are the ideas of Shah Wali Allah (1703-63) and his 
son Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1824). Their influence was felt through a variety of movements ranging from 
the Tariqa-i-Muhammadiyya of Syed Ahmed Barelwi to the ulema who founded the great seminary of dar-
ul- Uloom at Deoband. Though the school was initially politically inactive, many of its teachers and 
students became influenced by the call of pan-Islamism from Istanbul. Foremost among these was Maulana 
Mehmood-ul-Hassan (1852-1921).The main thrust of his movement was the declaration that India was dar 
ul harb; territory of war requiring a jihad (DeLong-Bass, 2010). 
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Between the year 2000 and 2013 a total of 43 incidents carried out by Jihadist 
groups have killed 994 persons in India outside the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir 
(SATP, 2013). The Indian security establishment cannot go on blaming a “Pakistan hand” 
for these attacks. Such large number of attacks sometimes within a very short time frame 
cannot have been possible without local recruits. India confronts a brood of homegrown 
Islamist terrorists feeding off popular and growing Muslim resentment toward the 
purported injustices and atrocities of the Hindu majority. A bevy of Jihadist organizations 
emerged in India in the 1990s that challenge the secular and democratic fabric of the 
Indian polity with an alternative view of society based on the Quran. Two of them, the 
Students Islamic Movement of India32 and Indian Mujahidin33, have been responsible for 
several terrorist attacks in Indian cities outside Kashmir (SATP, 2013). A second group 
of Islamic terrorists comprise a network of organized crime in Mumbai and Gujarat. The 
network, headed by a dreaded Mumbai gangster34, Dawood Ibrahim, now exiled in 
Pakistan, is less ideological and motivated by revenge for the atrocities committed on 
Muslim in India (Vicziany, 2007). 
Maoist Terror: India’s Biggest Internal Security Threat 
 Low intensity armed conflict between left-wing Maoist cadres and the Indian state 
has been going on for over four decades in various parts of eastern and central India 
                                                 
 
32 Founded in April 1977, SIMI was set up as the student wing of the Indian chapter, the Jamaat-e-Islami. 
From the outset, SIMI's leadership rejected democratic politics in India and its secularism. The practice of 
faith would remain incomplete without an Islamic state, it argued; Muslims who embraced secularism were 
headed to hell (Swami, 2011). 
33 In the 2007 manifesto of Indian Mujahidin, it said this: “We are not any foreign mujahidin nor even we 
have any attachment with neighboring countries”. “We are purely Indian”. In a later manifesto, the group 
called themselves “the homegrown jihadi militia of Islam” (Swami, 2013). 
34 The D-gang was responsible for March 12, 1993 Mumbai bombings that killed more than 300 civilians. 
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(Themner and Wallensteen, 2012).The movement that was first concentrated in West 
Bengal and Andhra Pradesh in 1967 declined in late 1970s, but part of the Maoist cadre 
remained intact. Different Maoist groups started mobilizing in the late 1980s and early 
1990s in low caste, tribal and Dalits35 majority parts of India. Presently, about 12 
extremist left-wing groups are active across nine states of India like Andhra Pradesh, 
Bihar, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Orissa and West 
Bengal known as ‘Red Corridor of India’. Among these, the Peoples’ War Group (PWG) 
and Maoist Coordination Committee (MCC) are the best organized and most active. It is 
estimated that the PWG has around 1,000 full-time underground cadres and about 5,000 
over-ground militants, while the MCC has over 300 professional revolutionaries and 50 
armed squads each consisting of some 20 cadres. The groups are also known to be in 
possession of thousands of AK-47 rifles, revolvers and guns (many of these forcibly 
seized from the police) and conduct periodic military training that includes jungle warfare 
and ambush skills (Ahuja and Ganguly, 2007).  
Major Maoist groups like the People’s War Group, Maoist Coordination 
Committee (MCC), the Red Flag and others came together to form the Communist Party 
of India (Maoist) in September 2004 (Ramana, 2008, p.163). This main unified group 
                                                 
 
35 India’s caste system can be traced back to the Indo-Aryan civilization (500 BC) when a complex 
stratification system outlining the division of labor, wealth and power resulted in a rigid social hierarchy. 
These divisions based on varna (caste) provided an overarching religious and ritual ranking system that 
defined one’s rights, duties and obligations in society. The four varnas in order of ‘purity’ were the 
brahmins, kshatriyas, vaishyas and shudras. While the first three varnas were assigned a privileged position 
in society by the caste system, the religious duty of shudras who included the bulk of the peasantry was to 
serve the upper castes with deference and loyalty. At the bottom of the caste hierarchy, nearly a quarter of 
the people had no varna standing at all – these were the ‘untouchables’ or harijans or Dalits. They were 
considered so unclean or ‘impure’ as to defile upper caste persons by touch, or even by sight (Sharma, 
1999). 
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operates in the Fifth Schedule areas that have special status in the Indian Constitution, 
meant to preserve the tribals’ existence. The areas36 in central and eastern India 
‘extremely affected’ by Naxalite37 violence constitute 19% of India’s forests (Das, 2001). 
The Maoists demand a proletarian revolution along orthodox Marxist lines, whereby the 
suppressed population will throw off the shackles of capitalism and exploitation and 
establish a people’s system of leadership with benefits for all workers. The Maoist 
program pledges that once a new people’s democratic state is established by 
accomplishing the Indian revolution, “it would redistribute land among landless poor 
peasants and agricultural laborers on the basis of the slogan ‘land to the tillers’ and 
ensure the equal right of women over the ownership of land” (Gupta, 2006).  
Maoist violence typically takes the form of attacks on the rural landed elite, police 
personnel, government officials, politicians and those seen by the movement’s 
representatives as a ‘class enemy’. Over the years, public buildings and railway property 
have also come under increasing attack by the Maoists. The Maoists justify violence as 
necessary to counter state terror, as retaliation against police or ‘informers’, to seize arms, 
‘to protect the tribals’, as a statement of their power and control, and for their own 
survival. They argue that ‘annihilation is the last choice’ but in the same breath argue that 
there is a class war and they have to counter state terror. On civilian killings they state, 
                                                 
 
36 The Bastar region in the state of Chhatisgarh is regarded the bastion of the terrorists. The rebels have 
intensified their activities in the region comprising the districts of Dantewada, Bijapur, Narayanpur, Baster 
and Kanker. 
37 The Maoists first led a series of peasant uprisings in an area of West Bengal called Naxalbari in 1967, 
and the Maoist cadre came to be known as Naxals or Naxalites. Hence the words, Naxalites and Maoist, are 
used interchangeably. 
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“Our boys also make mistakes” (cited in Chenoy and Chenoy, 2010). But a careful 
review of civilian fatalities in comparison with killings of security forces in Maoist 
violence would prove that their excuse of unintentional killings of civilians is blatantly 
false. Between 2005 and March 24, 2013, Maoist attacks killed 2483 civilian and 1554 
security personnel (SATP, 2013); therefore civilians comprise 64.5% of their total 
victims. It is the civilian target that makes the Maoists as terrorists. Aiyer (2010) argues 
that Maoism is terrorism because of their use of force or violence to intimidate civilians 
for a political cause, but draped in a fig leaf of virtuous intent, in Marxist-Leninist 
ideology.  
Heterogeneity Cost: Deprivation of the Minority  
 No country is as heterogeneous as India, and discrimination against minority 
groups in India is well-documented (Thakur, 1999; Benedikter, 2009; Deshpande, 2011). 
The Muslims and Dalit-tribal groups separately constitute ethno-religious minorities in 
India. These minorities bear ‘heterogeneity cost’ due to their ideological and in some 
cases geographical distance from the upper-caste Hindus who largely form the political 
class in India. The Jihadist terrorism and Maoist insurgency in India are consequences of 
their deprivation from public good provisions. In this section, I will first discuss 
discrimination against Muslims and then analyze the dynamics of group discrimination 
against the Dalits and tribal people. A discussion of economic discrimination, then of 
political discrimination and, finally, a review of their geographical isolation will situate 
these groups’ deprivation in the context of Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) theory of 
grievances and opportunity.  
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Discrimination against the Muslim Minority 
The roots of the grievances of the Muslims run deep in India, nourished by a long-
held sense of injustice over what many Indian Muslims perceive is institutionalized 
discrimination against the country’s largest religious minority group. The disparities 
between Muslims, who make up 13.4% of the population, and India's Hindus, who hover 
at around 80%, (Census India, 2001) are striking. In India, Islam is the ‘other’ — purged 
by the British, denigrated by the Hindu right, mistrusted by the majority, and 
marginalized by society. There are nearly as many Muslims in India as in all of Pakistan, 
but in a nation of about 1.2 billion, they are still a minority, with all the burdens that 
minorities anywhere carry (Baker, 2008). In addition, the Muslims bear a burden to 
constantly prove their nationalistic credentials. In the ‘Hindutva’38 discourse on 
patriotism in India, the Muslims are always cast as unpatriotic, anti-national and pro-
Pakistani and projected as the menacing ‘other’ (Sikand, 2006). As relations with 
Pakistan worsen, the Muslims in India are automatically suspected of being a fifth 
column for Pakistan. Decades of social and economic exclusion of the Muslim minority 
has severe impact of their community’s well-being. Generally speaking, Muslim Indians 
have lower levels of living condition, worse health, lower literacy levels and lower-
paying jobs than others.  
                                                 
 
38 Hindutva, a manifestation of Hindu nationalism, is the ideology of a part of the upper-caste, lower-
middle class Indians, though it has now spread to large parts of the urban middle classes. The chauvinistic 
ideology has been propagated by the Hindu rightist party, Indian People’s Party (BJP) as an integral 
strategy for political mobilization in the 1990s (Nandi, 1991).  
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Most of the grievances of the Muslims are common knowledge in India and those 
who are familiar with publications in Urdu language in different parts of the country are 
aware of the endless stories of ‘woes’ and ‘miseries’ of the group (Chishti, 2006). But a 
systematic study of these grievances was made by the federal government of India in 
2005. A high-level committee was appointed by the Prime Minister under the 
chairmanship of Justice Rajindar Sachar, a retired Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court, 
to study the ‘Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of 
India’ (Bhartiya, 2008). The Sachar Committee submitted its report in 2006. A review of 
the findings of the Sachar Committee (2006) in different areas of its concern would show 
the levels of institutionalized discrimination against the Muslims in India. 
Economic Exclusion 
Exclusionary practices over decades have left the Muslims poorer and 
educationally backward than others in India. The average monthly income of urban 
Muslims was 800 rupees a months in 2004-2005, as much as the Dalits and tribals and 
much less than for an upper caste Hindu’s average monthly income of 1469 rupees. 
Similarly, the share of Muslims living below the poverty line was 31 percent in 2004-
2005 whereas the share for others was 21 percent (Sachar, 2006). More importantly, the 
Muslims are experiencing a worsening impoverishment. In 1987, Muslims’ average 
earning was 77.5 percent of the Hindus’ average earning; in 1999 it was only 75 percent 
(Bhaumik and Chakraborty, 2010, p.239). The literacy rate for Muslims is far below the 
national average. The difference between the two rates is greater in urban areas than in 
rural areas. For women, too, the gap is greater in the urban areas. While the overall 
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literacy rate in India is above 65%, the literacy rate of Muslims is around 59%. However, 
Muslims fall far behind others even in other measures of education. In general, 26% of 
young adults (17 years and above) have completed their 10th grade in schools, but this 
percentage is only 17% amongst Muslims. The mean years of schooling among children 
of age group of 7- 16 years is lowest among Muslims at around 3.4 years whereas for 
others it is above 5 years. Besides, while only about 7 per cent of the overall population 
aged 20 years and above are graduates or hold diplomas, this proportion is less than 4 per 
cent amongst Muslims (Sachar, 2006).  
Another important element of exclusion of the Muslims in India is discrimination 
in job market. A field experiment by Thorat and Attewell (2007) studying job 
applications observed a pattern by which, on average, college-educated Muslim job 
applicants fare less well than equivalently-qualified applicants with high caste Hindu 
names, when applying by mail for employment in the modern private- enterprise sector. 
The only aspect of family background that was communicated in these applications was 
the applicant's name, yet this was enough to generate a different pattern of responses to 
applications from Muslims, compared to high caste Hindu names. Similar discriminatory 
practices are practiced in public sector jobs too. Although there is dearth of scientific 
research to support such a conjecture in Indian public sector jobs, a review of Muslim 
representation in government jobs from Sachar Report (2006) might be an indicator of 
discrimination against Muslims. Muslims have a considerably lower representation in 
jobs in the government including those in the Public Sector Undertakings compared to 
others. In no state of the country the level of Muslim employment is proportionate to their 
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percentage in the population. The highest percentage figure of government employment 
for Muslims is in Assam (11.2 per cent) even though it is far less than the state’s Muslim 
population (30.9 per cent).The most glaring case of Muslim deprivation in government 
jobs is found in the state of West Bengal where almost 25 per cent population practices 
the Muslim faith, but their share in government jobs is only 4.2 per cent. At the federal 
government level, the Muslims representation is shockingly low compared to their 
population percentage. In the civil services, Muslims are only 3 per cent in administrative 
service, 1.8 per cent in diplomatic service and 4 per cent in police service. In the 
railways, 4.5 per cent are Muslims and, significantly, ‘almost all’ (98.7 per cent) are in 
low level positions. Interestingly, there is a high share of Muslim workers in self-
employment activity, especially in urban areas. Whether this trend is due to exclusion or 
due to their inclination for certain types of work that are done best under self-
employment needs further study. In spite of the dependence on self employment, the 
Muslims are deprived from bank loans. According to the Sachar report, many areas of 
Muslim concentration have been marked by many public and private banks as ‘negative’ 
or ‘red’ zones where giving loans is not advisable. 
Political Exclusion 
Job market discrimination and economic marginalization follow a matching trend 
in political marginalization. In terms of representation in elective bodies, Muslims are 
pushed to the periphery of the political system in many different ways. In 1980, their 
percentage among the Lok Sabha39 Members of Parliament was 9 percent which was 
                                                 
 
39 Lok Sabha is the lower house of India’s federal parliament. 
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almost proportional to the Muslims’ share of 11.4 percent of India’s total population 
according to the 1981 census. Muslims’ political participation decreased with the decline 
of Congress Party and emergence of pro-Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 
1990s. The trend of declining political representation after an interruption in 2004 was 
again seen in 2009. In 2012, Muslim Members of Parliament (MP) represent 5.5 percent 
of the Lok Sabha MPs whereas Muslims constitute 13.4 percent of Indian population 
according to 2001 census. Muslims are also underrepresented in state assemblies (Gayer 
and Jaffrelot, 2012, p.5).  
The emergence of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist party, is the 
culmination of a sustained effort on the part of the Hindu Right to bring Hinduism into 
mainstream politics (Malik and Singh, 1994). BJP’s politics of religious polarization 
threatened the secular fabric of Indian democracy when the party’s volunteers pulled 
down the Babri mosque in Ayodhya in December 1992 (Jindal, 1995). Violence triggered 
by the demolition killed 1700 people and injured 5500 across the Indian subcontinent 
over the next four months (Ludden, 2005). In Bombay (now Mumbai), intense rioting 
broke out between Hindus and Muslims and continued in two phases - Dec 7-27, 1992, 
followed by a brief lull, and then again Jan 7-25, 1993 - making them the worst sectarian 
riots in the post-Independence era. According to official estimates, the two-phased riots 
claimed nearly 900 lives. Public and private property worth billions of rupees was 
destroyed. Muslims were the main victims (Menon, 2011). The state, intentionally or 
otherwise, failed to provide the basic public good of physical security to the victims. The 
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role of the state, openly exposed in a series of riots in Gujarat40 in 2002, further pushed 
the Muslim community to the brink of complete alienation. In February- March, 2002, 
Gujarat saw one of the worst forms of violence in the history of ethnic violence in India. 
About 600 Muslims were killed (the unofficial estimate being 2000), and more than 
200,000 were displaced in the ethnic clashes (Purwani, 2002). The organized nature and 
well-planned leadership of the mobs in unison with local BJP politicians and the total 
inaction of the BJP government transformed the riots in Gujarat into a state-sponsored 
massacre of Muslims (Ghassam-Fachandi, 2012). Such brutalization of Muslims has 
often been a reference point in the Indian jihadist propaganda (Rana, 2012).  
Spatial Exclusion 
Since 1992, Indian cities have witnessed communal riots every year causing 
hundreds of mostly Muslim deaths (Wilkinson, 2004). These incidents of violence have 
resulted in self-segregation among Muslims, who have been searching for safety in 
numbers. This process has been reinforced by the socio-economic marginalization 
affecting Muslims. The Muslim dominated neighborhoods which have been emerging or 
expanding in the process of regrouping are increasingly being referred as ‘Muslim 
ghettoes’ by India’s media, academics and political class (Gayer and Jaffrelot, 2012, 
p.21). This process of self-segregation, poor public services in ‘Muslim ghettoes’ and its 
                                                 
 
40 The 2002 Gujarat riots started in the town of Godhra with the burning of the Sabarmati express train 
which was carrying a large number of Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, a right wing Hindu organization) 
activists and supporters. Fifty-eight Hindu passengers were burnt alive. The following massacre of Muslims 
was allegedly a retaliation of 58 deaths (Kumar, 2010). 
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impact of the Muslims’ mobility and employability have been mentioned in Sachar 
Committee report. 
Increasing ghettoisation of the Community implies a shrinking space for it in the 
public sphere; an unhealthy trend that is gaining ground. Social boycott of 
Muslims in certain parts of the country has forced Muslims to migrate from places 
where they lived for centuries; this has affected their employability and means of 
earning a livelihood. (Sachar, 2006, p.14)  
 
In India, the issue of Muslim segregation may be very complicated. Often ethnic enclaves 
emerge as a product of an elected choice amongst members of a community.  Ghettoes 
are marked by the forced exclusion of a particular group. Muslim ghettoization is an 
urban Indian phenomenon that grew up in post-1992 period. Many localities in 
Ahmedabad (Gujarat) and Mumbai can quite easily be categorized as ‘ghettoes’ in that 
they are the direct result of communal violence (Jaffrelot and Thomas, 2012), most 
Muslim localities are more difficult to identify. In other cases, builders refuse to sell 
houses to Muslim buyers in Hindu localities. The Muslims have no choice but to settle in 
certain minority enclaves. Sometimes, these Muslim enclaves are put to special 
surveillance by security agencies and considered criminal dens (Contractor, 2012). 
Islamic terrorism in India can be interpreted in the context of minority 
discrimination as discussed above. On 26 July 2008, 16 simultaneous bomb blasts took 
place in Ahmedabad, the capital of Gujarat State, in India, which killed 49 people and 
injured more than 150. Several TV news stations received an e-mail41 five minutes before 
the first blasts in Ahmedabad. The message reportedly had the Indian Mujahideen 
proclaiming that they were based within the country, claiming sole responsibility for the 
                                                 
 
41 The authenticity of the email could not be verified by Indian security agencies. 
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attacks. The e-mail purportedly cited a list of grievances against India’s Hindu majority 
and hinted at more attacks to come (Singh, 2008). That first manifesto of India’s jihadist 
movement described the “wounds given by the idol worshippers to the Indian Muslims,” 
and blamed the Hindus who had “demolished our Babri Masjid and killed our brothers, 
children and raped our sisters.” It added that the Gujarat pogrom of 2002 had “forced us 
to take a strong stand against this injustice and all other wounds given by the idol 
worshippers of India.” “Only Islam,” it concluded, “has the power to establish a civilized 
society, and this could only be possible in Islamic rule which could be achieved by only 
one path: jihad” (Swami, 2011).  
Discrimination against the Dalits and Tribal People   
On the other hand, in the rise of the Maoist-led peasant uprising, India is 
witnessing two phenomena and three sets of actors in action (Mehra, 2000). According to 
Mehra (2000), the first phenomenon is peasant discontent with their socioeconomic plight 
expressing itself in a militant (not necessarily violent) movement against the anomalous 
social structure and the state apparatus protecting and perpetuating it. The second 
phenomenon is the ideological rationale, organized mobilization and organizational base 
provided by the Maoist outfits to the peasant uprising. The three sets of actors are the 
peasants (Maoists’ support base), the leftist revolutionaries (the Maoists) and the state. 
The landlords could be construed as the fourth actor in this drama; but since they were 
reduced to being victims, once the state swung into action and fought the war on their 
behalf they could be identified with the state. 
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The discontent among a section of people needs elaboration first because that is 
the key in understanding the spread of Maoist extremism in central and eastern India. 
Maoist extremism thrives in the areas inhabited by low caste people, Dalits and tribals42, 
who are marginalized in traditional Hindu society; this discriminated section of Indian 
populace forms the support base of different Maoist groups (Bhonsle, 2006). The tribals 
and Dalits constitute the majority population in the Bastar region in the state of 
Chhattisgarh, regarded as the bastion of the Maoist activities, although these people form 
minority groups at the national level in India and are scattered throughout the country. 
Different Maoist groups operate in such pockets of minority dominated areas in central, 
eastern and parts of southern India (Chakravarti, 2009). Thus, heterogeneity has a spatial 
or geographic dimension in this case. 
Economic Exclusion 
The Dalits and tribal population of India, mostly living in rural India, have been 
subject to deprivation in terms of land ownership; landlessness being the biggest cause of 
poverty in agrarian India. Modern India’s agrarian situation has been a classic case of 
‘too much land concentrated in too few hands’ with wide disparities in the ownership and 
control of land in rural society (Ahuja and Ganguly, 2007). The land owning class 
invariably comes from the upper castes and landless mass belong to the lower castes; 
class and caste perfectly merge into one identity based on deprivation and exploitation for 
the Dalits in most of rural India (Shah, 2006, p.165). Despite attempts at land reforms by 
                                                 
 
42 In the complicated Hindu caste system, the low castes, the Untouchables (or Dalits) and the tribal people 
are officially known as ‘Scheduled Castes’ and ‘Scheduled Tribes’ representing 16.2% and 8.2% of the 
total population according to latest official data (India Census, 2001). 
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several state governments since India’s independence, most of rural India has retained a 
feudal structure. The socio-economic conditions in rural areas have changed little and the 
policies followed by the post-independent Indian State have generally failed to mitigate 
rural problems. Thus, the Maoist insurgency in India is the latest manifestation of peasant 
struggles caused by grinding poverty, exploitation and inequality that have prevailed in 
rural areas for centuries (Brass, 2013).  
Rural poverty across India has historically been a direct consequence of the highly 
skewed pattern of agricultural landownership. The failure of land tenure reform and 
surplus rural labor force keep agricultural wages low. Often small farmers with little 
pieces of land borrow money from moneylenders and rich farmers to procure seeds and 
fertilizers. In the absence of institutional credit availability, the landlords charge 
exorbitant interest rates on loans given to small farmers, thus pushing them into a vicious 
cycle of debt. Consequently, farmers are left with little choice but to mortgage their tiny 
plots and eventually sell them off to the big farmers, thereby reducing their status to that 
of a tenant or sharecropper. Once ownership of land passed into the hands of the big 
farmer, the tenant became a bonded laborer and agricultural land increasingly gets 
accumulated in fewer hands (Sethi, 2011). This pattern may not be universal in the whole 
of rural India, but at least applies to most parts affected by the Maoist insurgency. 
Moreover, since the 1990s the Indian state has tended to favor industrial development 
over agriculture.43 While industry continues to enjoy tax-holidays, cheaper credit, highly 
subsidized land, and excise duty relief, no such incentives exist for agriculture. Low 
                                                 
 
43 Agriculture constitutes 10.6% of total plan outlay under 10th 5 years plan (2002-2007); it was 37.3% 
under 1st 5 years plan (Salunkhe and Deshmukh, 2012) 
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priority given to agricultural credit44 and limited credit coverage to small farmers or 
share-croppers has resulted in small farmers and landless laborers depending upon local 
landlords and usurious moneylenders, making the poor peasantry vulnerable to 
exploitation and humiliation.  
The Dalits and tribals are regularly discriminated against in their access to 
education. High drop-out and lower literacy rates among lower-caste populations have 
often been characterized as the natural consequences of poverty and underdevelopment. 
Though these rates are partly attributable to the need for low-caste children to supplement 
their family wages through labor, discriminatory and abusive treatment faced by low-
caste school children by teachers and fellow students is rampant (Reddy et. al., 2004). 
The 2001 India census shows that the rate of literacy among the Dalits is 50.89 percent, 
whereas national literacy rate, including the Dalits, is 64.8 percent. Most of the 
government schools in which Dalit and tribal students are enrolled are deficient in basic 
infrastructure, classrooms, teachers, and teaching aids. Despite state assistance in primary 
education, Dalits and tribals suffer from an alarming drop-out rate. According to the 
National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes' 1996-1997 and 1997-
1998 Report, the national drop-out rate for Dalit children-who often sit in the back of 
classrooms-was a staggering 49.35 percent at the primary level, 67.77 percent for middle 
school, and 77.65 percent for secondary school (NCSCST, 1990). 
                                                 
 
44 The share of agriculture in total bank credit was at 18 per cent towards the end of the 1980s, but 
thereafter it has dipped to less than 10 per cent in the late 1990s. Even the number of farm loan accounts 
with scheduled commercial banks has declined in absolute terms from 27.74 million in March 1992 to 
20.84 million in March 2003 (Shetty, 2004). 
 
 
162 
Besides, reports from several International Organizations, Non-Govt. 
Organizations and even Govt. of India Planning Commission show the tribal people’s 
economic deprivation. United Nations Development Program India Report 2012 has 
reported steady improvement in human development and reduction in the percentage of 
population in poverty from 45% to 37% between 1993-94 and 2004-05 at the national 
level. But, forty-seven percent of India's rural tribal population lives below the poverty 
line (UNDP, 2012).45 
Socio-political Exclusion and Segregation 
Besides chronic poverty, starvation and economic deprivation, this considerable 
section of India’s rural poor, being from the lower castes (Dalits) and aboriginal 
communities (tribals), often experiences humiliating discrimination and socio-political 
exclusion. The caste system denies the equal worth of all human beings (Donnelley, 
2003, p.83). The gravity of the situation was highlighted in a statement of present Indian 
Prime Minister, Dr. Monmohan Singh: 
Dalits have faced a unique discrimination in our society that is fundamentally 
different from the problems of minority groups in general. The only parallel to the 
practice of untouchability was apartheid. (Singh, December 28, 2006, p.1) 
 
The first aspect of discrimination in all areas, urban and rural, is geographical 
segregation. Everywhere in both village and the city, the low castes are segregated and 
huddled together (Harrison, 2005, p.50). Although there is no de jure policy of 
segregation in India, Dalits and tribals are subject to de facto segregation in all spheres, 
including housing, the enjoyment of public services, and education. Residential 
                                                 
 
45 The measurement of poverty differs among organizations that have different criteria. Moreover, we have 
conflicting data on poverty in India. 
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segregation is prevalent across the country, and is the rule rather than the exception. Most 
Dalits and tribals in rural areas live in segregated colonies, away from the upper-caste 
residents. Basic residential services such as the use of water are segregated by caste, 
meaning that the Dalits and tribals are forbidden from using the water sources and tanks 
used by the non-Dalits. The state provides poorer quality facilities for the Dalit colonies 
and sometimes does not provide any of the facilities that are provided to the non-Dalit 
colonies; for example, medical facilities and the better, thatched-roof houses exist 
exclusively in upper-caste colonies in rural areas (Weisskopf, 2004; Sadangi, 2008). The 
unequal allocation of public goods and resources reflects wider social injustices on which 
Maoist extremists thrive in areas largely inhabited by the marginalized low caste people 
(Morrison, 2012). 
The second aspect of discrimination against the Dalits and the tribals is the 
atrocities committed on them and the administrative inaction in addressing these. 
Atrocities against these people are established techniques adopted by the dominant castes 
to reinforce their power and assert their superiority. The upper caste landlords even have 
their own private army to perpetuate their position and the feudal structure. Such a 
private army, called Ranbir Sena, has been outlawed by the government. The landlords 
can perpetrate unlawful activity with impunity because they have tremendous political 
clout (Narula, 1999, p.53). The official statistics for the decade 1990-2000 indicate that a 
total of 285,871 cases of various crimes against Dalits and tribals were registered 
countrywide. This means that an average of 28,587 cases of caste discrimination and 
atrocities were registered every year in the 1990s. In other words, every hour more than 
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three cases of atrocities against these caste groups are registered, and every day three 
cases of rape and at least one murder is reported (Shah, 2006, p.134). This might be only 
the tip of the iceberg, because in many cases, as reported by different human rights 
groups, the police refuse to report the cases of Untouchables against the upper caste 
people. The state’s refusal to recognize the continued oppression of the Dalits is a pointer 
toward its lack of real commitment to the cause of the Dalits (Harrison, 2005, p.62). The 
right of Dalits to equal treatment before organs administering justice is denied through 
the poor quality of prosecutions under the Protection of Civil Rights Act and Prevention 
of Atrocities Act, 1989. The Government of India has itself noted this failure in its 2001-
2002 Annual Report on the Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989, which states that in 2002, 
only 2.31 percent of cases brought under the Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 had 
resulted in convictions (Annual Report on the Prevention of Atrocities Act for the years 
2001-2002, p. 12). The police force, generally dominated by the upper caste people, 
refuse even to get a report filed by the Untouchables against the upper caste. Even the 
lower level of judiciary is not free from caste prejudices as the judges generally come 
from the upper castes (Gangoli, 2007, p.96). 
Finally, Dalit and tribal women, occupying the bottom of both the caste and 
gender hierarchies, are both uniquely susceptible to violence and particularly vulnerable 
to the infringements of their right to equal treatment before organs administering justice. 
Cases documented by the National Commission for Women, Human Rights Watch, local 
and national women’s rights organizations, and the press, overwhelmingly demonstrate a 
systemic pattern of impunity in attacks on Dalit and tribal women. A humiliating aspect 
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of discrimination is the existence of bonded labor. There are an estimated 40 million 
bonded laborers in India, of whom 15 million are children (Narula, 1999, p.139-166). The 
vast majority of these laborers are Dalits and tribals. Bonded labor is sustained by the 
caste system, in particular through the traditional expectation of free labor and/or 
inadequate remuneration for work, the lack of Dalit ownership of land, social and 
economic boycotts levied by upper-caste community members. As mentioned earlier, 
bonded labor also results from indebtedness to landlords or moneylenders.  
The Maoist groups’ views of the caste system are rooted in the political 
philosophy the nationalist Indian Left developed during the British colonial period. The 
British viewed India as a degenerate, caste-ridden society that was inherently incapable 
of acquiring the virtues of modernity and nationhood (Kaviraj, 1997, p.94). In responding 
to this charge, the Indian nationalist Left and the Marxists adopted a strategy of denying 
the suggestion that caste was essential to the characterization of Indian society. Caste, 
according to this argument, is a feature of the superstructure of Indian society; its 
existence and efficacy are to be understood as the ideological products of the specific pre-
capitalist social formations. With the suppression of these pre-capitalist formations, caste 
too would disappear. The perfect alignment of caste and class in most of India (Omvedt, 
1978) gives credence to the Leftist belief that the only solution to the caste system is a 
replacement of the Indian parliamentary system of democracy with a people’s democracy 
as introduced by post-Mao revolution in China. The Maoists are vehemently opposed to 
the exploitative nature of Indian caste system and aim at its demise through a violent 
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revolution; thus they try to draw support of these low caste groups by championing their 
causes (Biswas, 2008). Article 2 of Communist Party of India (Maoist) Program reads:  
For thousands of years the feudalism that has dominated Indian society is a rigid 
caste-based feudalism which was built on a brahminical ideology. This pernicious 
caste system was of enormous value to extract large surplus from the oppressed 
particularly the so-called outcastes, who were pushed to a slave-like condition. 
(SATP, 2013) 
 
 It is doubtful how much support the Maoists enjoy among the Dalits (Scheduled Castes) 
because the mainstream Dalit political parties like Samajwadi Party (SP), Bahujan Samaj 
Party (BSP) and Rastriya Janata Dal (RJD) are officially opposed to the Maoist 
campaign, but a considerable section of the Dalit population forms the Maoist support 
base in central and eastern India. The tribal people known as Scheduled Tribes under 
Indian Constitution and lying at the bottom of Indian caste structure along with the Dalits 
have been extensively mobilized by the Maoists as their support base in post-
liberalization period (Kashyap, 2008). 
The present mobilization of the Maoists after the merger of major groups into the 
Communist Party of India (Maoist) in 2004 has a distinct feature.46 Maoists are now 
prioritizing mobilization, especially of the tribals against mining and other projects 
involving displacements of people. Their prime objective has become that of mobilization 
against ‘imperialism’ as reflected in India’s economic liberalization and the effects of 
globalization rather than ‘anti-feudal’ struggles (Harriss, 2010). The Maoists are hyper 
active in tribal Bastar region, where they have established their liberated zone of 
                                                 
 
46 Banerjee (2009) identifies three phases of Maoist movement in India. In the first two phases (1967-75 
and the 1980s), the Maoists mobilized the poor peasants in semi-feudal Indian villages and targeted the 
high caste landlords giving an impression of peasant uprising. The third phase started in 1990s and 
intensified in 2004 has been anti-imperialist in nature although they still espouse the peasants’ cause. 
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‘Dandakaranya’, spread over the forest regions of Bastar and parts of Andhra Pradesh. 
The state and security forces describe this region as “areas dominated by the Maoists”. 
Located on the tri-junction of Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh, many areas of 
improvised Sukma district form part of the so-called liberated zone of ‘Dandakaranya’ 
(see Map in Figure 19) of the Maoists where they are reported to be running a parallel 
government and there is virtually no presence of civil administration (Prakash, 2009). 
The Maoist leadership like Ganapathy, Koteswar Rao, Kisenji, Kobad Ghandy hail from 
different parts of the state of Andhra Pradesh and elsewhere and moved to the forests of 
Dandakaranya to work among the tribals. They have been able to recruit women and 
children from the tribal people and have appropriated the right to speak on behalf of the 
tribals as a whole (SATP, 2013). The tribals’ support to the Maoist insurgents is part of a 
larger center-periphery conflict in which these marginalized people are fighting for their 
rights to access resources. India’s integration to the global economy has provided the 
Maoists as well as Jihadists opportunities to mobilize the aggrieved minority groups. 
Global Economic Integration: Opportunities and Grievances 
In 1991, India experienced a classic external payments crisis: high fiscal and 
current account deficits, external borrowing to finance the deficits, rising debt service 
obligations, rising inflation, and inadequate exchange rate adjustment (Ghosh, 2006). The 
collapse of India’s most important international benefactor, the Soviet Union, coupled 
with a dramatic rise in world energy prices during the first Gulf War, presented enormous 
challenges to the country’s quasi-socialist and isolated economy. In response, then 
Finance Minister Manmohan Singh (the current Prime Minister), initiated a series of  
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Figure 19. Maoist Affected Areas in India (Source: IISS, 2013) 
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macro-economic reforms liberalizing trade, investment, and markets in an effort to 
revitalize the nation’s competitiveness (Harnetiaux, 2008). India’s gradual integration to 
the international economy had contradictory effects on the polity. Firstly, India has 
emerged as a regional and global economic powerhouse. Secondly, the pattern of rapid 
economic growth has left out a large section of people, leading to discontent among this 
disenfranchised population and violence against the state. Most of the minorities - 
Muslims and Dalit-tribals – are losers in the globalized economy in India because of their 
educational backwardness. Economic globalization has contributed both to grievances 
among the losers and provided them with the opportunity to mobilize. 
India’s GDP growth surged from 3-4% a year in the 1980s to 5-7% throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s. In 2006, real economic growth was 9.2%, second only to China 
among Asian economies (Martin and Kronstadt, 2007). While living conditions for most 
Indians have improved, a super rich elite and an emerging urban middle class is the 
largest beneficiary of this growth. Development on these top-down terms all but 
abandons about 300 million Indians who subsist in abject poverty. The paradox of India’s 
growth story is that India is a country with more indigenous billionaires than any except 
the US, yet one in three of the 1.1 billion population subsists on less than $1 per day 
(Thornton and Thornton, 2009). According to Oxford University’s Multidimensional 
Poverty Index (2010), a staggering 55% of the Indian population lives below the poverty 
line of US $1.25 despite a bevy of rural development programs intended to rectify the 
situation. These poor constitute almost 421 million people in just eight Indian states: 
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and 
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West Bengal.47 In 2010 the UN recorded one maternal death at childbirth every ten 
minutes in India, with a maternal mortality rate higher than that of Sudan, Ethiopia and 
Bangladesh. Infant mortality in the state of Madhya Pradesh, one of the poorest states, is 
higher than in Senegal or Eritrea (Bandyopadhyay. 2013). Although poverty was a major 
problem in India even before 1990, the post-1990s globalization has resulted in widening 
the gap between the rich and the poor. Several studies have indicated growing inequality 
in post-reform India. A disproportionately large income/consumption gains by the upper 
tail of the population is reported. In the 1990s, the real incomes of the top one per cent of 
income earners in India increased by about 50 per cent. Furthermore, among this top one 
per cent, the richest one per cent increased their real incomes by more than three times 
(Banerjee and Piketty, 2001). Three distinct trends of changing patterns of inequality 
during the 1990s have been observed. Firstly, there is strong evidence of divergence in 
per capita consumption across states. Secondly, state-wise per capita expenditures 
revealed that rural-urban inequality in per capita expenditure significantly increased 
across India. Thirdly, strong evidence emerged of increased rural-urban inequalities 
within states between 1993-1994 and 1999-2000 (Deaton and Dreze, 2002). A glimpse of 
increasing individual income inequality (net) between 1989 and 2005 measured by the 
Gini index (Solt, 2009) would support the trend in post reform period India (see Figure 
20). 
The story of India’s economic growth is largely driven by a surging service 
sector. The relative declines in manufacturing and agriculture have meant very little net  
                                                 
 
47 Seven of these eight states are home to the Maoist insurgents. 
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Figure 20. Inequality in post-reform India: 1989 – 2005 
 
job creation. Therefore, joblessness is rampant among the less skilled and illiterate 
people. The minorities being traditionally backward are left out in the process of India’s 
economic development. This deprivation creates grievances among sections of the 
population and provides manpower to terrorist organizations. The Planning Commission 
of India argues that the Maoists gain support primarily from impoverished rural 
populations that suffer from underdevelopment, social injustice, and discrimination 
(Planning Commission of India 2008). The report argues that the Maoists exploit the gap 
between social-economic promises made by the Indian government to its poorest and the 
government’s actual service provision in order to gain allegiance. Jihadist terrorism in 
India can also be attributed to the gradual impoverishment and marginalization of urban 
Muslims. 
In an effort to lure more manufacturing jobs to the country, India recently took 
steps to further liberalize the investment environment and draw more FDI from abroad. 
Most notably, in February 2006, India implemented the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) 
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Act 2005, allowing the establishment of SEZs (similar to those in China) with tax, 
regulatory, and tariff incentives for foreign invested enterprises (Palit and Bhattacharjee, 
2008). By May 8, 2013, 588 such enclaves (SEZ) have been approved by the government 
of India under SEZ Act 2005 earmarking thousands of acres of land (Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, India, 2013). The effort enjoyed considerable success, 
increasing inbound foreign investment from $4.7 billion in 2005 to about $32 billion in 
2011 (World Bank, 2012). The policy, however, has attracted significant controversy, 
most pointedly over the issue of land acquisition. The federal and state governments have 
extensive rights of eminent domain, and their often forceful methods of evicting the 
(usually poor) owners of land needed for SEZ development have created discontent and 
resulted in violence. The state has often used repressive measures on the protesters, thus 
giving leverage to Islamic fundamentalist groups and the Maoists in their mobilization. In 
2007 the police shot dead 14 people who were protesting the notification of acquisition of 
25000 acres of land under Land Acquisition Act of 1894 for SEZ project of Indonesian 
Salem chemicals in Nandigram, a Muslim majority farming village in the state of West 
Bengal. In other places like Bhatta-Parsaul in UP, Jagatsinghpur in Orissa, Jaitpur in 
Maharastra and so on, the government has used police force to control and intimidate any 
genuine protest against its land grab polices (Patnaik, 2007; Sampat, 2008). Indian 
economy is predominantly agrarian. This is evidenced from the fact that in 2011, about 
74% of its population lived in some half million villages. Agricultural sector contributed 
about 26 % of the GDP in 2009 and 66% of Indian workforce are engaged in this sector 
(Siddiqui, 2012). When land is the basic means of livelihood for millions of small, 
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medium farmers, sharecroppers and agricultural laborers, the government’s forceful 
acquisition of farmland is perceived as an existential threat to these people. Moreover, 
inadequate resettlement policy, rampant corruption among public officials and 
administrative delay in disbursing compensation complicate things and push the poor into 
the extremists’ camps.  
India has witnessed unprecedented land grab and human displacement due to 
mining (and mine industries), power projects and dams as part of post-reform push for 
development. Mineral production is reported from almost all the states of Indian union, 
but among onshore areas and states Andhra Pradesh (12.3% share in total production by 
value), Chattisgarh (9.2%), Jarkhand (9%) and Orissa (11.9%) dominate in minerals like 
coal, tin, bauxite and iron ore (Siddiqui, 2012). These regions mostly covered by dense 
forests are also home to large tribal populations and these are also the regions where 
Maoists insurgency48 is on the rise from the year 2004. Orissa49 now stands as one of 
India’s most striking examples of the neoliberal economic boom and its paradox; it is also 
one of the most ‘left behind’ states in the Indian federation. In 2005 the state government 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the South Korean Pohang Steel 
Company (POSCO) for a US$12 billion steel plant, the largest foreign investment ever in 
India. In that same year Orissa held the record for the highest rate of poverty in India. 
Between 2002 and 2005 alone, the government of Orissa signed 42 MoUs with 
                                                 
 
48 The commercial and industrial exploitation of forest produce and mining of the minerals is one the core 
issues of the Maoist insurgency. 
49 Dalits comprise 53 percent and the tribals, 22.23 percent of Orissa’s population (India Census, 2001). 
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corporations for proposed steel, aluminum, and other industries in Kalinganagar50 and 
various locations across the state, including Jagatsinghpur, the site of the proposed 
POSCO plant mentioned above. Significantly, the majority of those whose lands had 
been seized had not received adequate or any compensation or rehabilitation. In the case 
of the Kalinganagar Industrial Area, for example, the government reported that it started 
offering compensation to the ‘eligible’ dispossessed in the 1990s, when it moved to attain 
land rights to about 13,000 acres. But in 2006 the Government of Orissa candidly 
admitted that roughly 1,500 of the 1,800 ‘eligible’ families who had been displaced in 
Kalinganagar had still not received full compensation51 (Sengupta, 2006). 
Chhattisgarh, another poor but mineral rich state of Indian federation, has 
experienced an enormous land grab by the state and displacement of tribal people. Close 
to 45 percent of the mineral-rich land in Chhattisgarh is classified as forestland and is 
inhabited mostly by the tribal people (Walker, 2008).  In 2001-2010, the Chhattisgarh 
Government has signed 121 Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with national and 
international mining, power, and other industrial firms promising about 34.9 billion US$ 
worth of investment (CIPB Report, 2013). Since June 2005, a state militia called Salwa 
Judum has destroyed hundreds of villages and uprooted tens of thousands of tribal people 
from their homes (Roy, 2012). Private mining companies in a nexus with corrupt state 
reap huge profits at the cost of the local people and the environment. A huge controversy 
                                                 
 
50 An Industrial enclave was created in Kalinganagar, a tribal area in Orissa, in 1992-94 to tap and utilize 
huge iron ore reserve of this area. This place has witnessed protests by the tribal people and resultant state 
brutalities. 
51 Only title owners of land are eligible for compensation. The displaced landless laborers and wage earners 
are simply not counted. 
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in Chhattisgarh over bauxite mining by Vedanta Resources, a UK-based mining 
conglomerate, over alleged large-scale infringement of tribal areas in violation of laws 
shows the extent of the government-industry nexus (The Indian Express, October 11, 
2010). In Jharkhand, another tribal region of central India, around thirty coal and iron 
blocs fall in the forest areas where most of the illegal mining takes place. The Jharkhand 
government signed contracts with private sector companies like Tatas, Birlas and Essar 
groups for aluminum and iron ore plants displacing thousands of tribal people and 
depriving livelihood for others without any proper resettlement (Areeparampil, 2010). 
The same story goes for Andhra Pradesh. The local people, mostly poor, resent the 
plundering of their property by outsiders. The contractor – politician – mining – 
transportation nexus and the huge profits being made is part of local knowledge and 
frustration. The Maoists are able to take advantage of this exploitation and the failure of 
government institutions (Chenoy and Chenoy, 2010).  
The human cost of mines, dams, and other development projects is a thorny issue 
in the literary discourse of political violence in India. Studies highlighting the 
displacement and rehabilitation problems have begun to question specific projects and 
developmental polices that induce displacement (Iyer, 2007; Sharma and Singh, 2009; 
Siddiqui, 2012). The exact number of people displaced in post-reform period is unknown. 
According to one estimate, about 60 million people have been displaced due to mines, 
dams and other developmental projects between 1947 and 2004. Fewer than 20% have 
been resettled even partially and the rest are left to fend for themselves. Not surprisingly, 
40% of the 60 million displaced people are tribals, who constitute just 8.08% of India's 
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population, 20% are Dalits and another 20% are from other rural poor communities like 
fishermen and quarry workers (Fernandes, 2008, pp. 181-207). Another report estimates 
that the magnitude of forced population displacement caused by development programs 
was around 10 million each year between 1980 and 2000. At the national level, the tribal 
peoples and Dalits constitute around 60% of the persons displaced by various 
development projects. Only 25% of the affected have been resettled (Sahoo, 2005). 
In India’s neo-liberal restructuring in 1990s, the emphasis has increasingly been 
focused on agricultural exports. This has encouraged the cultivation of cash crops over 
food grains, thereby seriously threatening food security in many rural areas. For instance, 
tomatoes are being grown in place of wheat, flowers in place of rice, and so on. In coastal 
areas, private enterprise is taking away the fish catch depriving local communities of a 
livelihood and a critical nutrition source. In Kerala, vast tracts of forests and paddy fields 
have been converted into rubber, coffee and coconut plantations. It is not mere 
coincidence that deaths due to starvation were reported in 13 Indian states in 2001 (Ahuja 
and Ganguly, 2007). The incidents of farmers’ suicides in India in last two decades are 
often argued to be linked to globalization. It is estimated that more than a quarter of a 
million Indian farmers have committed suicide between 1995 and 2011- the largest wave 
of recorded suicides in human history. A great number of those affected are cash crop 
farmers and cotton farmers in particular. In 2009 alone, the most recent year for which 
official figures are available, 17,638 farmers committed suicide-that’s one farmer every 
30 minutes (CHRCJ Report, 2011). Between 1996 and 2001 the Indian federal 
government rapidly removed trade protection for agriculture and reduced agricultural 
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subsidies as part of liberalizing trade policies mandated by World Trade Organization.52 
During that five-year period, the prices of all primary products, including cotton, jute, 
food grains, and sugar, fell by an astonishing 40 to 60 percent. Under such severe price 
compression many peasant-farmers could not sell their crops and the already indebted 
became insolvent (Patnaik, 2008). Besides dwindling agriculture subsidies in post reform 
India, the role of Multi National Corporations in Indian agriculture is a hotly debated 
topic in the country as far as farmers’ suicides are concerned. In exchange for IMF loans 
in the 1980s and 1990s, which helped restructure India’s economy, agricultural 
conglomerates like Monsanto, Cargill and Syngenta were given preferential access to 
Indian markets. Since then, India’s agricultural market has been flooded with BT cotton, 
but farmers are not properly informed that BT cottonseeds require a far greater amount of 
water than natural varieties, and demand irrigation techniques few farmers can afford. In 
addition to crop failure, farmers invest huge amounts of money to buy GM (Genetically 
Modified) seeds that cost 10 times the amount of natural seeds. Farmers must buy new 
seeds each year, since GM varieties are non-renewable. As the story goes, forced to buy 
inordinately priced and unsuccessful seeds each year, farmers sink more into debt and 
many take their own lives (Pugen, 2013). Although the truth of the story is disputed, a 
study by the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research in 2006 found that 86.5% 
of the farmers who took their own lives were indebted – their average debt was about 
US$835 – and 40% had suffered a crop failure (Sahoo, 2010). 
                                                 
 
52 India had entered the World Trade Organization in 1995 as one of the original signatories 
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While India’s integration into the global economy might have put India in the 
leadership position of the global South along with China and Brazil, the problem of 
marginalization of the losers of globalization has not been addressed by the political 
elites. Instead of compensating them, the Indian state has progressively withdrawn from 
providing the major social services and welfare functions, leading some to suggest that 
redistributive politics have become irrelevant in India (Mehta, 2003). The crisis is not 
limited to farming as mentioned above; state governments have almost uniformly reduced 
their budgetary allocation for elementary education. The share of education in total 
government expenditure has declined compared to the early mid–1970s. Total 
expenditure on education declined in real terms and was even more marked in the case of 
expenditure per pupil (Tilak, 1992, p.389). Health expenditure is now dominated by 
private spending and public health investment in India is among the lowest in the world. 
In concrete terms, the budgetary allocation for the public health system decreased from 
1.3% in 1990 to as low as 0.9% in 2004 (Ghosh, 2006).53 
Globalization and Resources for Terrorist Organizations 
In addition to supplying the terrorist organizations with new recruits from the 
aggrieved sections of the Indian population, the process of globalization has also 
provided those groups with financial opportunities to acquire new weaponry and 
resources to strengthen their organizational capabilities by spending on welfare54 of their 
                                                 
 
53 In 2005 the education budget was raised by one billion, and the dearth of rural medicine is being 
addressed by a health spending hike from 1% to 3%of national income (Thornton and Thornton, 2009). 
This is a half-hearted policy response to growing dissatisfaction with the state in post-reform India.  
54 In Dandakaranya region (see Map 6.1), the Maoists are providing basic services in health, education, 
roads etc (Roy, 2012). 
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sympathizers, maintaining training camps and paying for propaganda. Several non-
governmental sources give estimates of Maoists’ financial resources in recent years. A 
noteworthy media report in 2010 quoted an intelligence evaluation that the Maoists have 
collected a fund of more than Rs 2,500 crore (US$ 454 million). This whopping amount 
was collected by the CPI (Maoist), the prominent Maoist organization, in 12 months (Roy 
Chaudhury, 2010). On March 5, 2010, Indian Home Secretary Mr. G. K. Pillai told that 
the Maoists collect around Rs. 1,400 crores (US$ 254 million) a year (New Delhi 
Television, 2010). Although the authenticity of such reports is not verifiable, they 
indicate the availability of huge amounts of money flowing to the Maoists. The Maoists 
run extensive extortion rackets throughout the areas where those organizations operate. 
The Maoists extort money from industries and forest contractors giving rise to the 
dynamics of corruption, patronage, and protection. Industrialists often work out private 
bargains with the Maoists for protection (Anoop, 2011). It is noteworthy that Maoists 
have mostly targeted the security forces and government sympathizers, but mining and 
other industrial enterprises can operate without much hindrance from them. The 
contractor – politician – mining – transportation nexus and the huge ‘levy’ being extorted 
by the Maoist extremists have been an integral part of the political economy of Maoists 
insurgency in India (Chenoy and Chenoy, 2010). The huge amount of money extorted 
from private industries by the Maoists organizations is one of the major reasons for their 
success in post-reform India.  
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Immature Democracy and opportunity to Mobilize 
With more than six decades of periodic elections in which all political offices are 
contested and, in which all adult citizens are qualified to vote, India, barring a short 
period between 1975 and 1977, has worked successfully as a democracy. Even India’s 
founding national party, Congress, which increasingly resembles a dynasty, has been 
voted out of power first in 1977 and then a number of times and replaced by other 
challengers. It is in these procedural and political senses of the term that Indian 
democracy has succeeded (Kohli, 2001). But, a more demanding assessment of the 
accomplishments of Indian democracy would clearly be more qualified and be faulted on 
many counts. In the initial years, scholars focused on India’s sluggish growth, 3-4 percent 
between 1950 and 1980, and criticized the state for its excessive intervention in the 
economy (Bhagawati, 1993), its feeble capacity to alleviate mass poverty, inability to 
provide universal primary education, and more broadly for governing poorly (Weiner, 
1991; Kohli, 1990). Besides India’s inability to address the problem of poverty, India is 
not categorized as a ‘fully institutionalized democracy’ for exhibiting certain flaws in its 
governing institutions (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). The Economist (2011) consistently 
places India in the category of ‘Flawed Democracy’.55 The index is based on sixty 
indicators grouped in five different categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil 
liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political culture.  
The Indian democratic system resembles what Zakaria (2007) has aptly termed an 
“illiberal democracy” where the rights of religious and ethnic minorities are at risk even 
                                                 
 
55 ‘Flawed Democracy’ is the second category. The top category called ‘Full Democracy’ comprises the 
most institutionalized democratic countries. 
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though electoral alterations take place routinely and in a moderately free and fair fashion. 
The inefficient functioning of the conflict resolution mechanisms of Indian democratic 
institutions helps terrorist organizations to mobilize by exploiting the grievances of 
certain populations. On the other hand, unlike an authoritarian state, the Indian state is 
not absolutely repressive; hence some permissive features of the system encourage 
mobilization of dissent, and electoral accountability of the governments at different levels 
makes civilians vulnerable to terrorist attacks. It is interesting to note here that the Maoist 
insurgency that started in 1967 almost died down in 1972. That was the first phase of the 
Maoist insurgency; the second phase, marked by the movement’s dormancy began in 
early 1980s (Banerjee, 2009). The time gap between the first and the second phase 
coincides with a systemic change in Indian democracy. The 22 months old Emergency 
Rule (from June 25, 1975 to March 21, 1977) imposed by Prime Minister Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi56 in 1975 radically altered the governing structure of the Indian polity converting 
it into an authoritarian state (Reddy and Suhaib, 2006). The Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act of 1971 (Preventive Detention) was revamped during 1975-1977 Emergency 
to allow the government to arrest individuals without declaring charges. The government 
repressed all sorts of dissent and opposition to the regime by using MISA 1971 and 
Defense Indian Rules 1962 (Omar, 2002). Thus the temporary cancellation of democratic 
rule in India was one of the major causes of the suppression of Left Wing Extremism in 
India in the end of 1970s. The quality of Indian democracy can be assessed by focusing 
                                                 
 
56 Mrs. Indira Gandhi was the third Prime Minister of India. She became Prime Minister in 1966. 
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on severe distortions of rule of law in India and several aberrations in the actual working 
of the polity.  
Indian constitution is based on the principle of rule of law. However, the 
dysfunctional criminal justice system is a major hindrance to the actual working of the 
democratic polity. The state of policing in India remains deplorable. Most cases of human 
rights abuses taken up by various Human Rights Organizations are directly attributable to 
the local police (Das and Mohanty, 2007). The police force, generally dominated by the 
upper caste Hindus, refuse even to get a report filed by the minority against privileged 
people. In several cases, the police are the abusers, and in a few others the police failed to 
take action against a perpetrator. To summarize the problems affecting the policing 
system in India can be listed as follows: 1. Impunity; 2. The prevalent practice of 
violence and custodial torture; 3. The lack of a legal framework to ensure accountability 
and to prevent crimes from being committed by police; 4. Alarmingly low public 
confidence in the system, which shows that the police are not protectors, but perpetrators; 
5. The lack of awareness about how to engage in better policing; 6. Political influence; 7. 
Corruption (Verma, 2005).  
According to the report of the Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR), “Torture 
in India 2011”, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) recorded a total of 
14,231 deaths in custody in India between 2001 and 2010, which includes about 1,504 
deaths in police custody and about 12,727 deaths in judicial custody. The ACHR report 
observes that these are only the cases reported to the NHRC, and do not include all cases 
of custodial deaths. The report attributes the deaths in custody to torture, denial of 
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medical facilities and inhuman prison conditions (ACHR, 2011). Torture of the victims 
during interrogation is common across various police cells in India. Physical torture 
remains an integral part of criminal investigations in order to obtain confessions from 
suspects in India. Terror suspects are at an increased risk of torture given the immense 
pressure on the police to solve the crimes. People from minority groups are often victims 
of torture and custodial deaths as suspects of terrorism (Human Rights Watch, 2011). 
India has an unusual practice of ‘encounter killing’. The police kill a suspect at 
sight or after capture and then report it as an ‘encounter’ between the militants and the 
police. The official justification is that the suspect was attempting to escape and got 
killed in the gunfire with police. Sometimes, the police manufacture evidence to show 
that the suspect was trying to shoot at the cops. Like custodial deaths, ‘encounter killings’ 
are common in India’s conflict zones (Chenoy and Chenoy, 2010). On July 3, 2013, 
India’s premier federal investigation agency, the Central Bureau of Investigation, charged 
seven police officers in the western state of Gujarat for the killing of four individuals, 
including a 19-year-old woman named Ishrat Jahan.57 Such cases of ‘fake encounters’ 
have earlier been addressed by the judiciary in India (Ganguly, 2013). In addition to 
combating terrorism, ‘encounter killings’ have also been used to rid society of criminals. 
These encounters are often sanctioned by the state governments that find that encounter 
killings do what the criminal justice system cannot; drive down crime figures. Encounter 
                                                 
 
57 Ishrat Jahan, 19, was gunned down on June 15, 2004 along with three men she was with, by a group of 
policemen near Ahmedabad city in Gujarat. Local police at the time alleged the group were part of 
Lashkar-e-Taiba, a banned Pakistan-based terrorist organization, and involved in a plan to assassinate 
Gujarat’s Chief Minister Narendra Modi. 
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killings serve as a useful tool for politician and the government more generally to appear 
tough on crime. As a result, the police and ‘encounter specialists’ who carry out the 
killings are rarely prosecuted (Pelly, 2009). When the police are allowed to act as judge 
and executioner, a basic principle of the rule of law requiring an impartial trial by an 
independent judiciary is violated. 
In a flagrant violation of rule of law, the Indian political establishment in 
collusion with upper-caste landed class has often used private militias to fight against the 
Maoist challenge to the state, thus making a mockery of Indian democracy. In Bihar, the 
landowners of the higher castes and some of those of the intermediate classes have 
formed private militias or senas in response to the mobilization of the landless lower 
castes under political parties and peasant organizations. Political patronage of the upper-
caste militias and police collusion has reinforced the strong nexus among landlords, 
contractors, criminals, politicians, and administrators and has allowed the senas to 
operate with impunity (Chandran and Gupta, 2002). One of the most prominent of the 
senas, the Ranvir Sena, founded in 1994 by upper-caste landlords of central Bihar, has 
been responsible for dozens of massacres in which, according to different reports, 
perhaps as many as a thousand villagers have been killed. In some cases, police have 
accompanied sena members on raids and have stood by as they killed villagers and 
burned their homes in the pretext of fighting the Maoist menace (Naval, 2001).  
In late 2005 in its response to the growing communist insurgency, the government 
of Chhattisgarh authorized and supported the formation of so-called citizens’ militias 
among rural tribal residents, in what they called a Salwa Judum (‘purification hunt’) or 
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‘spontaneous tribal uprising against the Maoists’ (Sundar, 2006). Through its sponsorship 
of this vigilante style action the government has attempted to both split the tribal 
population and carry out a classic counterinsurgency ‘sanitization’ campaign. Villages 
that refuse to attend Judum meetings or to hand over villagers who are part of Maoist led 
village-level organizations, are repeatedly attacked until they ‘surrender’ (Walker, 2008). 
Youth, mostly non-tribal, trained, armed, and given the status of ‘special police officers’ 
(SPOs), herded the ‘surrendered’ villagers to refugee camps set up in larger villages. 
Once the villages had been cleared by the Salwa Judam militia, security forces entered 
into such areas to kill anyone left out in the forest as Maoist suspects. Through the Salwa 
Judum the government has not only escalated the level of violence by promoting 
fratricidal conflict, but also has developed a rationale for moving tribals off their land and 
exposing its rich subterranean resources to industry (Sengupta, 2006; Chenoy and 
Chenoy, 2010). In 2011 the Supreme Court of India declared as illegal and 
unconstitutional the deployment of tribal youths as Special Police Officers - either as 
Salwa Judum or any other force — in the fight against the Maoist insurgency and ordered 
their immediate disarming (The Hindu, 2011). Similarly, the state government of West 
Bengal has used private militias, mostly goons from the ruling Communist Party, to break 
the people’s resistance against forceful acquisition of land for SEZ in Nandigram village 
in 2007, killing about a dozen of villagers and terrorizing others (Dhobal and Jacob, 
2012). The government’s resorting to such extra-constitutional methods of 
counterinsurgency tactics exposes the illiberal nature of India’s democratic framework 
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and compels the aggrieved sections of the population to adopt violent means to redress 
their grievances.  
The functioning of India’s judicial institutions creates opportunities for dissent 
among the underprivileged sections of population and adds to grievances. One of the grey 
areas, where the Indian justice delivery system has failed to come up to the people’s 
expectations is that the judiciary has failed to deliver justice expeditiously. The delay in 
the delivery of justice is in fact one of the greatest challenges before the judiciary and has 
resulted in the erosion of faith in the system. Faith in the legal system is determined by its 
ability to provide accessible, speedy and cost effective justice to all equally. The people 
are a mute witness to the court process, often spending their savings to their unending 
case. Pendency is a result of the court procedures, lawyer’s tendency to drag cases, lack 
of sufficient judges, poor infrastructure in courts and so on. At the end it is the clients 
who are left to suffer this ignominy. With 30 million cases pending in various courts and 
an average time span of 15 years to get a dispute resolved through court system, the 
judicial system can hardly be described as satisfactory (Kumar, 2012). Delay in judicial 
procedure has resulted in thousands of people being incarcerated without trial for years. 
In many cases when the suspect is finally acquitted by the judiciary, the person has 
already spent years in prison. In the absence of compensation, such ignominious 
treatment creates grievances. According to 2010 Indian government data, about 300,000 
of the total 430,000 prisoners in India were under-trials who are unconvicted defendants 
in criminal cases. In 2007, that number was only 250,727, which would suggest that the 
number has grown by 50,000 people in just over two years (Bhaskar, 2012). 
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India’s democratic institutions have been further sullied by a criminal-political-
bureaucratic nexus that has obstructed the observance of rule of law in post-Nehru era 
(Vadackumchery, 2002). In the 1970s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her younger son, 
Sanjay Gandhi, facing challenges to the hegemony of Congress rule from regional parties 
and internal party dissent, brought large numbers of unruly youth into the Congress Party 
to be used as enforcers (Bhan, 1995). These young men with little regard for democratic 
procedures or professional probity had the only purpose to serve as a private army in 
closely contested elections to intimidate voters, intimidate political opponents, and, on 
occasion, try and subvert other electoral processes. The political protection and patronage 
that these men enjoyed frequently demoralized local police and other administrative 
authorities, creating a climate in which the rule of law could be flouted with impunity. 
Bureaucrats who refused to buckle under the demands of politicians were frequently 
transferred to less desirable postings; in a short time the political independence of the 
bureaucracy was thoroughly compromised as political interference became rampant 
(Kumar, 2009). As democratic norms frayed, politicians increasingly came to rely on 
local kingpins to threaten and harass political opponents with little fear of police and 
other authorities. The criminalization of politics that started in 1970s became 
institutionalized as other parties adopted the same methods (Saksena, 1992). In the 1990s 
the blatant involvement of politicians with known criminals became so widespread that 
even the government felt the need to appoint a one-man commission to investigate and 
report on the politician-criminal nexus. The Vohra Commission, created in 1993, 
submitted its report within a year providing a damning indictment of the politician-
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criminal nexus. The problem that Vohra identified in his report continues to plague 
Indian politics (Sharma, 2010). As in 2013, 1,448 of India's 4,835 Members of 
Parliaments and state legislators have declared criminal cases, and 641 of these 1,448 are 
facing serious charges like murder, rape and kidnapping. The figures are based on 
information politicians themselves provide in their mandatory pre-election declarations 
(North, 2013). Once these ‘strong-arm’ politicians, present in all political parties, are in 
the electoral fray, they manipulate elections through intimidation and violence. When 
they are elected to political offices, they scuttle criminal cases against them, making a 
mockery of Indian judicial institutions. Money and muscle power are two integral parts of 
Indian democracy (Jaffrelot, 2002). 
Thus weak institutions in India and the aberrations in the democratic system not 
only fail to solve conflicts and alleviate the grievances of minorities but also create 
incentives for the aggrieved people to further challenge the state. The Indian Constitution 
allows political associations and, therefore, the government cannot stop the initial 
formation of groups as long as they remain under constitutional limits. Often such groups 
emerge as sources of political mobilization of aggrieved people.  The case of Indian 
Mujahedeen and SIMI, reported to be responsible for many terrorist attacks, can be a 
good example in this regard. Evidence points to the fact that the Student’s Islamic 
Movement of India (SIMI), serving as a “feeder organization”, brought together the key 
players involved in forming the Indian Mujahedeen (Gupta, 2011, p.3). SIMI was 
founded in Aligarh on April 25, 1977 with the purpose of working with Muslim students 
to create among them an Islamic consciousness. In the 1990s, militant chauvinism of the 
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Hindu Right, the demolition of the Babri Mosque and consequent violence on Muslim 
community led to SIMI’s radicalization. An apparently benign organization like SIMI 
declared in 1996 that since democracy and secularism had failed to protect Muslims in 
India, the only option now was to work for a Caliphate through violent jihad (Rana, 
2012). The Government of India declared SIMI an outlawed organization on September 
27, 2001, after it was charged with carrying out terror strikes along with Indian 
Mujahedeen (Singh, 2007). Similarly, the government of India imposed a ban on Maoist 
Parties in 2009 as terrorist organizations although their genesis can be traced to the 
formation of Communist Party of India in 1920s. The main party and its other factions 
like Communist Party of India (Marxist) have been participating in the democratic 
process as legal entities (Coates, 2011).  
Jihadist Terrorism and Maoist Violence: A Comparison 
One sixth of India’s citizens live in areas of armed conflict. There are 
insurgencies in the Northeast, the secessionism and conflict in Kashmir, and struggles to 
capture power in several regions of India (Chenoy and Chenoy, 2010). But the Islamic 
Jihadist terrorism and the Maoist insurgencies are presently considered to be the biggest 
threats to internal security in India. Although the same types of grievances and 
opportunities account for both violent political movements, there are more differences in 
their manifestations than similarities. Islamic Jihadist violence can be perfectly 
interpreted as terrorism. Jihadist organizations lack funds as there is almost no 
information about their financial resources. They mostly use improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) to harm civilians. They have not targeted security forces outside the state 
 
190 
of Jammu and Kashmir.58 Organizations like Indian Mujahedeen are known for their 
clandestine operations and often evade detection. The Islamists work in small cells which 
are independent of one another and the groups lack hierarchical structures. The 
independent cells draw their inspirations from a central leadership but are not physically 
controlled by it (Gupta, 2011; Rana, 2012). On the other hand, Maoists are fighting 
guerrilla warfare against the state in the Bastar region of central India. Their activities 
involve the kidnapping of government officials, extortion from mining companies, 
attacking police stations, destroying public buildings and railway stations, and ambush of 
security forces in their strongholds. They are highly visible in uniforms dispensing 
justice, even the death penalty, in kangaroo courts in the Maoist bastion of central India 
(Roy, 2012). They use terrorism as a strategy in areas where they are relatively weak. 
Between 2005 and March 24, 2013, Maoist attacks killed 2483 civilians and 1554 
security personnel (SATP, 2013); it is the civilian targets that make the Maoists terrorists 
(Aiyer, 2010). Maoist operations are clandestine in most parts of India other than in the 
Bastar forests where they have declared a ‘liberated zone’ (Chakravarti, 2009). The 
Maoists are flush with financial resources that enable them to buy all sorts of modern 
weaponry. In 2010 the Maoists had a fund of more than US$ 454 million (Roy 
Chaudhury, 2010).        
Factors like exclusion, bad governance, underdevelopment and inequality 
contributed to the adoption of political violence by both the Jihadists and the Maoists in 
India. But a reference to ideologies is necessary to explain why the Islamists and Maoists 
                                                 
 
58 Jihadists in Jammu and Kashmir are considered transnational terrorists because of their connection with 
Pakistan. 
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have chosen the course of armed struggle, rather than other non-violent options. For both 
the groups, totalitarian ideologies provided the rationale of political violence. The Indian 
Jihadist vision of Islam derives from the voluminous writings of the Islamist ideologue, 
Sayyed Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of the leading South Asian Islamist movement. 
For Maududi, as for the Islamists, the mission of the Prophet Muhammad is seen 
principally as having been the struggle to establish an ideal state and society as dictated 
by the Quran. All man-made systems of law are condemned as ‘false’, even Satanic, and 
Muslims are reminded that unless they actively struggle to be ruled in accordance with 
shariah, their commitment to and faith in Islam is not complete and remains suspect. 
Secularism is seen as inherently anti-Islamic and so is democracy. To be ruled by man-
made laws instead of the shariah is tantamount to an unforgivable sin. All ideologies and 
religions other than Islam are condemned as false and sinful and their adherents as ‘rebels 
against God’ (Sikand, 2003). For Maududi, the objective of the Islamic jihad is to 
eliminate the rule of an un-Islamic system, and establish in its place an Islamic system of 
state rule (Jackson, 2011). So violence is an integral part of the Islamists in India. 
Class struggle in the form of armed revolution is the core of communist 
philosophy. The primacy of political and ideological factors is evident by an avowed goal 
of the Maoist insurgency: overthrow of the present polity based on multiparty 
parliamentary democracy through armed revolution and its replacement with a new 
political system known as people's democracy. In their party program, Maoists characterize 
the postcolonial Indian state as reactionary and autocratic, and seek a worker - peasant alliance 
“to overthrow imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism” via an armed 
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revolutionary struggle. The CPI (Maoist) politburo, which constitutes its ideological leadership, 
is thus supported by an underground People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The party’s long - 
term objective is to establish a people’s democratic state under the leadership of the 
proletariat “that will guarantee real democracy for the vast majority of people while 
exercising dictatorship over a tiny minority of exploiters” (Chakraborty and Kujur, 2010).  
In addition to propagating violence, rejection of liberal democracy and inherent 
intolerance to plurality, radical Islam and communism have striking similarities. In the 
words of Nobel Laureate V. S. Naipul (1981, p.78): “Both sides depend on revealed truth 
and a special reading of historical events; both require absolute faith. And both are fed by 
the same passion: justice, union, vengeance.”  At the same time, there are substantial 
differences in the two hegemonic ideologies. Islamists’ ideal state is a theocracy and, 
hence, non-Muslims have no place in their scheme of society. On the other hand, the 
Maoists are avidly secular and appeal to religion is not acceptable to them; hence their 
ideal society is more inclusive than the Islamists. Islamists abhor the West for cultural 
and religious reasons and their anti-Americanism is borne out of the US presence in Arab 
lands, but the Maoists dislike America because of the US imperialistic policies in the 
global South.  
Finally the urban based Islamic terrorism and predominantly rural Maoist 
insurgency in India are often tied to the geo-politics of South Asia. The Islamic terrorism 
that afflicts Indian urban centers draws its ideological inspiration from the Jihadists of 
Pakistan and their ideologue Ala Maududi. The Indian government agencies routinely 
blame the Pakistan government and its intelligence agency Inter Services Intelligence 
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(ISI) for providing logistic support to homegrown Islamic terrorist organization in India. 
These non-state actors definitely have important roles in the India-Pakistan conflict 
(Barthwal-Datta, 2012). Since 2001, when violence in Jammu and Kashmir began to 
decline, these new groups engaged in a sustained campaign of terrorism throughout India. 
Operating with the infrastructural assistance of Pakistan-based and Bangladesh-based 
organizations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami, the groups wage 
sustained terrorist campaign against India - a campaign that keeps the Islamist pressure 
on the Indian state (Swami, 2008). 
On the other hand, the Indian Maoists’ aim to bring about a communist revolution 
in tune with Mao Zedong’ 1949 revolution ideologically connects them to China. The 
Indian defense establishment and political elites often view the Maoist threat to Indian 
internal security in the context of the protracted Sino – Indian rivalry. The Indian Home 
Secretary, G.K. Pillai said in November 2009 that he was confident about the supply of 
arms from China to the Maoists in India (Jain, 2009). Although India did not officially 
allege any connection between the Chinese and the Maoist insurgent in India, the 
repeated recoveries of Chinese made arms, radio sets and other electronic devices (DNA, 
November 16, 2009) from the Maoists often indicate Maoist-China linkages. Moreover, 
the Communist Party of India (Maoist) is considered to be part of the international ultra-
left brethren. It is a member of the Coordination Committee of Maoists Parties and 
Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), which is believed to have the direct 
blessings of Communist Party of China (Dash, 2006). Given that the Chinese Communist 
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Party does not officially clarify its position on Maoist insurgency in India, alleged 
Chinese support to these Leftist Extremist groups remains unclear. 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter I have examined two sources of terrorism in India. The Jihadist 
terrorism and Maoist insurgency are responsible for enormous death and destruction in 
post-Cold War India. Based on Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) theoretical framework, 
three crucial factors- (1) heterogeneity cost, (2) global economic integration, and (3) 
political openness - have been used to explain the menace of Islamist and Maoist political 
violence in the post-1990s India. I have argued that resorting to terrorism is a rational 
choice for the minorities in India as their cost of heterogeneity - deprivation from public 
goods due to their ideological distance from the political elites –increases with post-Cold 
war economic openness and political changes. Political violence by the Islamists and the 
Maoists results from minority discrimination that has been practiced in India for decades. 
India’s participation in the global economy has added to minority grievances and helped 
the marginalized groups to mobilize. The country’s weak institutions provide further 
incentives for the aggrieved sections to challenge the state. As the minorities cannot 
redress their problems through peaceful means, they resort to violence. The two sources 
of terrorism in India are similar as well as dissimilar in many ways, but their hegemonic 
ideologies are inherently inimical to the principles of pluralism and tolerance that India 
stands for.  
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In the next Chapter, I conclude the dissertation with a summary of my findings. I 
offer suggestions on how this research can be extended in the future and discuss the 
policy implications of the findings of this research. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Globalization is considered by many scholars and policy makers to be the ultimate 
celebration of the political, economic and social homogenization of the international 
system. Commonalities in terms of economic aspirations and technological progress are 
emphasized by politicians and opinion makers, over differences such as religion, culture 
and ethnicity. The post-Cold War world is rapidly moving to realizing the ideal of global 
economic integration. World foreign direct investment flows (FDI), which amounted to 
less than $13 billion in 1970, quadrupled every 10 years, reaching $209 billion in 1990. 
The upward surge continued, reaching $ 4 trillion in 2007 (World Investment Report, 
2010, p.187). Worldwide trade also increased dramatically over the same time period. 
Trade as a percent of GDP grew from 27 percent in 1970 to 49.6 percent by the year 2000 
and culminating at 59.6 percent in 2008 (World Bank, 2012). During the same time 
period in question, there has been an increase in democratization across the globe. In 
1995 the percentage of democracies in the world was 47; in 2000 democracies went up to 
49 percent and in 2007 to 56 percent (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). 
But Fukuyama’s (1992) optimism in free market capitalism and liberal democracy 
as the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human 
government” has hardly resulted in the “end of history.” The collapse of the “Soviet 
Empire” was followed by the emergence, or re-emergence, of many serious conflicts in 
several areas that had been relatively quiescent during the Cold War. Some of these new 
conflicts have been taking place within the former Soviet Union, such as the fighting in 
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Chechnya. But some conflicts also erupted or intensified in several countries outside of 
Russia, and many Third World conflicts in which the superpowers were not deeply 
involved during the Cold War have persisted after it, like the secessionist movements in 
India, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. The rise of religious militancy, insurgency in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, civil war in Syria, political instability in post-July 2013 coup Egypt still 
threaten the international order. Domestic terrorism, as a form of intrastate violence, has 
varied widely along with the post-Cold War period of global economic integration and 
emergence of democracies. Domestic terrorist incidents have varied after the end of 
Cold-War, taking almost a U-shape in their fluctuation. Fatalities from these incidents 
have varied in tune with these incidents, but yearly average of deaths per incident has 
risen (Enders et al., 2011). 
Homegrown Terrorism: Grievances and Opportunities 
In this dissertation I developed a theory connecting domestic terrorism to 
economic integration and the emergence of democracies. In developing the theory I 
largely extended the theoretical model developed by Alesina and Spolaore (2003) to 
argue that resort to terrorism is a rational choice when individuals’ grievances referred as 
‘heterogeneity cost’ - deprivation from public goods due to geographical and ideological 
distance from the ruling elites –increase, and opportunity for mobilization is provided by 
political openness and integration to the global economy. There is a trade-off between the 
benefits (e.g., lower per capita costs of public goods, better protection from foreign 
aggression, greater productivity for economies of scale and larger markers) from the size 
of heterogeneous state and the cost of its heterogeneity. Heterogeneous people may 
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differentiate over policy preferences. Groups or individuals who differ from the ruling 
class in ideology, religion, ethnicity or nationality might be deprived from public good 
provisions. The disadvantaged groups or individuals may either want to change the 
configuration of borders or bring about by regime change a new government that would 
make resource transfer to them.  
People also may challenge the state more when a political system opens up. A 
dictator does not care much about individuals’ (heterogeneous) preferences and represses 
dissent. But the permissive nature of a democracy facilitates political mobilization by 
tolerating dissent. A higher level of terrorist activities would be experienced in a state 
which has not consolidated as a mature democracy. But, in an institutionalized 
democracy several conflict-reducing mechanisms make the resort to violence a less 
attractive option (Schmid, 1992). Like democratization, economic globalization creates 
opportunities for violent political opposition to a state. The trade regime influences the 
trade-off between state’s size and heterogeneity (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). Because of 
specialization and other mechanisms, interaction among a large number of individuals 
may increase productivity in a large market. A country’s market size coincides with its 
political size only if the country’s economy is perfectly integrated domestically but 
completely closed to the rest of the world. In an autarkic world a small country has a 
small market and thus a low demand for output, low production and low probability of 
capital mobilization. In an economically-integrated world where borders are totally 
irrelevant for economic interactions, the market size of each country is the world. Since 
the economic costs of being small fall as economic integration increases, one should 
 
199 
observe that ethnic minorities and border regions of larger countries may prefer to split 
away. Separatist violence may go up. Other types of domestic terrorism may also 
increase due to global economic integration. Economic globalization creates winners and 
losers (Stiglitz, 2002). By lowering the opportunity cost of violence for the losers of 
globalization, a move toward economic openness can increase domestic conflict (Magee 
and Massoud, 2011). In a heterogeneous country with group discrimination, if the losers 
of economic globalization happen to belong to the already aggrieved section, terrorist 
organizations representing such aggrieved sections might grow stronger with more people 
joining their ranks. 
Key Empirical Findings 
I put the above theory to test in chapters four through six of my dissertation. In 
Chapter Four, my study on the incidence of domestic terrorism using a country-year 
database of 172 countries from 1990 to 2007 shows strong support that group 
discrimination in a heterogeneous country increases domestic terrorism. Political and 
economic discrimination of minority group/groups in a heterogeneous country is one of 
the reasons for domestic terrorism. Similarly, immature democracy as a regime type leads 
to increases in domestic terrorism. But the presence of heterogeneity and discrimination 
in an immature democracy neither increases nor decreases incidents of domestic 
terrorism.  There is likely to be higher levels of domestic terrorism in an immature 
democracy in the presence of grievances. In my model I only include minority 
discrimination which is one of the many possible grievances. Therefore, the probable 
presence of other types of grievances such as racial enmity, perceived threat from new 
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immigrants or fear of losing privileged positions in society or state along with minority 
discrimination may dilute the marginal effect of heterogeneity cost in an immature 
democracy in predicting higher levels of domestic terrorism. 
Another important finding in Chapter Four is that trade is negatively related to 
domestic terrorism. This finding on a cross-country dataset of 172 countries is contrary to 
my theoretical expectation because I expected a positive relation.  For Neo-liberals, an 
open economy leads to a higher level of economic development and helps promote 
democracy. Development and democracy together alleviate the problem of intrastate 
conflict like terrorism (Hegre et. al., 2003). This argument naturally follows from the 
supposition that a primary cause of terrorism is underdevelopment and poverty. But the 
assumption that terrorism is a function of poverty is not empirically supported in many 
studies (Feldmann and Perala, 2004; Abadie, 2006; Berrebi, 2007; Asal and Rethemeyer, 
2008). My explanation for the negative relationship between domestic terrorism and trade 
is that domestic terrorism may reduce international trade, thus lowering a country’s level 
of economic integration to the world. In such a case, we would observe a negative 
correlation between terrorism and openness because of the impact of terrorism on 
openness rather than because openness causes a decline in terrorism. That civil wars 
reduce international trade flows has been supported in several studies (Bayer and Rupert, 
2004; Martin et al., 2008; Magee and Massoud, 2011). The same phenomenon may also 
be occurring with domestic terrorism.  
Findings in Chapter Four also show that a history of terrorist violence in a country 
is a positive predictor of terrorism. This is consistent with the expectation by scholars that 
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both the presence and the absence of terrorist activities tend to be persistent. Terrorist 
groups, once operational, tend to engage in activities continuously (Li and Schaub, 2004). 
The size of a country is positively related to the rate of terrorist incidents. The theoretical 
expectation that greater country size as a major indicator of greater heterogeneity cost 
(Alesina and Spolaore, 2003) will increase domestic terrorism receives support in my 
research. Economic development increases the rate of terrorist incidents. This finding 
supports earlier empirical studies that terrorism originating in a country is positively 
associated with the country’s wealth or economic development (Burgoon, 2006; Berrebi, 
2007; Lai, 2007; Piazza, 2011). A theoretical expectation was that economic and political 
opportunities would facilitate terrorism. State fragility in a country increases the expected 
rate of incidents of domestic terrorism. This finding is compatible with earlier findings 
that weak states are ideal breeding grounds for internal conflicts like civil wars and 
insurgencies (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).  
In Chapter Five, my study on a regional dataset on South Asia for the same 
temporal domain between 1990 and 2007 largely supports the theoretical expectations. 
As expected, both discrimination against heterogeneous groups and immature democracy 
as a regime type increase domestic terrorism in a country. That economic globalization is 
likely to increase domestic terrorism did not find empirical support. But economic 
globalization in the presence of heterogeneity and minority discrimination increases 
domestic terrorism. Similarly, minority discrimination in an immature democracy further 
increases terrorism compared to other regime types. In Chapter Four, I found that global 
economic integration in the form of international trade reduced domestic terrorism on a 
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global dataset. Moreover, the presence of heterogeneity cost in an immature democracy 
neither reduced nor increased terrorism. Similarly, global economic integration neither 
reduced nor increased terrorism in the presence of heterogeneity cost. These findings 
were contrary to theoretical expectations. I argued in Chapter Four that the probable 
presence of other types of grievances along with minority discrimination might dilute the 
effect of discrimination in an immature democracy and on trade in predicting higher 
levels of domestic terrorism. But my findings in Chapter Five are more supportive of the 
theoretical expectations because discrimination against minority groups is practiced in all 
five countries of South Asia. The homegrown terrorist movements in South Asia mostly 
resulted from exclusion of certain groups from public good provisions.  
Some other findings in Chapter Five are also interesting. Levels of unemployment 
increase the rate of domestic terrorist incidents. Globalization might result in job loss 
among the losers of trade. If the jobless are from discriminated groups, terrorist 
organizations might find new recruits. Regime durability, the duration of a particular 
regime, increases terrorist incidents. I expected a negative relationship because longer 
regime durability indicates political stability. Political stability should reduce dissent. But 
in South Asia political regimes consistently follow discriminatory practices; the longer 
the regimes survive, the more institutionalized the discriminatory practices are. 
Therefore, we see high levels of terrorist activities along with regime durability. 
 Chapter Six is a case study of India. In this chapter, I analyzed the causes and 
nature of two sources of terrorism in India prevalent since the 1990s with the same 
theoretical framework that terrorism is driven by group grievances of being deprived 
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from public good provisions due to their religious, linguistic or ethnic difference from the 
political elites. Among the two sources of terrorism analyzed, the first set comprises a 
network of rage-driven Indian Muslim youth and Indian Jihadist outfits who are active 
throughout India since the late 1990s. The second set is formed by radical Leftists known 
as Maoist insurgents who have grown as India’s biggest internal security threat in the last 
decade. Muslims and the lower caste Hindus (support base of the Maoists), religious and 
ethnic minorities in India, are both victims of social and political exclusion by the high 
caste Hindi power elites. They are left out in the post-1990s economic development 
process. Weak conflict-resolution mechanisms of Indian democracy fail to redress their 
grievances and its permissive nature provides opportunity to mobilize. The case study on 
India analyzes terrorism in historical context and supplements the generalized findings of 
the large-N and regional-level studies. 
Suggestions for Future Research  
Like every research project, this one is constrained by time, space and data 
deficiency; hence I offer directions for future research on domestic terrorism. In Chapter 
Four, my findings on the relationship between terrorism and economic globalization on a 
global dataset did not support my theoretical expectations. Foreign direct investment was 
not related to terrorism. Trade had a negative relationship with domestic terrorism. I 
argued that domestic terrorism may reduce international trade, thus lowering a country’s 
level of economic integration to the world. In such a case, a negative correlation between 
terrorism and trade is observed because of the impact of terrorism on trade rather than 
because trade causes a decline in terrorism. Therefore, it would be very useful to 
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systematically reevaluate this relationship. As homegrown terrorism affects the level of 
trade, international trade should be treated as an endogenous variable. The effect of trade 
on terrorism can be estimated controlling for endogeneity to see if trade significantly 
reduces domestic terrorism. On the other hand, trade treated as dependent variable in a 
research design may further show whether terrorism as an explanatory variable reduces a 
country’s international trade. A longer temporal domain and an alternative measure of 
global economic integration can be used for robustness check.  
Another important finding in Chapter Four is that countries that are highly 
integrated into the global economy have two common features: high political 
effectiveness and state legitimacy. The five most open countries in terms of trade as 
percentage of GDP, Singapore, Luxemburg, Netherland, Belgium and Ireland (World 
Bank, 2011), are low in state fragility index - a composite score of political effectiveness 
and legitimacy (Marshall and Cole, 2010). These countries are more or less free from the 
menace of domestic terrorism. Their strong political institutions and immunity from the 
problem of terrorism might contribute to greater openness. I think this observation 
provides an avenue for future research to explore the relationship between state strength 
and terrorism. Weak states are likely to experience greater levels of domestic terrorism. 
Political violence is likely when state conditions either allow terrorists to easily evade 
government forces or recruit from the population. States are likely to be greater producers 
of terrorism when they impose low costs on groups for mobilizing and operating in that 
state. My second suggestion for research is to explore the relationship between state 
weakness and domestic terrorism. Lai (2007) has found that the number of transnational 
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terrorist incidents originating from a state increase if that state is engaged in war or 
experiencing civil war. Research can extend Lai’s research to the study of domestic 
terrorism. 
In Chapter Four, I found that presence of heterogeneity cost in an immature 
democracy neither reduced nor increased terrorism. Similarly, global economic 
integration neither reduced nor increased terrorism in the presence of heterogeneity cost. 
These findings were contrary to theoretical expectations. But in Chapter Five I found that 
both immature democracy and trade increase domestic terrorism in the presence of 
minority discrimination. My findings in Chapter Five are more supportive of the 
theoretical expectations because discrimination against minority groups is practiced in all 
five countries of South Asia. I argued in Chapter Four that the probable presence of other 
types of grievances along with minority discrimination at the global level might dilute the 
effect of discrimination in an immature democracy and on trade in predicting higher level 
of domestic terrorism. My third suggestion for future research would involve 
differentiating the global dataset of domestic terrorism on the basis of typologies. A 
subset of global data on domestic terrorism driven by minority discrimination can be used 
for a similar study. Likewise, a subset of data on separatist violence (incidence of 
domestic terrorism for a separate homeland) might best serve in testing the theoretical 
implications of Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) model. 
Policy Implications 
My findings have several policy implications. Crenshaw (1981) argued that any 
political or social movement is primarily driven by grievances. In my study I found 
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strong support that group discrimination in a heterogeneous country leads to homegrown 
terrorism. Therefore, the policy suggestion naturally following from the finding is that a 
heterogeneous country requires institutional arrangements to make sure that minority 
groups are not discriminated against. Current patterns of socio-economic inequality 
within nations are often intertwined with much older systems of stratification. In Europe, 
the Roma and other semi-nomadic groups that pre-date modern nation states find 
themselves distrusted and socially excluded. In India and her neighboring countries, 
ancient systems of caste inequality endure; their modern manifestations severely constrict 
the lives and opportunities of lower caste citizens. In many nations, groups at the bottom 
of the stratification order have either won or have been granted rights of equal 
citizenship. Nowadays, modern constitutions and legal codes outlaw the more violent or 
oppressive forms of social exclusion. In some countries, lawmakers have gone further to 
offer group- specific rights and privileges intended to redress past wrongs (Darity and 
Deshpande, 2003). Such constitutional safeguards and legal codes can prove effective in 
preventing marginalization of excluded minorities. Another way of redressing minority 
grievances is to recognize group heterogeneity and decentralize power to such groups 
within constitutional framework. States often deny heterogeneity and marginalize 
minority groups in the name of homogenization of the entire population. Terrorism in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh mostly resulted from the states’ imposition of Sunni Islam on 
diverse peoples (Ahsan and Chakma, 1989; Ghufran, 2009).   
That the rate of domestic terrorist incidents is higher in immature democracies 
than in other regime types has received strong support in my study. In such democracies, 
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conflict resolutions mechanisms are weak and there is scant respect for rule of law. If 
aggrieved people cannot redress their problems through peaceful legal means, they are 
left with only option to resort to violence. Therefore, ensuring efficient functioning of the 
democratic institutions and observance of rule of law should be a government’s priorities. 
Manipulation of democratic institutions for short-term gains diminishes state legitimacy 
and strengthens terrorists’ appeal to the people (Schmid, 1992). A state should not 
abdicate its legitimacy by abrogating democratic principles. Although consolidation of 
democratic institutions is a time-consuming process, political elites have important role to 
play in expediting the process. A respect for rule of law by the political class can boost 
democratic consolidation. Countries like Chile, Poland and Czech Republic are good 
examples of speedy democratic consolidation (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010).  
I found in Chapter Five that trade in the presence minority discrimination leads to 
an increase in terrorism. In some countries, the minority groups are left out in the 
development process. The state needs to compensate the losers of international trade. A 
huge body of scholarly literature addresses the issue of compensation in International 
Political Economy. I just want to reiterate that the state should be more careful in 
addressing the grievances of the losers of trade in a heterogeneous society.  
A major finding of my research is the positive relationship between state fragility 
and terrorism. A fragile state is likely to host domestic terrorist organizations. A state 
faced with homegrown terrorism needs to strengthen internal security. States employ 
defensive measures to guard against attacks as an effective counter-terrorism policy 
(Sandler, 2005; Powell, 2007). This has been a significant response in the United States 
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since the attacks on 9/11. Defensive measures work to reduce terrorism by raising the 
costs to groups of carrying out attacks. Greater surveillance and detection by security 
forces also raises the costs to such group in operating. But strengthening internal security 
does not come cheap. The US Department of Homeland Security’s budget for 2012 was 
$57 billion and has been increasing at a rate of about 7 percent a year (Frieden et. al., 
2012). Such costs can be a huge burden to the public exchequer of a poor country.  
Concluding Remark 
The findings presented in this dissertation present a bleak picture for human 
security in the immediate future. Domestic terrorism is here to stay because minority 
discrimination is institutionalized in most of the countries suffering from internal conflict. 
Given that political leaders have incentives to politicize heterogeneity for electoral 
purpose, it is likely that ethnicity, religion and race continue to be focal points in political 
mobilization. Democratic institutions may take generations to consolidate and it is 
problematic to compensate losers of trade in a divided society. States faced with the 
threats of terrorism will most probably take security steps in fighting against terrorism 
and violate human rights. Still the dissertation is able to point out some root causes of 
domestic terrorism.  
 
 
 
 
    
 
209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of References 
 
210 
Abadie, Alberto. (2006). “Poverty, Political Freedom and the Roots of Terrorism.” 
American Economic Review 96(2): 159–177. 
 
Ahmar, Moonis. (1996). “Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan: The Karachi Crisis.” 
Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 10: 1031-1048. 
 
Ahsan, Aziz-al and Bhumitra Chakma. (1989). “Problems of National Integration in 
Bangladesh: The Chittagong Hill Tracts” Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 10: 959-970. 
 
Ahuja, Pratul and Rajat Ganguly. (2007). “The Fire Within: Naxalite Insurgency 
Violence in India.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 18:2: 249-274. 
 
Aiyer, Shankar. (April 9, 2010). “Maoism is Terrorism.” India Today (News Magazine) 
New Delhi: Toady Group.  
 
Alesina, Alberto and Enrico Spolaore. (2003). The Size of Nations. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
Alesina, Alberto, Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phillip Swagel. (1996). “Political 
Instability and Economic Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth 1(2): 189-211. 
 
Ali, Riaz. (2012). Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Annual Report on the Prevention of Atrocities Act (India) for 2001-2002. (September, 
2002). Human Rights Watch. Retrieved on August 8, 2008 from Human Rights 
Watch Archive Web site: www.hrw.org (search) 
 
Anoop, Aj. (2011). Maoist Funding: Dimensions, Sources and Implications. Vivekananda 
International Foundation. Retrieved on May 16, 2013 from VIF website: 
http://www.vifindia.org/article/2011/january/14/Maoist-Funding-Dimensions-
Sources-and-Implications 
 
Areeparampil, Mathew. (2010). “Industries, Mines and Dispossession of Indigenous 
People: The Case of Chotonagpur.” In Asha Mishra, and Chittaranjan Kumar 
Party eds. Tribal Movements In Jharkhand 1857-2007 New Delhi: Concept 
Publishing Pvt. Ltd. 
 
Asian Centre for Human Rights. (2011). Torture in India 2011. Retrieved on 5/20/13 
from ACHR website: http://www.achrweb.org/reports/india/torture2011.pdf  
 
Asal, Victor and Karl R. Rethemeyer. (2008). “The Nature of the Beast: Organizational 
Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks.” Journal of Politics 70(2):437–
49. 
 
211 
 
Baker, Aryn. (2008). “India's Muslims in Crisis.” Time, Nov. 27, 2008. Retrieved on 
August 6, 2013 from website: 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1862650,00.html 
 
Bahl, Arvin. (2007). From Jinnah to Jihad: Pakistan's Kashmir Quest and the Limits of 
Realism. New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers. 
 
Baral, Lok Raj. (2000). The Regional Paradox: Essays in Nepali and South Asian Affairs. 
Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 
 
Barthwal-Datta, Monika. (2012). Understanding Security Practices in South Asia: 
Securitization Theory and the Role of Non-State Actors. New York: Routledge. 
 
Bandyopadhyay, Sanghamitra. (2013). “Why Inequality in India is on Rise.” LSE on 
India: London School of Economics and Political Science. Retrieved on May 8, 
2013 from website: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/indiaatlse/2013/03/27/why-inequality-
in-indi-is-on-the-rise/ 
 
Banerjee, Abhijit and Thomas Piketty (2001). Are the Rich Growing Richer: Evidence 
from Indian Tax Data. Processed, MIT, Cambridge MA and CEPREMAP, Paris. 
Retrieved on June 23, 2011 from website: 
http://www.worldbank.org/indiapovertyworkshop 
 
Banerjee, Sumanta. (2009). “Reflections of a One-time Maoist Activist.”  Dialectical 
Anthropology, Vol.33, nos.3-4: 253-269. 
 
Bayer, Resat and Matthew Rupert. (2004). “Effects of Civil Wars on International Trade, 
1950–92.” Journal of Peace Research 41(6): 699–713. 
 
Benedikter, Thomas. (2009). Language Policy and Linguistic Minorities in India. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 
 
Berman, Eli and David D. Laitin. (2005). Hard Targets: Theory and Evidence on Suicide 
Attacks. NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES. Working Paper 11740, Available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11740 
 
Berrebi, Claude. (2007). “Evidence about the Link between Education, Poverty and 
Terrorism among Palestinians.” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public 
Policy Volume 13, Issue 1 Article 2: 1-36. 
 
Berrebi, Claude and Darius Lakdawalla. (2007). “How Does Terrorism Risk Vary across 
Space and Time? An analysis based on the Israeli experience.” Defence and 
Peace Economics 18 (2), 113-131. 
 
212 
Bhagawati, Jagdish. (1993). India in Transition: Freeing the Economy. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Bhan, Susheela. (1995). Criminalization of Politics. New Delhi: Shipra Publications. 
 
Bhartiya, Santosh. (2008). Dalit And Minority Empowerment. New Delhi: Rajkamal 
Prakashan. 
 
Bhaskar, R. Narayan. (Sept. 24, 2012). “Why the judicial process gets delayed.” DNA. 
Retrieved on 5/20/2013 from website: 
http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/1744407/report-why-the-judicial-process-gets-
delayed 
 
Bhaumik, Suman Kumar and Manisha Chakraborty. (2010). “Earning Inequality: The 
Impact of Caste and Religion Based Politics?” in Basant Rakesh and Shariff 
Abusaleh eds. Handbook of Muslims in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press.  
 
Bhhatachan, Krishna Bahadur. (2000). “Possible Ethnic Revolution or Insurgency in a 
Predatory Unitary Hindu State.” in Dhruba Kumar eds. Domestic Conflict and 
Crisis of Governability in Nepal. Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian 
Studies. 
  
Bhonsle, R. Kumar. (2006). Indian Security Scope 2006: The New Great Game. New 
Delhi: Kalpaz Publications.  
 
Biden, Joseph R. (2001). “Toward Economic Growth in Africa: The Fifth Action in the 
War on Terrorism.” Retrieved February 5, 2003, from 
http://biden.senate.gov/press/speeches/economicgrowthinafrica.htm 
 
Biswas, Saugat K. (2008). Nine Decades of Marxism in the Land of Brahminism. Calicut: 
Other Books. 
 
Bjorgo, Tore. (2005). “Introduction.” In Tore Bjorgo eds. Root Causes of Terrorism: 
Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward. London: Routledge. 
 
Blomberg, Brock S., and Gregory D. Hess. (2008). “The Lexus and the Olive Branch: 
Globalization, Democratization, and Terrorism.” In Philip Keefer and Norman 
Loayza, eds. Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 116-147.  
 
Board, Robin. (2004). “The Washington Consensus Meets the Global Backlash: Shifting 
Debates and Policies.” Globalization Vol. 1, No. 2: 129–154. 
 
 
213 
Bodea, Cristina. (2012). Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War: Can Rents 
Stabilize Coup Prone Regimes? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
6071, Retrieved on September 26, 2012 from World Bank website: 
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/05/16
/000158349_20120516151940/Rendered/PDF/WPS6071.pdf 
 
Boswell, Terry and William J. Dixon. (1990). “Dependency and Rebellion: a Cross-
national Analysis.”  American Sociological Review 55(4): 540–559. 
 
Boylan, Brandon M. (2010). “Economic Development, Religion, and the Conditions for 
Domestic Terrorism.” Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies 2: 
28-44. 
 
Brass, Paul. (1973). Language, Religion and Politics in North India. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Brass, Tom. (2013). Peasants, Populism and Postmodernism: The Return of the Agrarian 
Myth. New York: Frank Class Publishers. 
 
Brown, T. Louise. (1996). The Challenge to Democracy in Nepal: A Political History. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Burgoon, Brian. (2006). “On Welfare and Terror: Social Welfare Policies and Political- 
Economic Roots of Terrorism.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 4 (50): 176 - 203. 
 
Bush, George W. (2002). “President Outlines Plan to Help World’s Poor.” Retrieved 
February 2, 2003, from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/print/ 
20020322-1.html 
 
Bussmann, Margit and Gerald Schneider. (2007). “When Globalization Discontent Turns 
Violent: Foreign Economic Liberalization and Internal War.” International 
Studies Quarterly 51(1): 79–97. 
 
The Census Report. (2001). Retrieved on September 15, 2008 from Government of India 
web site: www.censusindia.net 
 
Center for Human Rights and Global Justice. (2011). Every Thirty Minutes: Farmer 
Suicides, Human Rights, and the Agrarian Crisis in India. New York: NYU 
School of Law. 
 
Chakravarti, Sudeep. (2009). Red Sun: Travels in Naxalite Country. New Delhi: Penguin 
Books.  
 
 
214 
Chakrabarty, Bidyut and Rajat Kumar Kujur. (2010). Maoism in India: Reincarnation of 
Ultra-Left Wing Extremism in the Twenty First Century. New York: Routledge. 
 
Chalk, Peter. (2007). “Trends in Transnational Terrorism and Implications for U.S. 
National Security and U.S. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act.” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 30(9): 767-776. 
 
Chhattisgarh Investment Promotion Board Report. (2013). Government of Chhattisgarh, 
Retrieved on May 12, 2013 from Govt. of Chhattisgarh website: 
http://cg.gov.in/departments/sipb/sipb.htm 
 
Chandran, Suba and Alok Kumar Gupta. (2002). “India: Caste Violence and Class in 
Bihar: The Ranvir Sena.” Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia, 
European Center for Conflict Prevention. 
 
Chenoy, Anuradha M. and Kamal A. Mitra Chenoy. (2010). Maoist and Other Armed 
Conflicts. New Delhi: Penguin Books. 
 
Chishti, Anees. (2006). “Sachar Committee Report: A Review” Mainstream Vol. XLV 
No. 01. 
 
Choi, Seung W. (2010). “Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law?” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 54(6): 940-966. 
 
Chowdhury, Iftekhar A. (2012). Small States in UN System: Constraints, Concerns, and 
Contributions. Institute of South Asian Studies Working Paper No.160, 
Singapore: National University of Singapore.  
  
Clarke, Ryan. (2011). Crime-Terror Nexus in South Asia. NY: Taylor & Francis. 
 
Coates, Peter. (2011). The Communist Party of India (Maoist) Volume I: An Analysis, 
History and Assessment of Maoism in India and How It Is Threatening the Very 
Survival of the Indian State. New Delhi: LAP Lambert. 
 
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. (2004). “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford 
Economic Papers 56(4): 563-95. 
 
Contractor, Qudsiya. (2012). “Unwanted in My City: The Making of a Muslim Slum in 
India” in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot  eds. Muslims in Indian Cities: 
Trajectories of Marginalisation. New Delhi: Harper Collins. 
 
Crenshaw, Martha. (1981). “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics 13 (4): 379-
399. 
 
 
215 
Crenshaw, Martha. (1983). “Introduction: Reflections on the Effects of Terrorism.” In 
Martha Crenshaw eds. Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of 
Political Violence. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press. 
 
Crenshaw, Martha. (1995). “Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Context.” In 
Martha Crenshaw eds. Terrorism in Context. University Park, PA:  Pennsylvania 
State University Press. 
 
Cronin, Audrey K. (2002). “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International 
Terrorism.” International Security 27(3): 30-58. 
 
Darity, William and Ashwini Deshpande. (2003). Boundaries of Clan and Colour. 
Routledge, New York. 
 
Das, Asish Kumar and Prasanta Kumar Mohanty. (2007). Human Rights In India. New 
Delhi: Sarup and Sons. 
 
Das, J. Kumar. (2001). Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples. New Delhi: APH 
Publishers. 
 
Dash, Satya Prakash. (2006). Naxal Movement and State Power: With Special Reference 
of Orissa. New Delhi: Sarup and Sons. 
 
Datta, Sreeradha. (2007). “Islamic Militancy in Bangladesh: The Threat from Within.” 
South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 30 (1): 145-170. 
 
Deaton, Angus and Jean Dreze. (2002). “Poverty and Inequality in India: A Re-
Examination.” Economic and Political Weekly, 7 September: 3729-3748. 
 
DeLong-Bass, Natana. (2010). Jihad: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research Guide. 
UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
Dhobal, Harsh and Mathew Jacob. (Ed.,). (2012). Rugged Road to Justice, A Social Audit 
of State Human Rights Commissions In India. Vol.1. New Delhi: Human Rights 
Law Network. 
 
Deshpande, Ashwini. (2011). The Grammar of Caste: Economic Discrimination in 
Contemporary India. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Donnelley, Jack. (2003). Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. New York: 
Cornell University Press. 
 
 
216 
Drakos, Konstantinos and Andreas Gofas. (2006). “The Devil You Know but are Afraid 
to Face: Underreporting Bias and its Distorting Effects on the Study of 
Terrorism.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(5): 714–735. 
 
Eckstein, Harry and Ted R. Gurr (1975). Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for 
Political Inquiry. New York: Wiley. 
 
The Economist. (2011). Democracy index: Democracy under stress. A Report from the 
Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved on May 17, 2013 from website: 
http://www.sida.se/Global/About%20Sida/S%C3%A5%20arbetar%20vi/EIU_De
mocracy_Index_Dec2011.pdf 
 
“Empowered lives. Resilient nations.” (2012). UNDP IN INDIA. Retrieved on April 29, 
2013 from UNDP website: 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/india/docs/UNDP_in_india_2012_final_artwor
k.pdf 
 
Englebert, Pierre and James Ron. (2004). “Primary Commodities and War: Congo-
Brazzaville's Ambivalent Resource Curse.” Comparative Politics 37 (1): 61-81. 
 
Enders, Walter, and Todd Sandler. (1993). “The effectiveness of antiterrorism policies: A 
vector autoregression-intervention analysis.”  American Political Science Review 
87:829-44. 
 
Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler. (1999). “Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War 
Era.” International Studies Quarterly 43(1), 145-167. 
 
Enders, Walter, and Todd Sandler. (2002). “Patterns of Transnational Terrorism, 1970–
1999.” International Studies Quarterly 46: 145–165. 
 
Enders, Walter, Todd Sandler, and Khusrav Gaibulloev. (2011). “Domestic versus 
transnational terrorism: Data, decomposition and dynamics.” Journal of Peace 
Research 48(3): 319–338. Data downloaded on June 2011 from 
www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. 
 
Eubank, William L. and Leonard Weinberg. (1994). ‘‘Does Democracy Encourage 
Terrorism?’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 6 (4): 417–63. 
 
Eubank, William L. and Leonard Weinberg. (2001). “Terrorism and democracy: 
Perpetrators and victims.” Terrorism and Political Violence 13 (1): 135-64. 
 
Eusufzai, Zaki. (1996). “Openness, Economic Growth, and Development: Some Further 
Results.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 44(2): 333–338. 
 
 
217 
Eyerman, Joe. (1998). “Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible 
Systems.” International Interactions 24(2): 151–170. 
 
Fearon, James and David Laitin. (2003). “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” 
American Political Science Review 97(1): 75–90. 
 
Feldmann, Andreas E. and Maiju Perala. (2004). “Reassessing the Causes of 
Nongovernmental Terrorism in Latin America.” Latin American Politics and 
Society 46(2): 101-132. 
 
Fernandes, Walter. (2008). “India's Forced Displacement Policy and Practice Is 
Compensation upto its Functions?” In Michael M. Cernea and Hari Mohan 
Mathus eds. Can Compensation Prevent Impoverishment?  Reforming 
Resettlement through Investments and Benefit-Sharing. New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Firebaugh, Glenn and Frank D. Beck. (1994). “Does Economic Growth Benefit the 
Masses? Growth, Dependence, and Welfare in the Third World.” American 
Sociological Review 59(5): 631–53. 
 
Frankel, Jeffrey and David Romer, “Does trade cause growth?” American Economic 
Review 89-3: 379–399. 
 
Freedom in the World. (2012). Freedom House. Retrieved on July 7, 2012 from Freedom 
House website: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20
Booklet--Final.pdf 
 
Frieden, Jeffry A., David A. Lake and Kenneth A. Schultz. (2010). World Politics: 
Interests, Interactions and Institutions. New York: WW. Norton & Company. 
 
Fukuyama, Francis. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
  
Galtung, Johan. (1971). “A Structural Theory of Imperialism.” Journal of Peace 
Research 8(2): 81–117. 
 
Gandhirajan, C. Kumar. (2004). Organized Crime. New Delhi: APH Publishing. 
 
Gangoli, Geetanjali. (2007). Indian Feminism: Law, Patriarchies and Violence in India. 
London: Ashgate. 
 
 
218 
Ganguly, Rajat. (2005). “Poverty, Malgovernance and Ethnopolitical Mobilization: 
Gorkha Nationalism and the Gorkhaland Agitation in India.” Nationalism and 
Ethnic Politics 11:4, 467-502. 
 
Ganguly, Meenakshi. (2013). “Extrajudicial Killings Corrode Democracy in India.” The 
New York Times, July 15, 2013. Retrieved on July 21 from website: 
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/extrajudicial-killings-corrode-
democracy-in-india/?_r=1 
Gayer, Laurent and Christophe Jaffrelot. (2012) “Introduction.” in Laurent Gayer and 
Christophe Jaffrelot eds. Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of 
Marginalisation. New Delhi: Harper Collins. 
 
Gellner, David N. and Krishna Hachhethu. (2008). Local Democracy in South Asia: 
Microprocesses of Democratization in Nepal and its Neighbors. NY: Sage 
Publication. 
 
 Ghassam-Fachandi, Parvis. (2012). Pogrom in Gujarat: Hindu Nationalism and Anti-
Muslims Violence in India. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Ghosh, Jayanta. (2006). “Unhealthy Burden.” Frontline Vol.19, No. 23. 
 
Ghosh, Arunabha. (2006). “Pathways through Financial Crisis: India.” Global 
Governance 12: 413–429. 
 
Ghufran, Nasreen. (2009). “Pushtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the 
North West Frontier Province of Pakistan.” Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 6: 1092-
1114. 
 
Gissinger, Ranveig and Nils P. Gleditsch. (1999). “Globalization and Conflict: Welfare, 
Distribution, and Political Unrest.” Journal of World Systems Research 5(2):327-
365. 
 
Green, Jerrold D. (1995). “Terrorism and Politics in Iran.” in Martha Crenshaw eds. 
Terrorism in Context. University Park, PA:  Pennsylvania State University Press, 
553-594. 
 
Gore, Al. (2002). “A Commentary on the War Against Terror: Our Larger Tasks,” 
remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, February 12, 2002. Retrieved on 
August, 23, 2012 from website: http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/commentary-war-
against-terror-our-larger-tasks/p4343 
 
Gupta, Shishir. (2011). Indian Mujahedeen- The Enemy Within. New Delhi: Hachette 
India. 
 
 
219 
Gupta, Tilak D. (2006). “Maoism in India: Ideology, Programme and Armed Struggle.” 
Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 41, No. 29 (Jul. 22-28, 2006): 3172-3176. 
 
Hardgrave, Robert L. Jr., and Stanley A. Kochanek. (1990). India: Government and 
Politics in a Developing Nation. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: pp.123–
44. 
 
Hardin, Russell. (1995). One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Harnetiaux, Keith J. (2008). “The Resurgence of Naxalism: How Great a Threat to 
India?” MA Thesis. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved 
on May 2, 2013 from website: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10335 
 
Harriss, John. (2010). “The Naxalite/Maoist Movement in India: A Review of Recent 
Literature.” Institute of South Asian Studies Working Paper No. 109. Singapore: 
National University of Singapore. 
 
Harrison, Faye V. (Ed.). (2005). Resisting Race and Xenophobia: Global Perspective on 
Race, Gender and Human Rights. New York: Altamira Press. 
 
Hegre, Havard, Ranveig Gissinger and Nils Petter Gleditsch. (2003). “Globalization and 
Internal Conflict.” In Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri and Nils Petter 
Gleditsch, eds. Globalization and Conflict. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield: 
251-275. 
 
Highlights of the report for the years 1996-97 and 1997-98. (March 15, 1999). National 
Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Retrieved on September 
5, 2008 from Government of India Web site: www.ncsc.nic.in 
 
Hobbes, Thomas. (1651). Leviathan. Reprinted 1982. New York: Penguin. 
 
Hobsbawm E (1973) Revolutionaries: Contemporary Essays. New York: Pantheon 
Books. 
 
Hoffman, Bruce. (2006). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Human Rights Watch. (2011). The “Anti-Nationals”: Arbitrary Detention and Torture of 
Terrorism Suspects in India. Retrieved on 5/22/2013 from website: 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/india0211W.pdf 
 
Hutt, Michael., Martin Hoftun, William Raeper and John Whelpton. (1999). People, 
Politics and Ideology: Democracy and Social Change in Nepal. Kathmandu: 
Mandala Book Point. 
 
220 
 
Hussain, Wasbir. (2007). “Ethno-Nationalism and the Politics of Terror in India's 
Northeast.” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 30 (1): 93-110. 
 
Islam, Syed Nazmul. (1978). “The Karnafuli Project: Its Impact on the Tribal 
Population,” Public Administration (Dacca University, Bangladesh) 3:2 (Summer 
1978). 
 
Iyer, Ramaswamy. (2007). “Towards a Just Displacement and Rehabilitation Policy”, 
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.42, No.30, Mumbai. 
 
Jackson, Roy. (2011). Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam: Authority and the Islamic 
state. New York: Routledge. 
 
Jaffrelot, Christophe. (2002). “Indian Democracy: The Rule of Law on Trial.” India 
Review 1(1):77-120. 
 
Jaffrelot, Christophe and Charlotte Thomas. (2012). “Facing Ghettoisation in Riot City: 
Old Ahmedabad and Juhapura between Victimization and Self-help” in Laurent 
Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot 2012. (Ed.,). Muslims in Indian Cities: 
Trajectories of Marginalisation. New Delhi: Harper Collins.  
 
Jenkins, Brian M. (1980). “The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems.” Paper 6563, 
Rand Corporation. Retrieved on 23 March, 2012 from website: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P6563.html 
 
Jindal, T. P. (1995). Ayodhya Imbroglio. New Delhi: Asish Publishing House. 
 
Johnson, Chalmers. (1978). “Perspectives of Terrorism.” in Walter Lanqueur eds. The 
Terrorism Reader. NY: American Library. 
 
Kahn, Joseph and Tim Weiner. (2002). “World Leaders Rethinking Strategy on Aid to 
Poor.” The New York Times. New York, March 18, Sec. A, p. 3. 
 
Kaviraj, Sudipta. (Ed.). (1997). Politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kashyap, Aruna. (2008). Dangerous Duty: Children and the Chhattisgarh Conflict. New 
York: Human Rights Watch. 
 
Kennedy, Paul. (1988). The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. New York: Random House. 
 
Khan, Adeel. (2003). “Baloch Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan: From Guerrilla War to 
Nowhere?” Asian Ethnicity 4:2: 281-293. 
 
 
221 
Kohli, Atul. (1990). Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
(2001). Success of India’s Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Krieger, Tim and Daniel Meierrieks. (2010). “Terrorism in the Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(6): 902-939. 
 
Kronstadt, K. Alan and Bruce Vaughn. (2005). Terrorism in South Asia. Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved on November, 23, 2012 from 
CRS website: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/52750.pdf 
 
Krueger, Alan B. (2007). What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of 
Terrorism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Maleckova. (2003). “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is 
There a Causal Connection?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (4): 119-
144. 
 
Krueger, Alan B. and David D. Laitin. (2008). “Kto Kogo? A Cross-Country Study of the 
Origins and Targets of Terrorism.” In Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza eds. 
Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 148-173. 
 
Kumar, Vandana Ajay. (2012). “Judicial Delays in India: Causes & Remedies.” Journal 
of Law: Policy and Globalization Vol. 4: 16-24. 
 
Kumar, Praveen. (2009). Inside India. Baltimore: Publish America. 
 
Kumar, Praveen. (2012). Communal Crimes and National Integration: A Socio-legal 
Study. New Delhi: Roadworthy Publications. 
 
Lai, Brian. (2007). “Draining the Swamp: An Empirical Examination of the Production 
of International Terrorism, 1968–1998.” Conflict Management and Peace 
Science, 24 (4): 297-310. 
 
Lawoti, Mahendra. (2007). “Political Exclusion and the Lack of Democratization: Cross-
National Evaluation of Nepali Institutions using a Majoritarian–Consensus 
Framework.” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 45 (1): 57-77. 
 
Levin, Jack. (2006). The Roots of Terrorism: Domestic Terrorism. New York: Chelsea 
Publishing House. 
 
 
222 
Levine, David I., and Dov Rothman. (2006). “Does trade affect child health?” Journal of 
Health Economics 25: 538–554. 
 
Lewis, Bernard. (1968). The Assassins: A Radical Sect In Islam. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Lichbach, Mark I. (1989). “An Evaluation of “Does Economic Inequality Breed Political 
Conflict?” - Studies.” World Politics 41(4): 431–470. 
 
Lipset, Seymour M. (1959). “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 
53(1): 69–106. 
 
Li, Quan and Drew Schaub. (2004). “Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: 
A Pooled Time-Series Analysis.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(2): 230-258. 
 
Li, Quan. (2005). “Does democracy promote or reduce transnational terrorist incidents?” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2): 278-97. 
 
Lippold, Kirk S. (2012). Front Burner: Al Qaeda's Attack on the USS Cole. USA: Public 
Affairs Books. 
 
Long, Scott J. and Jeremy Freese. (2005). Regression Models for Categorical Outcomes 
using Stata. College Station, TX 
 
Long, J. Scott. (1997). Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent 
Variables. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Ludden, David. (2005). Making India Hindu: Religion, Community and the Politics of 
Democracy in India. London: Oxford University Press.  
 
Magee, Christopher S. P., and Tansa George Massoud. (2011). “Openness and Internal 
Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 48 (1): 59-72 
 
Malik, Yogendra K. and V. B. Singh. (1994). Hindu Nationalists in India the Rise of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party. Boulder, Westview Press. 
 
“Maoist objective is to overthrow Indian state: Home Secretary” NDTV, March 5, 2010. 
Retrieved on May 16, 2013 from NDTV website: 
http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/maoist-objective-is-to-overthrow-indian-state-
home-secretary-17255 
 
Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett. (1993). “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic 
Peace, 1946–1986.”  American Political Science Review 87: 624–638. 
 
223 
 
Martin, Michael F., and K. Alan Kronstadt. (2007). “India – U.S. Economic and Trade 
Relations.” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL 
34161(August 31). 
 
Martin, Hans-Petter and Harald Schumann. (1998). The Global Trap: Globalization and 
the Assault on Prosperity and Democracy. London: Zed. 
 
Marshall, Monty G. and Benjamin R. Cole. (2010). State Fragility Index and Matrix 1995 
– 2010. Center for Systemic Peace. Accessed on 23rd June, 2012 from website: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 
 
Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. (2010). Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010. College Park, MD: Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland. 
Retrieved on July 2, 2012 from website: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
 
Martin, Philippe., Thierry Mayer and Mathias Thoenig. (2008). “Civil Wars and 
International Trade.” Journal of the European Economic Association 6(3): 541–
550. 
 
Mehra, Ajay K. (2000). “Naxalism in India: Revolution or Terror?” Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 12 (2): 37-66. 
 
Mehta, Pratap Bhanu. (2003). The Burden of Democracy. New Delhi: Penguin. 
 
Mickolus, Edward F. and Susan L. Simmons. (1997). Terrorism, 1992-1995: A 
Chronology of Events and a Selectively Annotated Bibliography. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press. 
 
Mickolus, Edward F., Todd Sandler, Jean M. Murdock and Peter Flemming. (2010). 
International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1968–2009 (ITERATE). 
Dunn Loring, VA: Vinyard Software. 
 
Mickolus, Edward F. and Susan L. Simmons. (1997). Terrorism, 1992-1995: A 
Chronology of Events and a Selectively Annotated Bibliography. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press. 
 
Miller, Gregory. (2007). “Confronting Terrorisms: Group Motivation and Successful 
State Policies.” Terrorism and Political Violence. 19, 331-350. 
 
 
224 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India. (2013). “Special Economic Zones in India.” 
Retrieved on May 8, 2013 from Government of India website: 
http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/pdf/ListofFormalapprovals.pdf 
 
Minorities at Risk Project (2009) Minorities at Risk Database. College Park, MD: Center 
for International Development and Conflict Management. 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp Accessed July 2011. 
 
Mir, Amir. (1999). “Unholy crusade.” Newsline ( Karachi), October 1999. 
 
Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Brandon C. Prins. (1999). “Beyond Territorial 
Contiguity: Issues at Stake in Democratic Militarized Interstate Disputes.” 
International Studies Quarterly Vol. 43, No. 1: 169-183. 
 
Morrison, Chas. (2012). “Grievance, Mobilisation and State Response: An examination 
of the Naxalite Insurgency in India.” Journal of Conflict Transformation and 
Security Vol. 2 No.1: 54-75. 
 
Muller, Edward and Mitchell A. Seligson. (1987). “Inequality and Insurgency.” American 
Political Science Review 82(2): 425–451. 
 
Naipul, Vidya S. (1981). Among the Believers. London: Random House. 
 
Nandy, Ashis. (1991). “Hinduism versus Hindutva: The Inevitability of a Confrontation.” 
Times of India, February 18.  
 
Narula, Smita. (1999). Broken people: Caste violence against India’s “untouchables”. 
Human Rights Watch. Retrieved on July 8, 2008 from Human Rights Watch 
Archive Web site: www.hrw.org/reports/1999/india/ 
 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 
(2010 a) History of GTD. (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/History.aspx) 
accessed June 2011. 
 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 
(2010 b) Data Collection Methodology. (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/) 
accessed June 2011 
 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 
(2009a) Global Terrorism Database. CD-ROM. College Park, MD: University of 
Maryland. 
 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 
(2009b) Global Terrorism Database: GTD Variables & Inclusion Criteria, Version 
 
225 
3.0. University of Maryland (http:// 
www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) accessed 15 April 2010. 
 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 
(2010) History of GTD. (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/History.aspx) 
accessed 2 October 2010. 
 
Naval, T. Raj. (2001). Law of Prevention of Atrocities on the Scheduled Castes and the 
Scheduled Tribes. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company. 
 
Noonan, Sean and Scott Stewart. (2011). “The Evolution of a Pakistani Militant 
Network.” Security Weekly, Thursday, September 15, 2011. Retrieved on June 12, 
2013 from website: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110914-evolution-
pakistans-militant-networks 
 
North, Andrew. (2013). “The Indian politicians facing criminal charges.” BBC India Report, 
February 15, 2013. Retrieved on 5/19/13 from bbc website: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-21469286 
 
“Now, Vedanta lands in mining row in Chhattisgarh.” The Indian Express, October 11, 
2010, New Delhi: India. 
 
Nubin, Walter. (2003). Sri Lanka: Current Issues and Historical Backgrounds. NY: Nova 
Science Publishers. 
 
Oldenburg, Philip. (2010). India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of 
Divergent Paths. New York: Routledge. 
 
Omar, Imtiaz. (2002). Emergency Powers and the Courts in India and Pakistan. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International Press. 
 
Omvedt, Gail. (1978). “Towards a Marxist Analysis of Caste.” Social Scientist, VI (11). 
 
O’Neal, John R. and Bruce Russet. (1997). “The Classical Liberals Were Right: 
Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985.”  International Studies 
Quarterly 41 (2): 267-94. 
 
O’Neal, John R. and Bruce Russett. (1999). “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of 
Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization.” World Politics 52: 
1–37. 
 
Owen, Ann and Stephen Wu. (2007). “Is Trade Good for Your Health?” Review of 
International Economics, 15-4: 660–682. 
 
 
226 
Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, 2010. “Multidimensional Poverty 
Index.” Oxford: Oxford University, in consultation with UNDP. 
 
Palit, Amitendu and Subhomoy Bhattacharjee. (2008). Special Economic Zones in India: 
Myths and Realities. New Delhi: Anthem Press. 
 
Palmer, David S. (1995). “The Revolutionary Terrorism of Peru’s Shining Path.” In 
Martha Crenshaw eds. Terrorism in Context. University Park, PA:  Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 249-308. 
 
Panday, Devendra Raj (1999). Nepal’s Failed Development: Reflections on the Mission 
and the Maladies. Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Study Centre. 
 
Pape, Robert A. (2003). “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” The American 
Political Science Review 97 (3): 343-361. 
 
Patnaik, Utsa. (2008). “Neoliberal Roots.” Frontline Vol.25, No.6, Retrieved on 29 April 
2013 from website: 
http://www.frontline.in/navigation/?type=static&page=flonnet&rdurl=fl2506/stori
es/20080328250601700.htm. 
 
Pelly, Grace. (2009). State Terrorism: Torture, Extra-judicial Killings, and Forced 
Disappearances in India. New Delhi: Human Rights Law Network. 
 
Perera, Jehan. (2006). “Terrorism and Subalternity – I: The Misgovernance Syndrome in 
Sri Lanka.” In Imtiaz Ahmed eds. Understanding Terrorism in South Asia: 
Beyond Statist Discourse. New Delhi: Monohar Publishers: 253-286. 
 
Piazza, James A. (2008). “Do democracy and free markets protect us from terrorism?” 
International Politics 45 (1): 72-91. 
 
Piazza, James A. (2011). “Poverty, Minority Economic Discrimination, and Domestic 
Terrorism.” Journal of Peace Research 48(3): 339–353. 
 
Planning Commission of India. (2008). Development Challenges in Extremist Affected 
Areas. PCI New Delhi: Govt. of India. 
 
Pomper, Philip. (1995). “Russian Revolutionary Terrorism.” in Martha Crenshaw eds. 
Terrorism in Context. University Park, PA:  Pennsylvania State University Press, 
63-101. 
 
Powell, Robert. (2007). “Defending against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources.” 
American Political Science Review 101, no. 3:527-41. 
 
 
227 
Prakash, Ved. (2009). Terrorism in India: Vol. III. New Delhi: Kalpaz Publications. 
 
Pugen, Adam. (2013). “Are GM Seeds to Blame for Indian Farmer Suicides?” The 
International. Retrieved on May 10, 2013 from website: 
http://www.theinternational.org/articles/349-are-gm-seeds-to-blame-for-indian-
farmer-s 
 
Purwani, James. (2002). “The Carnage at Godhra.” In Siddharth Varadarajan (Ed.), 
Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy (pp. 46–74). New Delhi: Penguin Books. 
 
Ramana, P. V. (ed). (2008). The Naxal Challenge: Causes, Linkages and Policy Option. 
New Delhi: Pearson. 
Rana, Anshul. (2012). “Indian Mujahedeen: Religious Fanatics, Modern Jihadists or 
Islamic Avengers?” SAIS Review, Volume 32, Number 1, Winter-Spring, pp. 
193-202. 
 
Reddy, L. Venkateswara,  M. Lakshmi Narayana, and D. Bhaskara Rao. (2004). 
Education for Dalits. New Delhi: Discovery Publishing House. 
 
Reddy, G. Behari and Suhaib, Md. (2006). Constitution Of India And Professional Ethics. 
New Delhi: JK International Publication. 
 
Reinares, Fernando. (2005). “Nationalist Separatism and Terrorism in Comparative 
Perspective.” In Tore Bjorgo eds. Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and 
Ways Forward. London: Routledge. 
 
Rice, Susan E. (2001). “The Africa Battle.” The Washington Post, December 11. 
 
Richardson, Louise. (2007). What Terrorists Want. New York: Random House Trade 
Paperbacks. 
 
Riedel, Bruce. (2008). “Terrorism in India and the Global Jihad.” Brookings, Nov. 30, 
2008. Retrieved on August 4, 2013 from website: 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2008/11/30-india-terrorism-riedel 
 
Rogers, William H. (1993). “Regression Standard Errors in Clustered Samples.” Stata 
Technical Bulletin 13:19-23. 
 
Rodrik, Dani. (1997). Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics. 
 
Rogowski, Ronald. (1985). “Causes and Varieties of Nationalism: A Rationalist 
Account.” in Ronald Rogowski and E. Teriyakia eds. New Nationalism of the 
Developed West. London: Routledge. 
 
228 
 
Ross, Jeffrey I. (2006). Political Terrorism: An Interdisciplinary Approach. New York: 
Peter Lang. 
 
Roy Chaudhury, Sumanta. (2010). “Red rebels get richer by Rs 2,500 crore in West 
Bengal.” Daily News & Analysis Dec 14, 2010 Retrieved on May 16, 2013 from 
website: http://www.dnaindia.com/india/1480928/report-red-rebels-get-richer-by-
rs2500-crore-in-west-bengal 
 
Roy, Arundhati. (2012). Walking with the Comrades. New York: Penguin Books. 
 
Rummel, Rudolph J. (1995). “Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder.” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 39(1): 3–26. 
Russell, Charles and Bowman Miller. (1983). “Profile of a Terrorist.” in Lawrence Z. 
Freedman and Yonah Alexander eds. Perspectives on Terrorism. Wilmington, 
Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc: 45-60.  
 
Russett, Bruce M. and John R. Oneal. (2001). Triangulating Peace. New York: Norton. 
 
Sachar, Rajender. (2006). Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim 
Community in India: A Report. New Delhi: Govt. of India. Retrieved on May 21, 
2013 from GOI website: http://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sachar 
 
Sadangi, Himansu Charan. (2008). Dalit: The Downtrodden of India. New Delhi: ISHA 
Books. 
 
Sahoo, Sarbeswar. (2005) “Tribal Displacement and Human Rights Violations in Orissa,” 
Social Action: A Quarterly Review of Social Trends, 55, 2, pp. 153-66. 
 
(2010). “Political Mobilisation, the Poor and Democratisation in Neo-liberal India.” 
Journal of Contemporary Asia 40 (3): 487-508. 
 
Saksena, N. Singh (1992). India: Towards Anarchy 1967 – 1992. New Delhi: Abhinav 
Publications. 
 
Salunkhe, Harshal A. and Binod B. Deshmush. (2012). “The overview of Government 
subsidies to agriculture sector in India.” IOSR Journal of Agriculture and 
Veterinary Science Volume 1, Issue 5 (Nov. - Dec.): 43-47.  
 
Sandler, Todd, and Keith Hartley. (1995). The Economics of Defense. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sandler, Todd,Walter Enders, and Harvey E. Lapan. (1991). “Economic analysis can help 
fight international terrorism.” Challenge 34:10-17. 
 
229 
 
Sandler, Todd. (2003). “Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism.” The World 
Economy 26(6): 779-802. 
 
Sandler, Todd. (2005). “Collective versus Unilateral Responses to Terrorism.” Public 
Choice 124, nos. 1-2: 75-93.  
 
Savun, Burcu and Brian J. Phillips. (2009). “Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism.”  
Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (6): 878-904. 
 
Scheberle, Denise. (2004). Federalism and Environmental Policy: Trust and the Politics 
of Implementation. Georgetown: Georgetown University Press. 
 
Schelling, Thomas. (1963). The Strategy of Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press. 
P.54. 
 
Schmid, Alex. (1992). “Terrorism and Democracy,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4 
(4):15-23. 
 
Schmid, Alex and Albert Jongman. (1988). Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to 
Concepts, Theories, Databases, and Literature. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Books. 
 
“Security Forces Recover Chinese Arms from Naxals, Militants.” DNA, November 16, 
2009, retrieved on August, 27 from the newspaper website: 
http://www.dnaindia.com/india/1312443/report-security-forces-recover-chinese-
arms-from-naxals-militants 
 
Sen, Sumanta. (1986). “Another Body Plans Stir in Darjeeling,” The Times of India, 18 
May: 16. 
 
Sengupta, Somini. (2006). “India Prosperity Creates Paradox.” The New York Times, 
New York, 31 December. 
 
Sengupta, Somini, (2006). “Fatal Clash at Mill Site Shows Perils of India’s Rise.” The 
New York Times, New York, 20 January. 
 
Sethi, Raj Mohan. (ed.). (2011). Socio-Economic Profile of Rural India, Vol. 5. New 
Delhi: Concept Publishing. 
 
Shabad, Goldie and Francisco J. L. Ramo. (1995). “Political Violence in a Democratic 
State: Basque Terrorism in Spain.” in Martha Crenshaw eds. Terrorism in 
Context. University Park, PA:  Pennsylvania State University Press, 410-469. 
 
 
230 
Shah, Ghanshyam. (2006). Untouchability in Rural India. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
 
Sharma, Shalendra D. ( 1999) Development and Democracy in India. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. 
 
Sharma, R. Nath. and Singh, Sashi. R. (2009) “Displacement in Singrauli Region: 
Entitlements and Rehabilitation.” Economic and Political Weekly, 44 (51): 62-69.  
 
Sharma, Mahendra Singh. (2010). Indian Democracy and Constitution. New Delhi: DPS 
Publishing House. 
 
Shetty, S. Lal. (2004). “Distributional Issues in Bank Credit – Multi-pronged Strategy for 
Correcting Past Neglect.” Economic and Political Weekly, 17 July. 
 
Siddiqui, Kalim. (2012). “Development and Displacement in India: Reforming the 
Economy towards Sustainability.” Journal of Physics: Conference Series 364 
(2012) 012108. 
 
Sikand, Yoginder. (2003). “Islamist Assertion in Contemporary India: The Case of the 
Students Islamic Movement of India.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 23:2, 
335-345. 
 
Sikand, Yoginder. (2006). Muslims in India: Contemporary Social and Political 
Discourses. New Delhi: Hope India Publications. 
 
Singh, Ujjwal Kumar. (2007). The State, Democracy and Anti-Terror Laws in India. New 
Delhi: Sage. 
 
Singh, Madhur. (2008). “India: The Terrorists Within.” The Times of India, July 27, 
2008, retrieved on July 23, 2013 from website: 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1826950,00.html 
 
Singh, Monmohan. (December 28, 2006). “The only parallel to the practice of 
untouchability was apartheid.” The Hindu. Retrieved on September 5, 2008, from 
The Hindu Archive Web site: www.epaper.thehindu.com 
 
Solt, Frederic. (2009). “Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database.” Social 
Science Quarterly 90: 231–242. 
 
South Asia Terrorism Portal. (2013). Fatalities in Left Wing Extremism in India. 
Retrieved on March 27, 2013 from SATP website: 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/data_sheets/fatalitiesnaxal05
-11.htm 
 
 
231 
South Asia Terrorism Portal. (2013). Terrorist attacks outside Jammu and Kashmir, 
Punjab and Northeast since 2000. Retrieved on March 27, 2013 from SATP 
website: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/OR_9-
11_majorterroristattacks.htm 
 
Soros, George. (2002). On Globalization. New York: Public Affairs. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph. (2002). Globalization and its Discontents. New York: WW Norton. 
 
Sundar, Nandini. (2006). “The Purification Hunt: The Salwar Judum, a 
Counterinsurgency Drive in Chhattisgarh Leaves Tribals Stupefied” Down to 
Earth, 31 January. 
 
“Supreme Court Judgment in Salwa Judum Case.” The Hindu, July 6, 2011 retrieved on 
March 12, 2012 from website: 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/supreme-court-judgment-in-salwa-
judum-case/article2185766.ece 
 
Swami, Praveen. (2008). “The Well-Tempered Jihad: the politics and practice of post-
2002 Islamist terrorism in India.” Contemporary South Asia 16 (3): 303-322. 
 
Swami, Praveen. (2011). “A decade after 9/11, Indian jihad still thrives.” The Hindu, 
September 9, 2011, Retrieved on August 4, 2013 from website: 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-decade-after-911-indian-jihad-still-
thrives/article2439813.ece 
 
Swami, Praveen. (Jul 23, 2013). “Was the Indian Mujahideen made by the 2002 Gujarat 
riots?” Firstpost India. Retrieved on August 4, 2013 from the magazine website: 
http://www.firstpost.com/india/was-the-indian-mujahideen-made-by-the-2002-
gujarat-riots-979913.html/2 
 
Talbot, Ian. (2002). “The Punjabization of Pakistan: Myth or Reality?” In Christophe 
Jaffrelot eds. Pakistan: Nation without Nationalism? NY: Zed Books Ltd.  
 
Tambiah, Stanley J. (1997). Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective 
Violence in South Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Tilak, Jandhyala B. G. (1992) ‘‘Student Loans in Financing Higher Education in India.’’ 
Higher Education 23, 4: 389-404. 
 
Thakur, Raj N. (1999). Plight of the Minorities: Problems and Grievances in Their 
Education. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House. 
 
 
232 
Themner, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen. (2012). “Armed Conflict, 1946-2011.” Journal of 
Peace Research Vol. 49 No. 4: 565-575. 
 
Tilly, Charles. (1978). From Mobilization to Revolution. New York: Random House. 
 
Thorat, Sukhadeo and Paul Attewell. (2007). “The Legacy of Social Exclusion: A 
Correspondence Study of Job Discrimination in India.” Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 41: 4141-4145. 
 
Thornton, William H., and Songok Han Thornton. (2009). “India in Search of Itself: The 
Crisis and Opportunity of Indo-Globalization.” New Political Science 31 (2): 183-
200. 
 
Townshend, Charles. (1995). “The Culture of Paramilitarism in Ireland.” in Martha 
Crenshaw eds. Terrorism in Context. University Park, PA:  Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 311-351. 
 
Tyson, Laura. (2001). “It’s Time to Step up the Global War on Poverty.” Business Week, 
December 3. 
 
United Nations Statistics Division. 2011. Demographic and Social Statistics. Retrieved 
on 22nd June 2011 from UNSD website: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2.htm 
 
United States Department of State. (2004). Office of the Coordinator of Counter 
Terrorism, Patters of Global Terrorism, 2003. Washington, DC: US Department 
of State, Publication 11124. 
 
Vadackumchery, James. (2002). Indian Police and Nexus Crimes. New Delhi: Kalpaz 
Publication. 
 
Vanhanen, Tutu. (2010). Ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic conflicts 2003-2010 [computer 
file]. FSD2588, version 1.0 Tampere: Finnish Social Science Data Archive 
[distributor], 2010. 
 
Vayrynen, Raimo. (1997). Global Transformation, Economics, Politics and Culture. 
Helsinki: Finnish National Fund for Research and Development. 
 
Verma, Arvind. (2005). The Indian Police: A Critical Evaluation. New Delhi: Regency 
Publications. 
 
Victoroff, Jeff. (2006). “Introduction: Managing Terror: The Devilish Traverse from a 
Theory to a Plan.” In Jeff Victoroff eds. Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological 
Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism. Amsterdam: IOS Press. 
 
233 
 
Vicziany, Marika. (2007). “Understanding the 1993 Mumbai Bombings: Madrassas and 
the Hierarchy of Terror.” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 30 (1): 43-
73. 
 
Wade, Sarah Jackson and Dan Reiter. (2007). “Does democracy matter?” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 51(2): 329–348. 
 
Walker, Kathy Le Mons. (2008). “Neoliberalism on the Ground in Rural India: Predatory 
Growth, Agrarian Crisis, Internal Colonization, and the Intensification of Class 
Struggle.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 35 (4): 557-620. 
 
Wallace, Paul. (1995). “Political Violence and Terrorism in India: The Crisis of Identity.” 
In Martha Crenshaw eds. Terrorism in Context. University Park, PA:  
Pennsylvania State University Press: 352-409. 
 
Weede, Erich. (1995). “Economic Policy and International Security Rent Seeking, Free 
Trade, and Democratic Peace.” European Journal of International Relations 1(4): 
519–537. 
 
Weiner, Myron. (1991). The Child and the State in India. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.  
     
Weisskopf, Thomas E. (2004). Affirmative Action in the United States and India: A 
Comparative Perspective. New York: Routledge. 
 
Wilkinson, Steven. (2004). Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots 
in India. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Williams, Phil. (2008). “Violent Non-State Actors and National and International 
Security.” International Relations and Security Network. Zurich, Switzerland: 
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. 
 
Williamson, John. (1990). The Progress of Policy Reform in Latin America, Policy 
Analysis in International Economics. Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics. 
 
Williams, Rick L. (2000). “A Note on Robust Variance Estimation for Cluster-Correlated 
Data.” Biometrics 56:645-46. 
 
Windsor, Jennifer. (2003). “Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism,” The 
Washington Quarterly 26 (3): 43-58. 
 
 
234 
Woerkens, Martin V. (2002). The Strangled Traveler: Colonial Imaginings and the Thugs 
of India. (Translated by Catherine Tihanyi). Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Wood, Adrian. (1994). North–South Trade, Employment and Inequality. Oxford: 
Clarendon. 
 
World Databank, Word Bank. (2011). Data retrieved on March 21, 2011 from the World 
Bank website: http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=1&id=4 
 
The World Factbook (2013) The Central Intelligence Agency of USA. Retrieved on 
January 22, 2013 from CIA website: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2147rank.html 
 
World Bank. (1996). World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
World Investment Report. (2010). United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. Retrieved on July 7, 2012 from UNCTAD website: 
unctad.org/en/docs/wir2010_en.pdf  
  
Wright, Theodore P. Jr. (1991). “Center-Periphery Relations and Ethnic Conflict in 
Pakistan: Sindhis, Muhajirs, and Punjabis.” Comparative Politics Vol. 23, No. 3: 
299-312. 
 
Yilmaz, Muzaffer E. (2008). “The New World Order: An Outline of Post Cold War Era.” 
Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 7 (4): 44-58. 
 
Yusuf, Huma. (July, 2012). Sectarian violence: Pakistan’s greatest security threat? 
Norwegian Peace-building Resource Centre Report. Retrieved on November 23, 
2012 from NOREF website: 
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/949e7f9
b2db9f947c95656e5b54e389e.pdf 
 
Young, Joseph K., and Michael G. Findley. (2011). “Promise and Pitfalls of Terrorism 
Research.” International Studies Review 13: 1–21. 
 
Zakaria, Fareed. (2007). The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and 
Abroad. New York: W. W. Norton. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
235 
Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
236 
 
Table 9.  Zero Inflated NB Model with Regional Dummies1990-2007  
 
        Independent Variable                  Coefficient         Standard Error                     p> z        
 
Heterogeneity Cost   0.307†  0.159                    0.054 
      
Immature Democracy 0.419**  0.144                    0.004 
      
Trade -0.012**  0.002                   0.000 
      
FDI                -0.006  0.005                     0.253 
      
History 0.031**  0.006                   0.000 
      
Log Area 0.098†  0.051                    0.053 
      
Log GNI t-1 0.605**  0.139                  0.000 
      
Regime Duration 0.0004  0.003                   0.889 
      
Unemployment 0.022**              0.007                           0.002 
      
State Fragility 0.17**             0.029                           0.000 
      
Urban Population -0.012†              0.007                           0.090 
      
The Americas 1.33**  0.338                    0.000 
      
South Asia 1.34**            0.458                            0.002 
      
Europe 1.87**  0.331                     0.000 
      
Africa -0.189  0.353                     0.592 
      
Middle East 1.31**  0.404                     0.001 
      
East Asia 1.98**           0.454                             0.000 
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Table 9. Continued. 
Independent Variable 
 
Central Asia 
Coefficient 
 
0.82†  
 
Std. Error 
 
0.477  
                   
                  P>z 
 
                   0.083 
      
Constant -6.81**  1.24                     0.000 
      
Inflated Logit (Certain Zero) 
Regime Duration                 0.071**                0.018                0.000 
      
Unemployment                 0.085**                0.029                0.004 
      
State Fragility                -0.279*                0.124                0.024 
      
Full Democracy                -50.15**                2.902                0.000  
      
        Constant  
                 -
2.333                 1.244                 0.263 
 
 
       Num. of Obs.     
                    
2767 
      
        Non Zero Obs.     
                    
1095 
      
        Zero Obs.     
                    
1672 
      
        Wald χ²     
             
344.43** 
      
        LR Test (alpha=0)     
           
2.0e+04** 
      
        Vuong z Test     
                 
3.65** 
 
Note: Dep. Variable is the country year counts of domestic terrorist incident.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on country in parentheses. ‘Oceania’ used  
as the reference category for the regional dummies in all models.  
Significance Level: († p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01) 
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Table 10. Zero Inflated NB Model with Full Democracy 1990-2007  
 
       Independent Variable               Coefficient         Standard Error                    p> z  
 
Heterogeneity Cost   0.318*  0.148                   0.032 
      
Full Democracy -0.219  0.355                   0.538 
      
Trade -0.009**  0.002                   0.000 
      
FDI                -0.01  0.006                   0.138 
      
History 0.041**  0.008                     0.000 
      
Log Area 0.147**  0.055                   0.008 
      
Log GNI t-1 0.504**  0.153                    0.001 
      
Regime Duration -0.003  0.003                     0.375 
      
Unemployment 0.01          0.008                           0.237 
      
State Fragility 0.078**         0.026                           0.003 
      
Urban Population -0.007       0.007                                     0.363 
   
  Constant                                           -4.67**             1.258                           0.000   
 
     
 Inflated Logit (Certain Zero) 
 
Regime Duration                 0.066**             0.015           0.000 
      
Unemployment                 0.084**             0.026            0.001 
      
State Fragility                -0.308*             0.132            0.020 
      
Full Democracy                -34.81**             2.928            0.000  
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Table 10 Continued. 
         Independent Variable                           Standard Error                             p>z 
        
        Constant  
                      
 -1.96  
                 
1.77 
                
0.269 
 
 
        Num. of Obs.          2767 
      
        Non Zero Obs.          1095 
      
        Zero Obs.          1672 
      
        Wald χ²     229.67** 
      
        LR Test (alpha=0)     2.4e+04** 
      
        Vuong z Test     3.07** 
 
Note: Dep. Variable is the country year counts of domestic terrorist incident.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on country in parentheses. 
Significance Level: († p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01) 
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Table 11. Zero Inflated NB Model with Anocracy 1990-2007 
Independent Variable             Coefficient          Standard Error         p>z 
 
Heterogeneity Cost 0.342* 0.152 0.025 
    
Anocracy -0.457* 0.212 0.031 
    
Trade -0.009** 0.002 0.000 
    
FDI -0.01 0.006 0.144 
    
History 0.04** 0.007 0.000 
    
Log Area 0.144** 0.052 0.006 
    
Log GNI 0.459** 0.135 0.001 
    
Regime Duration -0.003 0.003 0.303 
    
Unemployment 0.01 0.008 0.192 
    
State Fragility 0.092** 0.026 0.000 
    
Urban Population -0.006 0.007 0.384 
    
Constant -4.434** 1.227 0.000 
    
Inflated logit  
(Certain Zero)    
    
Regime Duration 0.072** 0.02 0.001 
    
Unemployment 0.092** 0.031 0.004 
    
State Fragility -0.291* 0.133 0.028 
    
Full Democracy -34.615** 3.074 0.000 
    
Constant -2.564 2.287 0.26 
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         Table 11. Continued. 
         Independent Variable                Coefficient             Standard Error                p>z 
 
                      
No. of Obs.   2767 
    
Non Zero Obs.   1095 
    
Zero Obs.   1672 
    
Wald Chi sq   198.45** 
    
LR Test (alpha=0)   2.30e+04** 
    
Vuong z Test   3.48** 
 
Note: Dep. Variable is the country year counts of domestic terrorist incident.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on country in parentheses.  
Significance Level: († p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01)  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
242 
Table 12. Zero Inflated NB Model with Autocracy 1990-2007 
Independent Variable             Coefficient          Standard Error         p>z 
 
Heterogeneity Cost 0.312* 0.147 0.035 
    
Autocracy 0.202 0.246 0.411 
    
Trade -0.009** 0.002 0.000 
    
FDI -0.009 0.007 0.146 
    
History 0.041** 0.007 0.000 
    
Log Area 0.153** 0.055 0.006 
    
Log GNI 0.478** 0.135 0.000 
    
Regime Duration -0.003 0.003 0.332 
    
Unemployment 0.01 0.008 0.251 
    
State Fragility 0.088** 0.026 0.001 
    
Urban Population -0.006 0.007 0.381 
    
Constant -4.73** 1.292 0.000 
    
Inflated logit  
(Certain Zero)    
    
Regime Duration 0.069** 0.018 0.000 
    
Unemployment 0.092** 0.029 0.001 
    
State Fragility -0.314* 0.134 0.019 
    
Full Democracy -34.99** 3.090 0.000 
    
Constant -2.362 1.988 0.235 
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       Table 12. Continued. 
       Independent Variable                                Standard Error                                p>z 
No. of Obs.    2767 
    
Non Zero Obs.   1095 
    
Zero Obs.   1672 
    
Wald Chi sq   200.03** 
    
LR Test   2.40e+04** 
    
Vuong z Test   3.17** 
 
Note: Dep. Variable is the country year counts of domestic terrorist 
incident.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on country in parentheses.  
Significance Level: († p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01) 
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Table 13. Distribution of Domestic Terrorism-Year (1990-2007) 
REGIME                                                    TERRORISM – YEAR (PER CENT) 
 
 
        
Regime Type             No Terrorism                 Terrorism                                       
   
Autocracy 14.3 7.5 
   
Anocracy 19.3 10.9 
   
Immature Democracy 14.9 13.5 
   
Full Democracy 11.9 7.7 
   
Total 60.4 39.6 
 
            Total Number of Terrorism-Years: 2965 
            Total number of Terrorist Incidents: 22641 
 
Regimes types are categorized on the 21 points combined autocracy- 
democracy score from Polity IV. Those are: Autocracy (-10 through -6),  
Anocracy  (-5 through +5), Immature Democracy (+6 through +9)  
and Full Democracy (+10). 
Source: Enders et. al., (2011); Marshall and Jaggers (2010). 
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Table 14. Heterogeneity Index Model 1990-2007 
Independent Variable             Coefficient          Standard Error         p>z 
 
Heterogeneity Index -0.003 0.004 0.491 
    
Immature Democracy 0.596** 0.167 0.000 
    
Trade -0.01** 0.002 0.000 
    
FDI -0.005 0.004 0.222 
    
History 0.041** 0.007 0.000 
    
Log Area 0.123* 0.054 0.022 
    
Log GNI 0.606** 0.135 0.000 
    
Regime Duration -0.002 0.003 0.495 
    
Unemployment 0.013† 0.008 0.092 
    
State Fragility 0.125** 0.025 0.000 
    
Urban Population -0.006 0.007 0.331 
    
Constant -5.567** 1.193 0.000 
    
Inflated logit  
(Certain Zero)    
    
Regime Duration 0.062** 0.016 0.000 
    
Unemployment 0.084** 0.023 0.000 
    
State Fragility -0.298* 0.128 0.020 
    
Full Democracy -34.14** 3.083 0.000 
    
Constant -1.903 1.528 0.213 
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          Table 14. Continued. 
           Independent variable                       Standard Error                       p>z 
No. of Obs.   2768 
    
Non Zero Obs.   1096 
    
Zero Obs.   1672 
    
Wald Chi sq   238.82** 
    
LR Test (alpha=0)   2.3e+04** 
    
Vuong z Test   3.68** 
 
Note: Dep. Variable is the country year counts of domestic terrorist 
incident.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on country in parentheses.  
Significance Level: († p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01)  
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Table 15. MAR Index Model 1990-2007 
Independent Variable             Coefficient          Standard Error         p>z 
 
Minority at Risk Index 0.403** 0.094 0.000 
    
Immature Democracy 0.470* 0.202 0.020 
    
Trade -0.008** 0.002 0.002 
    
FDI -0.008 0.005 0.174 
    
History 0.036** 0.007 0.000 
    
Log Area 0.141** 0.054 0.002 
    
Log GNI 0.419** 0.141 0.003 
    
Regime Duration -3.61e-06 0.003 0.999 
    
Unemployment 0.015† 0.007 0.060 
    
State Fragility 0.085** 0.022 0.000 
    
Urban Population -0.007 0.007 0.315 
    
Constant -5.062** 1.275 0.000 
    
Inflated logit  
(Certain Zero)    
    
Regime Duration 0.062** 0.016 0.000 
    
Unemployment 0.087** 0.023 0.000 
    
State Fragility -0.284* 0.122 0.020 
    
Full Democracy -35.25** 3.015 0.000 
    
Constant -2.09 1.686 0.215 
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     Table 15. Continued. 
           Independent Variable                          Standard Error                 p>z 
No. of Obs.   2768 
    
Non Zero Obs.   1096 
    
Zero Obs.   1672 
    
Wald Chi sq   250.21** 
    
LR Test (alpha=0)   2.2e+04** 
    
Vuong z Test   3.54** 
 
Note: Dep. Variable is the country year counts of domestic terrorist 
incident.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on country in parentheses.  
Significance Level: († p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01) 
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